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EX I'VE S 
This report presents the final hazard categorization (FHC) for the remediation of the 1 18-D- 1, 
118-D-2, and 118-D-3 Burials Grounds located within the 100-DIDR Area of the Hanford Site 
and the 118-H-1, 118-H-2, and 11 8-H-3 Burial Grounds located within the 100-H Area of the 
Hanford Site. The 1 18-D- 1, 11 8-D-2, and 1 18-D-3 Burial Grounds are located within the 
100-DR-2 Operable Unit, and the 118-H-1, 11 8-H-2, and 118-H-3 Burial Grounds are located 
with the 100-HR-2 Operable Unit. A material at risk calculation was performed that determined 
the radiological inventory for each burial ground to be Hazard Category 3. Because the initial 
hazard categorization was determined to be Hazard Category 3 for each of the sites, the 
development of an FHC was required. This resulted in an FHC of below Category 3 as a result 
of the analysis presented in this document. This FHC determination concludes that no 
activity/process authorized under this FHC could credibly result in undue risk to workers, the 
public, or the environment. 
This analysis includes the following: 
A description of the remediation activities to be performed at the 1 18-D- 1, 1 18-D-2, 
1 18-D-3, 1 18-H- 1, 1 18-H-2, and 1 18-H-3 Burial Grounds 
An assessment of the inventories of radioactive and other hazardous materials within the 
1 18-D- 1, 1 18-D-2, 1 18-D-3, 1 18-H- 1, 1 18-H-2, and 1 18-H-3 Burial Grounds 
Identification of the hazards associated with the remediation activities performed within the 
1 18-D- 1, 1 18-D-2, 1 18-D-3, 1 18-H- 1, 1 18-H-2, and 1 18-H-3 Burial Grounds 
Identification of those accident scenarios with the potential to produce local significant 
consequences during remediation of the 1 18-D- 1, 1 18-D-2, 1 18-D-3, 1 18-H- 1, 1 18-H-2, and 
1 18-H-3 Burial Grounds 
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An FHC based on the physical and chemical form of the radionuclides and the available 
dispersive energy sources for the burial ground and its hazardous materials 
Identification of special controls derived from the assumptions made in the FHC that are 
required to ensure that the FHC remains valid 
Identification of project-specific controls established for the protection of the workers that 
apply specifically to the activity under consideration. 
For hazardous chemicals identified during remediation, the sum of the ratios did not 
exceed 1 (one) for either 29 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 1910.119 or 40 CFR 68.130 
thresholds. The FHC for the 1 18-D- 1, 1 18-D-2, 1 18-D-3, 1 18-H- 1, 1 18-H-2, and 1 18-H-3 
Burial Grounds Remediation Project was determined based on a comparison of the radiological 
material at risk with adjusted DOE-STD- 1027 (DOE 1997) threshold quantities. The Category 3 
threshold quantities were adjusted based on the credible release fractions associated with 
remediation activities. This analysis has determined that the FHC for the 1 18-D- 1, 1 18-D-2, 
1 18-0-3, 1 18-H-1, 1 18-H-2, and 1 18-H-3 Burial Grounds Remediation Project is below 
Category 3 (sometimes referred to as “radiological”). To ensure that the conditions assumed in 
the hazard analysis are maintained, the controls, commitments, and any conditions of approval in 
the safety evaluation report shall be incorporated into the project’s readiness assessment to be 
completed prior to commencement of the work. 
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ALARA 
AOC 
ARF 
CERCLA 
CFR 
DOE 
EPA 
ERDF 
FHC 
FSB 
HMS 
MAR 
ou 
PMII 
PPE 
RadCon 
RA 
RCRA 
as low as reasonably achievable 
area of contamination 
airborne release fraction 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 
Code of Federal Regulations 
U.S. Department of Energy 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility 
final hazard categorization 
Fuel Storage Basin 
Hanford Meteorological Station 
material at risk 
operable unit 
Project Managers' Implementing Instructions 
personal protective equipment 
Radiological Control 
remedial action 
Resource Consewation and Recovery Act of 1976 
RDRRAWP remedial design report/remedial action work plan 
RF release fraction 
ROD Record of Decision 
RV release valve 
SAP sampling and analysis plan 
SNF spent nuclear fuel 
TQ threshold quantity 
Tri-Party 
WCH Washington Closure Hanford 
Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order 
Agreement 
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This document examines the hazards, identifies appropriate controls to manage the hazards, and 
documents the final hazard categorization (FHC) and commitments for the 1 18-D- 1, 1 18-D-2, 
1 18-D-3, 1 18-H- 1, 1 18-H-2, and 1 18-H-3 Burial Grounds Remediation Project. The FHC is 
based on the hazards associated with natural phenomena and remediation activities to be 
conducted at the burial grounds. The remediation activities analyzed in this FHC are those 
described in the Remedial Design Report/Remedial Action Work Plan for the 100 Area 
(RDR/RAWP) (DOE-RL 2005), augmented with those activities associated with the removal, 
packaging, and transport of discovered spent nuclear ftiel (SNF) elements. 
1.1 PURPOSE 
This report accomplishes the following: 
Describes the activities to be performed during remediation of the waste sites addressed by 
this FHC 
Assesses the inventory of radioactive and other hazardous materials associated with the 
1 18-D- 1, 1 18-D-2, 1 18-D-3, 1 18-H- 1, 1 18-H-2, and 1 18-H-3 Burial Grounds 
Identifies internally and externally initiated accident scenarios with the potential to produce 
significant local consequences during remediation of the burial grounds 
Determines an FHC based on a comparison of the material at risk (MAR) with 
DOE-STD- 1027 (DOE 1997) Category 3 threshold quantities (TQs), revised to reflect 
the credible release fractions (RFs) for remediation activities 
Identifies the necessary controls to manage the hazards and to ensure that the FHC remains 
valid. 
NT ORGANIZ~TION 
Section 1.3 describes the project activities that will be authorized by approval of this document. 
Section 1.4 describes how configuration and change control will be managed to maintain 
compliance with the requirements of this document. Section 1.5 summarizes the conclusions and 
project-specific controls. Section 1.6 describes the overall approach used in the FHC process. 
Section 2.0 provides the background information necessary to understand the hazards that have 
potential consequences to workers, the public, or the environment. Section 3.0 provides the basis 
of operations that are analyzed and authorized under the FHC. Section 4.0 identifies the hazards 
present, analyzes the identified hazards, and provides the FHC. Section 5.0 describes special, 
project-specific, and programmatic controls needed to ensure the FHC remains valid and to 
ensure that workers, the public, and the environment are adequately protected from hazards. 
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Appendix A identifies the inventory of hazardous substances, sources of energy, and nonroutine 
hazards unique to the site. Appendix I3 identifies a systematic examination of the hazards that 
could potentially lead to a release of hazardous substances, ranking of events, and administrative 
controls that serve to eliminate or reduce the frequency of these events and to mitigate the 
consequences. Appendix C provides the quantitative accidents analysis, defines the potential 
impacts of the site based on a bounding, unmitigated release of radioactive material, and 
provides the revised TQs, which forrn the basis for the FHC. 
1.3 AUTHORIZED ACTIVITIES 
The scope of this document involves evaluating the hazards associated with the remediation 
activities at the 1 18-D- 1, 1 18-D-2, 1 18-D-3, 1 18-H- 1 , 1 18-H-2, and 1 18-H-3 Burial Grounds. 
The remediation activities include the following general activities, which are further described in 
Section 3.0. 
Excavation of soildsediments, debris, and waste materials (includes field surveys) 
Material handling, sorting, and transportation 
Waste treatment and volume reduction 
Soil and waste characterization and analysis 
Remediation verification 
Identification, characterization, evaluation, accumulation, treatment, and packaging of 
discovered waste anomalies 
SNF characterization, storage, packaging, and transportation 
Spill cleanup 
Decontamination 
Placement of backfill 
Treatment of mercury 
Stabilization of liquids 
Demobilization. 
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1.4 FINAL HAZAR CATEGORIZATION EVALUATION 
Established configuratiodchange control processes are in place that require evaluation of 
proposed changes or discovered conditions that affect the assumptions, controls, or other 
commitments as identified within this FHC. If these commitments are violated, work will cease 
so that stabilization and/or recovery actions may be identified and implemented, as appropriate. 
Washington Closure Hanford (WCH) off-normal event procedures describe the reporting process 
and protocol applicable to such a discovery. NS- 1, Nuclear Safety Manual, NS- 1-2.1, "Hazard 
Categorization," defines the FHC evaluation process for facilities that have an FHC of "below 
Category 3 . ' I  
1.5 SAFETY SUMMARY 
Following a detailed analysis of the potential hazards that could be encountered while 
remediating the burial grounds, it was determined that no activity/process authorized by this 
FHC could credibly result in undue risk to workers, the public, or the environment (see 
Section 4.0). Controls that are special in regard to the assumptions made in the FHC are detailed 
in Section 5.1. Project-specific controls are detailed in Section 5.2, and programmatic controls 
are detailed in Section 5.3. 
1.6 CATEGORIZATION 
The FHC for the remediation of the 1 18-D- 1, 1 18-D-2, 1 18-D-3, 1 18-H- 1, 1 18-H-2, and 
118-H-3 Burial Grounds was determined to be below Category 3 (sometimes referred to as 
radiological). The FHC (Appendix C) for the burial grounds was determined using the total 
radionuclide inventories and the Category 3 TQs from DOE-STD-1027 (DOE 1997) revised to 
reflect credible RFs. 
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INF N 
The 100-D/DR and 100-H Areas are located along the northern boundary of the Hanford Site 
(Figure 2-1), with its northern border delineated by the southern bank of the Columbia River. 
The 100-D/DR Area contains two of Hanford’s surplus nine plutonium production reactors, and 
the 100-H Area contains one of Hanford’s surplus nine plutonium production reactors. Over the 
years, these reactor facilities released liquid effluents to the soil surface, the soil column, and to 
the groundwater. As was the case with all of the reactors, solid wastes from 100-DDR and 
100-H Area operations were deposited in designated burial grounds, such as the 1 18-D- 1, 
118-D-2, and 118-D-3 Burial Grounds located in the 100-DR-2 source operable unit (OU) and 
the 118-H-1, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Burial Grounds located in the 100-HR-2 source OU 
(Figures 2-2 and 2-3). 
Signatories to the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party 
Agreement) (Ecology et al. 19 89) developed a coordinated Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)/Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) site characterization and remediation strategy to comprehensively 
and expeditiously address environmental concerns associated with the Hanford Site. This 
strategy, known as the Hanford Past-Practice Strategy, emphasizes integration of the results of 
ongoing site characterization activities into the decision-making process as soon as practicable 
(a procedure called the “observational approach”) and expedites the remedial action (RA) 
process by emphasizing the use of interim actions. 
Investigation and remediation of the past-practice waste sites is governed by the Tri-Party 
Agreement, initially signed in 1989 by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Washington State Department of 
Ecology. This agreement grouped the waste sites into 78 OUs, each of which was to be 
investigated and remediated separately under the CERCLA program or the RCRA program, 
depending on the designation of the OU. 
Like each of Hanford’s National Priorities List sites, the 100 Area was divided into OUs, which 
are groupings of individual sites based primarily on geographic area and common waste sources. 
Geography also played an important role in the grouping of individual sites into OUs. Because it 
may be difficult to assess the environmental impacts of one site without obtaining information 
about other sites in the vicinity, grouping adjacent sites into OUs allows the impacts of the sites 
to be assessed as a group rather than on an individual basis. 
The Proposed Plan for the 100 Area Burial Grounds Interim Remedial Action (DOE-RL 2000b) 
recommends excavation and disposal of the burial ground debris and soils that are above cleanup 
levels. 
These types of burial grounds received a broad spectrum of chemical and radiological wastes. 
Because of the heterogeneous nature of their contents, these sites have been difficult to 
characterize, and quantitative characterization data are generally not abundant. 
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Figure 2-1. The Hanford Site. 
FHC for the Reinediation of 118-0-1, 118-0-2, 118-0-3, 118-H-I, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Solid Waste Burial Grounds 
April 2007 2-2 
ackground Information 
WCH-50 
Rev. 2 
Figure 2-2. 100-DR-2 Operable Unit. 
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Figure 2-3. 100-HR-2 Operable Unit. 
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Known attributes of the general content burial grounds include the following: 
0 None of the general content burial grounds currently appear to be impacting groundwater. 
0 Waste forms include contaminated trash (soft waste), noncombustible material (e.g., reactor 
internals), equipment, liquids, SNF oxide, SNF metal, soil, and gases, including compressed 
gas cylinders and tritium associated with waste. 
This FHC addresses the activities (e.g., excavation, sampling, sorting, handling, and stabilization 
of liquids; characterization, handling, packaging, and disposition of SNF pieces; aboveground 
interim storage; and surveillance and maintenance of exposed soil and filled containers of waste 
staged at the burial grounds) that are to be used to achieve remediation goals for the waste site, 
the inventories that are anticipated for the site, and the hazards associated with these activities 
and inventories. 
Past excavations at the 100 Area burial grounds have unearthed SNF elements, i.e., 118-B-1 and 
1 18-C- 1. This calculation conservatively assumes a bounding inventory of 25 spent fuel 
elements at each waste site. This number is based on the number of “standard” plutonium 
production elements (25) found during remediation of the 105-F and 105-H Fuel Storage Basins 
(FSBs). 
-1 (100-D Burial Ground Number 1) 
The 11 8-D-1 Burial Ground is an inactive solid waste site that operated from 1944 to 1967. 
The 137- by 114-m (450- by 375-ft) site was located approximately 274 m (900 ft) south of the 
105-DR Building. The burial ground was used to dispose of irradiated reactor parts, dummies, 
thimbles, rods, gun barrels, and other contaminated solid waste. The burial ground contains 
several trenches running north and south, but the exact number is unknown. The trenches were 
91 by 6 by 6 m (300 by 20 by 20 ft) deep with a 6-m (20-ft) space between them. The unit 
received an estimated 10,000 m3 (13,080 yd3) of waste. The burial ground was divided into four 
sections to allow grouping of like waste in each section (Hanford Drawing H-1-4046). 
118-D-2 (100-D Burial Ground Number 2) 
The 118-D-2 Burial Ground is an inactive solid waste site that operated from 1949 to 1970. 
The 305- by 109- by 6-m (1,000- by 357- by ZO-ft)-deep site is located approximately 823 m 
(2,700 ft) southwest of the 105-DR Building. The burial ground was used for disposal of an 
estimated 10,000 m3 (13,080 yd3) of miscellaneous contaminated solid waste, irradiated 
dummies, splines, rods, thimbles, and gun barrels. It is divided into four sections to allow 
grouping of like wastes (Hanford Drawing H-1-4046). 
Beginning in April 1966, 100-N Area low-level radioactive solid wastes were also buried at 
site. The site contains several trenches running east-west (the exact number is unknown) and 
five disposal pits. The trenches are 20 m (66 ft) wide at the surface, 6 m (20 ft) wide at the 
bottom, and 6 m (20 ft) deep. Each trench is composed of two small pits, constructed with 
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railroad ties, with interior dimensions of about 1.8 by 1.8 m (6 by 6 ft), and placed within an 
excavation 7.3 by 7.3 m (24 by 24 ft) deep. All were covered with 1.8 m (6 ft) of soil. Historical 
documents report that there was a fire in this burial ground in March 1958 (GE 1958a). The fire 
was difficult to extinguish and required large volumes of water (several tank truck loads) to put 
out; therefore, contaminants could potentially have been washed to the soil column beneath this 
burial ground. 
Burial Ground Number 3) 
The 118-D-3 Burial Ground is an inactive solid waste site that operated from 1956 to 1973. 
burial ground was located approximately 10’7 m (350 ft) east of the 105-DR Building. Typically, 
trenches were 61 by 6 by 6 m (200 by 20 by 20 ft) deep, and the spacing between trenches was 
not uniform. This burial ground was divided up into five sections to allow grouping of like 
wastes (Hanford Drawing H-1-4046). It also contained a burning pit that was used for the 
disposal of low-level radioactive combustible wastes. The burial ground was used for the 
disposal of miscellaneous contaminated solid wastes and irradiated dummies, splines, rods, 
thimbles, and gun barrels. 
The site was also used for disposal of 100-N solid wastes, extending the eastern boundary. Two 
additional solid waste burial ground sites in or very near this burial ground are considered a part 
of it, these being the Minor Construction burial ground number 2 and the “grave.” The Minor 
Construction burial ground number 2 was a trench dug in 1953 to receive contaminated thimbles, 
rod guides, and miscellaneous waste removed from the 105-DR Reactor during an extended 
Ball 3X shortage. The contaminated wastes were then covered with 1.8 m (6 ft) of dirt. The 
“grave” was a small trench dug in March 1954 to receive effluent water from the number one DR 
west effluent expansion box during repairs. The trench received specific wastes and was covered 
as soon as the waste was received. It is assumed that the trench was dug very near the expansion 
box and should be located in the northwest corner of the burial ground. 
urial Ground Number 1) 
1 18-H- 1 is an inactive mixed solid waste burial site that is recognized as having been the primary 
burial ground for the 100-H Area. It is located approximately 396 m (1,300 ft) southwest of the 
105-H Reactor Building. This site operated from 1949 until 1965 and received an estimated 
10,000 m3 (13,080 yd3) of waste from 100-H Reactor operations. The site received reactor 
process tubing, dummy fuel elements, contaminated lead brick, and other reactor hardware. 
The burial ground was enlarged in 1955. The total dimensions were 213 m (700 ft) long by 
107 m (350 ft) wide and 61 m (200 ft) deep. The numerous trenches in the easdwest-oriented 
burial ground run north to south. Trench layout details may be seen on Hanford Site Drawing 
H-1- 13484. Cross-sectional details and wooden crib design are provided on Hanford Site 
Drawing P-3475. The site is primarily backfilled with 1.8 m (6 ft) of soil cover. Near the 
southwest corner, portions of several horizontal controls rods are buried in slit trenches with 
0.6 to 1.2 m (2 to 4 ft) of soil cover. A fire at the site occurred in October 1960 (GE 1960). 
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118-H-2 (100-H Burial Ground Number 2) (H-1 Loop urial Ground) (P-13 Pit) 
11 8-H-2 is an inactive, solid mixed waste burial ground located approximately 457 m (1,500 ft) 
west of the 105-H Reactor Building. The site operated from 1955 to 1965 to receive a small 
volume of contaminated and activated test material and contaminated pipe. The burial ground 
was about 43 m (140 ft) long, 15.2 m (50 ft) wide, and 4.6 m (15 ft) deep when excavated in 
1955. 
Two concrete vaults were placed in the excavation to receive activated and contaminated 
hardware associated with an experimental reactor test facility, reportedly on behalf of the 
U.S. Navy. The easternmost vault was used for this purpose in 1955 when a test loop, or 
“stainless steel double tube” was transferred from the reactor to this vault for burial after several 
years of irradiation. Additional information on the “P-13” assembly project can be found in the 
Reactor Section, Radiation Monitoring Report for Month of March, 1955 (GE 1955) and , 
Emergency Removal of the KAPL-120 In-Pile Tube (GE 1956). The second vault, constructed in 
1958 to the west of the first vault, was intended for a similar use but was not used in the 
program. A small quantity of contaminated pipe was placed in it at the time of reactor 
deactivation in 1965. Both vaults were filled with gravel and the excavation was backfilled to 
grade. Additional clean soil has since been added to form a berm that rises approximately 0.9 m 
(3 ft) above grade over the burial ground. 
118-H-3 (Construction Burial Ground) 
The 118-H-3 Burial Ground is an inactive solid mixed waste burial ground located 
approximately 244 m (800 ft) southeast of the 105-H Reactor Building. It operated from 1953 to 
1957 and received approximately 3,000 m3 (3,924 yd3) of reactor components and hardware, 
including lengths of contaminated 40.6-cm (16-in.) pipe that were used as chutes for the removal 
of reactor vertical safety rod thimbles and other components from reactor modification programs. 
The burial ground is 91 m (300 ft) long, 61 m (200 ft) wide, and 6 m (20 ft) deep. It consists of 
multiple northhouth running trenches that have been backfilled to grade with approximately 
1.8 m (6 ft) of soil. 
2.1 SITE HISTORY 
From 1943 until 1990, the primary mission of the Hanford Site was to produce nuclear materials 
for the defense of the nation. Waste disposal activities associated with this mission resulted in 
the creation of more than 1,000 past-practice waste sites. The waste sites are contaminated with 
radioactive constituents, chemical constituents, or combinations of both. 
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers established the Hanford Site in 1943, as an integral part of 
the Manhattan Engineering District mission to produce nuclear weapons for use in World War 11. 
The Hanford Site, then referred to as the Hanford Engineer Works, had a specific mission: the I 
production of weapons-grade plutonium to fuel the nation’s nuclear arsenal. This was 
accomplished through a three-step process that involved the manufacturing of fuels in the 
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300 Area, irradiation of fuels in the 100 Area reactors, and the extraction and production of 
plutonium at the chemical separations plants in the 200 Areas. 
Direct land burial in excavated trenches, termed “burial grounds,” was used to dispose of solid, 
low-level radioactive materials associated with reactor operations (e.g., equipment and structural 
debris). Each reactor area (except the 100-N Area) includes burial grounds containing irradiated 
reactor hardware and other solid waste materials incidental to facility operations, mixed with 
soil. Each reactor area also has specialty burial grounds, where wastes from reactor alterations 
or other specific activities (e.g., biological research or facility construction) were disposed. 
During the first 30 years of reactor operations, virtually all of the radioactive wastes were buried 
in the reactor areas where they were generated. However, beginning in 1968, increasing 
amounts of waste were transported to the centrally located 200 Areas for disposal. 
The 100 Area of the Hanford Site were placed on the EPA’s National Priorities List on 
November 3, 1989, under CERCLA. A subset of the Hanford Site waste sites on the National 
Priorities List also falls under the jurisdiction of RCRA. 
2.2 PROJECT DESCRIPTION 
The 1 18-D- 1, 1 18-D-2, 1 18-D-3, 1 18-H- 1, 1 18-H-2, and 1 18-H-3 Burial Ground remediation 
activities described subsequently will remediate the site to meet rural-residential land-use 
requirements. Additional descriptions of the OU and descriptions of the remediation 
methodology are presented in background documents for this project (e.g., 100 Area Burial 
Grounds Focused Feasibility Study [DOE-RL 2000a1, RDRRAWP [DOE-RL 2005a1, and the 
100 Area Burial Grounds Remedial Action Sampling and Analysis Plan [DOE-RL 20011). 
The work scope for RA at the waste sites includes the following: 
Perform all necessary activities to remove, treat (if required), and dispose of contaminated 
soil, liquids, miscellaneous materials, SNF pieces, and piping as specified in Declaration of 
the Record of Decision: U S .  DOE Hanford 100 Area; 100-BC-1, 100-BC-2, 100-DR-1, 
100-DR-2, 100-FR-2, 100-HR-2, 100-KR-2 Operable Units, Hanford Site (1 00 Area Burial 
Grounds), Benton County, Washington (ROD) (EPA 2000). 
Remove and dispose of any below-grade structural material (e.g., spline silos) that interferes 
with RA. 
Backfill the sites consistent with future use. 
Establish necessary interfaces with existing site services (utilities and support personnel) and 
the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (ERDF). 
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0 Material that requires macroencapsulation to meet ERDF waste acceptance criteria will be 
treated at the waste site or at ERDF to meet the criteria and then disposed at ERDF. 
0 Material that does not meet, or cannot be treated to meet, ERDF waste acceptance criteria 
will be treated/disposed at another facility approved by the EPA and the Washington State 
Department of Ecology. 
RA activities for the burial ground will include the following elements: 
Removal and Transfer of Contaminated Concrete Structures to ERDF. Uncontaminated 
concrete may be size reduced and disposed at an onsite demolition debris disposal facility or 
used as a source of backfill. 
Removal and Disposal of Piping. Contaminated piping (e.g., irradiated process tubing) will 
be size reduced and disposed at ERDF. Uncontaminated piping may be size reduced and 
disposed onsite at a demolition debris disposal facility. 
Characterization, temporary storage, packaging, and shipment for transfer of suspect SNF 
pieces if discovered during excavation or sorting activities. 
Removal and Disposal of Contaminated Soil and Debris from Trenches and Silos. The burial 
grounds consist of several separate trenches and silos that contain contaminated debris and 
soil. Contaminated soil and debris will be removed to the bottom of the engineered structure 
(trench or silo). Excavated structural components and debris will be sorted and size reduced 
as required. After being loaded into containers, contaminated soil, debris, and miscellaneous 
materials will be transported to and disposed at ERDF. 
Other activities that may be required during the course of this project include the following: 
Grout Stabilization, Coating, and/or PackagingRepackaging for Radioactive Particulate 
Control andlor Shielding. Grouting may be used to control the spread of radioactive 
particulates or to provide shielding to protect workers. 
Removal and Storage of Dangerous Wastes. Containers or other materials that may contain, 
or consist of, dangerous waste will be removed and placed (staged) in an appropriate waste 
storage location. Sampling and analysis may be required in order to characterize the waste 
for designation and disposal. 
Sampling and Analysis. Sampling and analysis will be conducted to characterize waste 
(including any segregated high-radiation dose anomalies), guide remediation, and verify 
cleanup goals have been achieved. 
Site Backfilling and Regrading. After structures and debris have been removed, the burial 
ground will be backfilled, as required, from a designated borrow source and regraded. 
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Mercury Treatment. Elemental mercury may be treated onsite by amalgamation or other 
treatment prior to packaging and shipment for disposal. Any mercury-contaminated soils and 
other mercury-contaminated materials (e.g., spill cleanup materials) will be treated onsite or 
offsite, as appropriate. 
Characterization, Handling, Storage, Treatment, and Disposal of Liquids. Liquids will be 
identified, characterized, and evaluated, as necessary, on a case-b y-case basis for storage, 
treatment, and disposal. 
Piercing (pressure relief) of compressed gas cylinders. 
Certain site-specific factors influence the extent of remediation required at the waste sites. These 
waste sites will require selective excavation and removal of contaminated soil/debris that have 
concentrations above ROD cleanup requirements. 
Soils will be removed from areas identified by sampling and analysis to be contaminated above 
cleanup limits. Survey results will be used to verify that the excavated material meets the 
requirements of the ERDF waste profile, which has been established to ensure compliance with 
that facility’s waste acceptance criteria. 
Soil or material treatment (e.g., macroencapsulation), if required, may be performed by the 
remediation subcontractor but will be addressed on a case-by-case basis as a separate work 
scope. Groundwater remediation is being performed under a different program within DOE. 
Site revegetation will be performed under a separate subcontract to be awarded after the RA 
work is complete. 
This remediation project supports the future vision for the 100 Area, which includes accelerated 
RAs that will allow for potential economic development by local citykounty governments, and 
the private sector. The 100 Area source OUs will be remediated to meet rural-residential 
land-use requirements. 
2.3 S E G ~ N T ~ T ~ O N  
No segmentation within a burial ground was applied in the determination of the FHC. Each 
burial ground is treated as an individual facility because the distance between them precludes 
bringing hazardous material from different facilities together or causing harmful interaction from 
a common severe phenomenon. 
FHC for the Remediatiorz of 118-0-1, 118-0-2, 118-0-3, 118-1-1-1, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Solid Waste Burial Grourzds 
April 2007 2- 10 
Background InfQrrnatiQn 
WCH-50 
Rev. 2 
2.4 ~EMOGRAPHIC§ 
Population size and distribution are important criteria to assess the magnitude of risk to the 
public from radiological releases. The cities of Desert Aire, Mattawa, and Othello are the closest 
populated areas. From the 100-D Area to Desert Air, Mattawa, and Othello, the distances are 
30.97,32.53 and 39.41 km, (19,20, and 24 mi) respectively. From the 100-H Area to 
Desert Aire, Mattawa, and Othello, it is 24.75, 26.31 and 35.29 km (15, 16, and 22 mi), 
respectively. 
Approximately 376,000 people lived within a 50-mile radius of the Hanford Meteorological 
Station (HMS) in 1990. As of 1999, about 17,000 people were employed on DOE-related 
projects at the Hanford Site. 
Recreationists, consisting of hunters, fishermen, boaters, and off-road sports enthusiasts, enjoy 
activities throughout various parts of the area in proximity to the Hanford Site. The primary 
fishing season is June through November; the main hunting season is from October through 
January. The Columbia River, which is adjacent to the 100-DR-2 and 100-HR-2 OUs, is used 
for recreation and is open to the public. The heaviest use of the area by recreationists is on 
weekends and holidays, usually in the early morning. On average, 50 fishermen and 10 hunters 
are present east of the Columbia River during the weekdays. These numbers increase to about 
100 fishermen and 50 hunters on weekends and holidays. 
2.5 SITE LOCATION 
The 100-DR-2 and 100-HR-2 OUs are located on the Hanford Site, which is situated in the 
southeast portion of Washington State (Figure 2-1). The Hanford Site is located within Grant, 
Benton, and Franklin Counties. The 100-DR-2 and 100-HR-2 OUs are located on the south bank 
of the Columbia River, in the 100 Area, which is in the northernmost portion of the Hanford Site. 
Figures 2-2 and 2-3 show the applicable burials grounds and the surrounding features for the 
100-D/DR Area and 100-H Area, respectively. 
2.6 POPULATI I§TRI~UTION 
Approximately 60 individuals will work on the 1 18-D- 1, 1 18-D-2, and 1 18-D-3 Burial Grounds 
Remediation Project and another 60 on the 118-H- 1, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Burial Grounds 
Remediation Project. The bounding, unmitigated release that forms the basis for the FHC of the 
1 18-D- 1, 1 18-D-2, 1 18-D-3, 1 18-H- 1, 1 18-H-2, and 1 18-H-3 Burial Grounds Remediation 
Projects represents exposure to the maximally-exposed individual 30 m (98 ft) from the release. 
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2.7 SITE FEATURES 
This section contains information on the meteorological and geological characteristics of the 
area. 
2.7.1 Meteorology and Climate 
Temperature extremes vary from -29 "C to 46 "C (-20.20 OF to 114.8 OF) on the Hanford Site as 
reported in the Hanford Site Climatological Data Summary 2004 With Historical Data 
(Hoitink et al. 2005). Climatological data are available from the HMS (which is located between 
the 200 East and 200 West Areas on the Hanford Site) and from the 300 Area meteorological 
station. The HMS has collected data since 1945. Appendix A addresses the potential effects 
associated with exposure to heatkold extremes. 
2.7.2 Precipitation 
Precipitation that infiltrates through the ground (i.e., recharge) has the potential to carry 
contaminants through the soil to the groundwater and the river. Average annual precipitation on 
the Hanford Site is 16 cm (6 in.). In 1995, the wettest year on record, 31.3 cm (12 in.) of 
precipitation was measured; in the driest year, 1976, only 7.6 cm (3 in.) was measured. Most 
precipitation occurs during the winter, with more than half of the annual amount occurring from 
November through February. Appendices A and B assess the potential effects associated with 
internal flooding and flooding caused by a probable maximum flood. 
January is the wettest month, with an average of nearly 100 hours of precipitation, producing just 
over 2.3 cm (0.9 in.) of water. Days with greater than 1.3 cm (0.5 in.) of precipitation occur less 
than 1% of the year (Hoitink et al. 2005). Appendix A evaluates water intrusion during 
remediation project activities. Topography within the 100 Areas is generally flat, gently sloping 
toward the Columbia River, with no obvious drainage channels. The flat topography, the lack of 
well-defined drainages, and the arid to semi-arid climate suggest that little (if any) surface water 
would accumulate within the site. 
Mean annual run-off from the Pasco Basin is approximately 3% of the total precipitation. The 
remaining precipitation is assumed lost through evapotranspiration, with less than 1 % recharging 
the groundwater system as reported in Consultation Draft: Site Characterization Plan, 
Reference Repository Location, Hanford Site, Washington (DOE 1988). The Estimated 
Recharge Rates at the Hanford Site (Fayer and Walters 1995) estimated recharge at the 
100-F Area as high as 55.4 m d y r  (2.2 in./yr) on disturbed, nonvegetated sites with Rupert 
sands. The presence of shrub-steppe and cheatgrass vegetation reduces infiltration. At a 
recharge rate of 55.4 mm/yr (2.2 in./yr), precipitation would take about 28 years to travel 7.6 m 
(25 ft). 
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2.7.3 Prevailing Winds 
Historical meteorological data indicate that the prevailing winds align themselves with the 
Columbia River, traveling predominantly from the west and west-northwest. The wind speed 
averages 10 to 12 km/hr (6.2 to 7.4 m a r )  in winter and 13 to 17 krn/hr (8 to 10.5 mi/hr) in 
summer. The strongest winds are generally southwesterly, with speeds up to 130 krnhr 
(80.7 mihr). More than 90% of the southwesterly winds exceed 30 km/hr (18.6 mdhr). The 
daily average wind speed at the 100 Area ranges from 8 to 16 km/hr (5 to 10 mihr). 
High winds are likely to occur during site remediation activities. In the summer, high-speed 
winds from the southwest cause most of the dust storms. There is a remote possibility that high 
winds may also cause airborne missiles (e.g., scrap wood and miscellaneous items at the site). 
Blowing dust occurs at wind speeds higher than 30 km/hr (18.6 mihr) in areas with limited 
ground cover and low moisture content. An average of eight dust storms per year is recorded at 
the HMS. A storm generally lasts just over 3 hours; however; durations of 18 hours have been 
documented. The maximum wind gust recorded at 15 m (49 ft) above ground surface at the 
HMS was 128 km/hr (79.5 mi/hr) (Hoitink et al. 2005). Apeak gust of 138 km/hr (85.7 mi/hr) 
was calculated with a 100-year return period. The return period for gusts of 113 km/hr 
(70.2 mihr) is 10 years (Stone et al. 1983). 
2.7.4 Weather Phenomena 
At the Hanford Site, dust storms are a severe weather phenomenon that occur most frequently 
and have the greatest potential effect. 
A severe tornado of the midwestern type is highly unlikely because of the Pacific Northwest’s 
climatologic and topographic conditions. Only two tornado funnel clouds and one small tornado 
(June 1948) have been observed within the Hanford Site in the 34-year period between 1945 and 
1978. On average, Washington State experiences just over one tornado each year. The 
probability of a tornado striking a point at the Hanford Site is estimated to be 9.6 by 
year. As stated in the Final Environmental Impact Statement, Disposal of Hanford Defense 
High-Level, Transuranic and Tank Wastes (DOE 1987), tornadoes are infrequent and generally 
small in the northwest portion of the United States. 
per 
Washington State has an annual mean number of thunderstorm days of 10, which is considered to 
be relatively low (IEEE 1991). Thunderstorms occur most frequently from April to September. 
Lightning strikes in the summer occasionally have ignited range fires in the Hanford Site region. 
The 11 8-D- 1, 11 8-D-2, 11 8-D-3, 11 8-H- 1, 11 8-H-2, and 11 8-H-3 Burial Grounds are situated 
within the Columbia River drainage basin. Two major rivers within the Columbia River drainage 
basin border the Hanford Site: the Columbia and Yakima Rivers. 
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The following information on groundwater is provided primarily in the context of whether the 
water table might reach the bottom of the burial grounds and potentially leach contaminants from 
the buried materials. Groundwater in the unconfined aquifer at the Hanford Site generally flows 
from recharge areas in the elevated region near the western boundary of the Hanford Site, 
towards discharge areas along the Columbia River. The approximate distance from the bottom 
of the burial grounds to the highest recorded groundwater level ranges from 8 to 27 m (26.2 to 
88.5 ft). 
The release of contaminants to the vadose zone and migration to the aquifer is not a likely 
scenario at most solid waste burial grounds, because (1) they received mostly irradiated solid 
wastes that are not subject to leaching, and (2) evapotranspiration rates are so high that little 
precipitation is available to pass through the burial grounds and carry contaminants to the vadose 
zone. Based on the sources of contamination and the viable contaminant release/transport 
mechanisms, the potentially contaminated media are (in order of likelihood of occurrence and 
predominance of material) hard wastes, soils, soft wastes, air, biota, and groundwater. The 
maximum floods on record occurred in 1894 and 1948, with peak flows at the Hanford Site 
estimated at 21,000 m3/s (27,468 yd3/s) and 20,000 m3/s (26,160 yd3/s), respectively in the 
Hanford Site National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Characterization (Neitzel 1997). 
These floods occurred before the Priest Rapids Dam and several other upriver dams had been 
constructed. 
The flow regulation resulting from the upriver dams significantly lessens the projected intensity 
of the potential 1,000-year flood to about 12,400 m3/s (16,219 yd3/s). The regulated flood of 
1997 was just under this level. Thus, a 1,000-year flood would not inundate any of the reactor 
areas or burial grounds as stated in the Draft Hanford Remedial Action Environmental Impact 
Statement and Comprehensive Land Use Plan (DOE 1996b) because of the regulated flows. 
Neitzel(l997) also discusses a potential flood caused by a 50% breach of the Grand Coulee 
Dam, caused by sabotage or war. This breach would cause a flow estimated at 600,000 m3/s 
(784,800 yd3/s) and would cause significant flooding, including (for the Hanford Reach area) the 
remainder of the 100 Areas, West Lake and Gable Mountain Pond, the 300 Area, and nearly all 
of Richland, Washington (DOE 1996b). The potential effects from this scenario on waste sites 
have not been considered further because “. . .a breach under these conditions would indicate an 
emergency situation in which there might be other overriding major concerns” (Neitzel 1997). 
2.7.6 Geology and Seismology 
The Hanford Site lies within the Columbia Intermontane Province, which is bordered on the 
north and east by the Rocky Mountains, on the west by the Cascade Range, and on the south by 
the Basin and Range Province. The dominant geological characteristics of the Columbia 
Intermontane Province have resulted from flood basalt volcanism and deformation processes. 
FHC for the Remediation of 118-D-1, 118-0-2, 118-0-3, 118-H-I, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Solid Waste Burial Grounds 
April 2007 2- 14 
ackground Information 
WCH-50 
Rev. 2 
The geologic structure beneath the 100 Area is similar to much of the Hanford Site, which 
consists of three distinct levels of soil formations. The deepest level is a series of basalt flows 
that have warped and folded over time. The top level is also a basalt layer, the top of which 
ranges in elevation from 46 m (150 ft) below sea level, to 64 m (210 ft) below sea level. The 
middle layer, known as the Ringold Formation, consists of silt, gravel, and sand. 
The Hanford Site is Seismic Design Criteria Category C, as defined by the International 
Building Code (IBC 2000). Earthquake records for the Pacific Northwest extend to the 1850s. 
A network of seismographs was installed on the Columbia Plateau in 1969 (DOE 1989). Slope 
subsidence is the most likely result of seismic activity at a particular excavated burial ground. 
Seismic activity and related phenomena are not anticipated to result in significant radiological 
consequences to workers and the public because of the low energy of anticipated seismic activity 
and the form and distribution of the hazardous substances. In addition, it is not anticipated that 
multiple accident events would be initiated (similar to what may occur at a facility) as a result of 
a seismic event at the burial grounds. 
The stratigraphic record in the Pasco Basin suggests that tephra is the only primary product of 
Cascade Range volcanism that may reach the Pasco Basin during the next 10,000 years. During 
the May 18, 1980, eruption of Mount St. Helen’s, about 7.6 mm (0.3 in.) of ash was deposited at 
the HMS tower. In the first 9 hours following the eruption, about 1 mm (0.04 in.) of 
uncompacted ash was recorded at the Energy Northwest Plant 2 meteorological station. The 
Hanford Site was not in the main path of the ash cloud. 
2.7.7 Local Ecology 
A species of concern near the 100-H Area is the federally protected bald eagle with restrictions 
around established roosting sites from November 15 through March 15. Established bald eagle 
roosting and nesting sites are found near the 100-H and 100-F Areas, but the 1 18-D- 1, 1 18-D-2, 
1 18-D-3, 1 18-H- 1, 1 18-H-2, and 1 18-H-3 Burial Grounds are not within the 800-m (2,625-ft) 
buffer zone established to protect the eagles. 
2.8 ADJACENT FACILITI 
It is unlikely that any accidents specific to facilities outside of the 100-DR-2 or 100-HR-2 OUs 
(e.g., explosions and spills) will impact the 1 18-D- 1, 1 18-D-2, 1 18-D-3, 1 18-H- 1, 1 18-H-2, and 
118-H-3 Burial Grounds MAR due to significant distances between this OU and surrounding 
facilities. The most probable impacts would be a release of inventory from a nearby facility due 
to an accident or a fire. No activities are being carried out at the 118-D-1, 118-D-2, 118-D-3, 
11 8-H-1, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Burial Grounds that would be adversely impacted if an 
evacuation were required. A release of inventory from a nearby facility would not interact with 
the MAR at the remediation sites, resulting in new accident scenarios. A fire resulting from an 
accident at an adjacent facility is bounded by the high-wind scenario evaluated in Section 4.0. 
Therefore, based on the above discussion, no significant adverse impacts on the remediation site 
would occur from other projects within the Hanford Site. 
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3. 
The ROD for the 100 Area OU (EPA 2000) directs DOE to perform remediation activities at 
selected waste sites located within the OU. These activities include selective excavation of soils 
contaminated above cleanup levels, as well as excavation of wastes (e.g., drums and debris) from 
former process waste sites that were primarily used to dispose of liquid and solid waste streams 
originating from the reactor operations in the 100 Areas. 
Work on the 100-DDR and 100-H Burial Sites will be performed as two separate projects, but 
the work scope will be performed in the same manner. 
The RDR/RAWP governs the implementation of the RA process required by the ROD. The 
expected activities that will be performed at the burial grounds are fully described in the 
RDR./RAWP (DOE-RL 2005). 
3.1 PROJECT ACTIVITIES 
The remediation of the burial grounds is divided into separate subactions/activities: 
(1) mobilization; (2) project readiness; (3) excavation; (4) waste treatment; ( 5 )  volume reduction; 
(6) required treatment; (7) anomalous waste segregation; (8) characterization; (9) stabilization; 
(10) material handling and transportation; (1 1) soil/debris characterization and waste 
designation; ( 12) characterization of suspect SNF, temporary storage, packaging, and 
transportation for transfer of SNF pieces; (13) decontamination; (14) drummed waste 
characterization; (15) drummed waste stabilization; (16) waste transport, (17) close-out sampling 
and surveying; and (1 8) demobilization. Each activity is described in the following subsections. 
Dust suppression is discussed in Section 3.20. Operational systems are discussed in 
Section 3.21. 
3.2 ~ O B I ~ I Z A T I O ~  
Mobilization involves the establishment of the infrastructure that is needed to support the 
conduct of remediation and typically includes the following activities: 
Construction of access or haul roads 
Installation or relocation of electrical utilities (may include diesel- or gasoline-fueled 
electrical generators) 
Installation of personnel changing/shower/personal protective equipment (PPE), lunchroom, 
and administrative facilities (typically portable trailers), and weigh station 
Siting of radiological survey tent (possibly including propane heaters and small propane 
storage tanks), decontamination facility, container transfer area, area of contamination 
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(AOC) boundary, contaminated material staging pile area (including run-onlrun-off control), 
and clean overburden storage pile areas 
Staging of earthmoving or other heavy equipment (including water trucks) and diesel and 
gasoline fuel storage tankshefueling area 
Staging of maintenance equipment, including lubricating oils, hydraulic fluids, flammable 
material storage aredcabinets, and welding and cutting torch cylinder storage areas 
Establishing radiologicalhygiene monitoring areas (air monitors, portal monitors, step-off 
pads, boundaries, posting) 
Establishing sample storage areas 
Obtaining excavation permit in accordance with Hanford Site procedures 
3.3 PROJECT READINESS 
WCH procedures will determine the level of project readiness evaluation that will be needed to 
start operations. The project readiness evaluation, if needed, will determine if project operations 
can safely be initiated and that all regulatory, work implementing, and subcontractual 
documentation have been approved. 
3.4 EXCAVATION 
Equipment required to support the work activities at the burial grounds would be evaluated to 
ensure that any critical assumptions identified within the FHC are not affected. The initial 
remedial investigation activities have been completed. Areas with known contamination are 
excavated to a predetermined depth with the appropriate surveys being conducted. 
Field screening will be ongoing throughout the excavation phase. Contaminated materials will 
be placed into transfer containers for shipment to ERDF or other disposal sites or will be interim 
stored in the case of some drums. The uncontaminated soils will be stockpiled for site backfill 
when all of the contaminated materials have been removed. The contaminated debris will be cut 
or compacted, as necessary, and placed into transfer boxes for shipment to ERDF. 
Visible dust emissions from the sites are not permitted. Active excavations shall use water or 
other methods, as approved, for dust control in accordance with agreements between the DOE, 
Richland Operations Office, EPA, and the Washington State Department of Health. Water usage 
for dust control shall be minimized to protect against contaminant migration. Crusting agents or 
fixants shall be applied to any disturbed portion of the contamination area that will be inactive 
for more than 24 hours. Material to be disposed at ERDF shall also comply with the moisture 
content and other applicable requirements of the ERDF waste acceptance criteria. 
FHC for  the Remediation of 118-0-1, 118-0-2, 118-0-3, 118-H-1, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Solid Waste Burial Grounds 
April 2007 3-2 
per at ions 
WCH-50 
Rev. 2 
Materials that do not meet the ERDF waste acceptance criteria will typically be placed in a 
storage area within the AOC or staging pile area, pending treatment and/or identification of an 
alternate disposal method or until waivers are granted. Contaminated soils that exceed the ERDF 
waste acceptance criteria are bounded by the soil inventory identified in Appendix C. 
3 5  WASTE TIREAT 
Waste that requires treatment prior to disposal at ERDF will be retained within the approved 
onsite area or transported to ERDF pending treatment and disposal at ERDF. Waste pending 
treatment and disposal at ERDF may be held in specified locations at ERDF on a case-by-case 
basis with regulatory, procedural, and functional approval. Waste that requires a treatment not 
currently available at ERDF will be treated onsite, transported to Central Waste Complex or 
shipped offsite for treatment and/or disposal in accordance with regulatory approval. 
Soils contaminated with chemicals at levels exceeding waste disposal acceptance criteria would 
be treated by fixativeslsolidificatiodstabilization or other appropriate treatment technology. 
Solidification and stabilization are treatment technologies designed to reduce contaminant 
solubility, mobility, and toxicity through chemical or physical changes. Typical solidification 
and stabilization agents include cement-based materials, clays, asphalt, and resins (e.g., epoxies). 
Contaminated soil and/or contaminated products treated to meet applicable treatment standards 
would be disposed in the same manner as other materials that meet waste acceptance criteria 
without treatment. 
The selected remedy (in accordance with the ROD) is currently to remove, treat (if required), and 
dispose. For purposes of the design basis, “treatment as required” has two main components: 
(1) treatment to reduce waste volume, thereby lowering remediation costs, and (2) treatment as a 
regulatory requirement (e.g., dangerous waste). 
Waste volume reduction practices, such as minimizing cross-contamination during RA or 
segregation of clean overburden from contaminated materials, will be implemented where 
feasible. 
Treatment of soils may be required, based on state dangerous and federal hazardous waste 
regulations established in Washington Administrative Code 173-303- 140 and 40 Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR) 268. 
The treatment requirements for dangerous waste will not be developed as a part of remedial 
design. However, dangerous waste may be encountered. Dangerous waste will be collected in 
the AOC, staging piles within the onsite area, or stored in containers that meet the substantive 
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requirements of the regulations. Substantive requirements for staging piles are developed on a 
case-by-case basis, subject to approval by the regulatory authority. Once dangerous waste is 
confirmed, an appropriate treatment plan will be initiated that considers waste type(s) 
encountered, anticipated waste volumes, and associated treatment economics. 
3.8 ANOMALOUS WASTE 
Anomalous waste (i.e., waste that needs to be set aside for characterization and/or treatment) will 
be set aside in staging piles or containers. Unknown anomalous waste will be characterized 
more extensively through a combination of field screening or analytical laboratory 
characterization, using a graded approach as described in the sampling and analysis plan (SAP). 
3.9 LIMITE ARACT~RIZATION 
Additional field investigation activities may include test pit excavation, field radiological testing, 
and collectiodanalysis of samples. Findings from the field investigations will be evaluated and 
incorporated through a revision of this document or internal office memoranda, as needed. 
3.10 STABILIZATION 
Some waste materials may require stabilization to maintain worker exposure to airborne 
contaminants and/or direct radiation as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). Stabilization 
methods may include the use of grouts to encapsulate particulates and/or to provide shielding. 
Other methods of fixing contamination such as coatings or expandable foams may also be 
considered. Exposed soil surfaces will be stabilized through the application of soil fixatives if 
the site is to be left unattended for greater than 24 hours or the meteorological forecast includes a 
high-wind warning (see Section 3.20). 
3.11 MATERIAL ANDLING AN TRANSPORTATION 
Material-handling and transportation activities will be performed inside the remediation site 
boundaries. Contaminated materials are loaded into the shipping containers (provided by the 
ERDF) and moved by haul truck to the survey station. At the survey station, the loaded shipping 
containers are surveyed to verify that the outside is free of radiological contamination. If clean, 
the containers are moved to the transfer station where an ERDF haul truck picks up the 
container. When necessary, decontamination will be conducted in accordance with Section 3.14. 
Transportation to the disposal facility is provided by ERDF personnel. The project and ERDF 
personnel ensure that all appropriate shipping requirements, including use of appropriate 
shipping containers and labeling, are met. Containerized waste may also be temporarily stored at 
the waste site to accommodate surveying and loading schedules. 
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Certain bulky items that exceed the capacity of standard ERDF containers (e.g., large metal 
objects, piping, concrete sections) may be size reduced, packaged, and shipped in accordance 
with the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility Waste Acceptance Criteria (B HI 2002b) 
and the Supplemental Waste Acceptance Criteria for Bulk Shipment to the Environmental 
Restoration Disposal Facility (BHI 200%) with specified criteria and procedures. Shipment of 
U.S. Department of Transportation hazardous materials will comply with 49 CFR or will require 
safety documentation demonstrating an equivalent degree of safety. 
3.12 SOILDEBRIS CHARACTERI~ATION AND WASTE DESIGNATION 
The extent of radiological contaminants will be monitored onsite using a combination of 
hand-held and fixed-mounted sodium iodide detectors. Additional alpha, beta, and gamma 
detectors may be used as determined by the project radiological engineer or the SAP. These 
detectors will be used to guide excavation in accordance with the observational approach to 
remediation. The contaminant data will be entered into appropriate databases and used for 
guiding remedial excavation, packaging the waste, adjusting waste profiles, and providing 
backup data to support completion of waste tracking forms. 
Chemical characterization data will be obtained by discrete samples of soil and debris in 
accordance with the S A P  with analysis provided by a contract laboratory. The laboratory will 
follow protocols provided in Test Methods for Evaluating Solid Waste: PhysicaKhemical 
Methods, SW-846 (EPA 1995). Laboratory results will be entered into a database to support RA 
site closeout decisions and contaminated waste disposal. Chemical field screening methods may 
be used and will follow methods specified in WCH procedures or other methods specified in the 
SAP. Details of the characterization requirements are described in the data quality objective 
summary report/SAP. 
3.13 SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL PIECES 
During normal remedial activities conducted at the burial ground sites, initial visual screening of 
waste debris for anomalies will be conducted within the site. The waste debris will be moved to 
the sorting area for fkther sorting. Additional visual and radiological sorting will be conducted 
in the sorting area when spoils are handled to facilitate further inspection of the waste debris for 
any additional anomalies. Specific procedures for radiological screening for the SNF pieces 
have been incorporated into burial ground work instructions. The key elements of the sorting 
process as it relates to SNF are identified in Section 5.0, “Controls and Commitments.’’ The 
expected radiological monitoring readings from SNF pieces are based upon the sorting processes 
and potential fuel expected to be found. Any SNF discovered during radiological surveys will be 
segregated in the sorting area as a high-radiation dose anomaly. The maximum number of fuel 
elements allowed for storage at any time shall comply with the requirements as specified within 
Section 5.0, “Controls and Commitments.” Placement of high-dose anomalies will then be 
placed in a shielded location within the sorting area (e.g., a bunker built with concrete ecology 
blocks). 
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High-dose rate anomalies that conform to the physical characteristics of SNF are considered 
suspect SNF. Suspect SNF will be located within the shielded location and managed to the 
requirements as specified in Section 5.0, “Controls and Commitments.” Suspect SNF is then 
characterized within the sorting area to determine if each suspect anomaly is (confirmed) SNF. 
Characterization activities can include washing, weighing, measuring, gamma spectroscopy, and 
other examinations. If the anomaly is determined to be SNF, the type or model of reactor fuel 
will be determined, if possible. 
Any discovered SNF is also managed and controlled in accordance with the requirements of the 
safeguards and security plan within the sorting area, until the SNF is packaged onsite and 
transported offsite. Packaging activities can include weighing and other characterization 
activities and packaging into an appropriate shipping container (e.g., PAS- 1 cask). 
3.14 DECONTA 
Decontamination will occur at the waste site, the survey station, or a decontamination station. 
If minor contamination is found on the outside of shipping containers at the survey station, it will 
be cleaned at the waste site or survey station. If major contamination is found, the container will 
be routed to the waste site or a decontamination station for cleaning. Following 
decontamination, the shipping container will then be returned to the survey station to ensure that 
the outside of the container is free of removable contamination. A decontamination station may 
also be used to remove contamination from equipment and materials upon completion of RAs. 
Equipment and materials exiting waste site contamination areas or surface contamination areas 
may be decontaminated at the waste site. 
Rinsate will not be collected when decontamination occurs within the waste site. Any rinsate 
collected at the decontamination facility washdown pad (primarily expected to be used for 
decontaminating haul trucks and containers) will be pumped to a trailer-mounted tank and held 
there pending further processing. If the decontamination fluid is found to be above purgewater 
acceptance criteria levels, the rinsate will be transferred to tanker trucks and transported to the 
200 Area Effluent Treatment Facility. 
3.15 DRU ARACTERIZATION 
Drummed waste, particularly radiologically contaminated drummed waste, is not expected to be 
exhumed from these sites. However, if such waste is found, the drums will be sampled to 
characterize their contents. The remediation of the burial grounds shall implement the applicable 
drum handling plan for any drummed waste found in the 118-D-1, 118-D-2, 11 8-D-3, 118-H-1, 
1 18-H-2, and 1 18-H-3 Burial Grounds. 
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RUNIiYED WASTE S 
Burial ground remediation will follow the drum handling plan to stabilize any drummed waste, if 
such waste is found at the site. Field instructions shall discuss fire protection, health and safety 
requirements, administrative controls, and contingency plans. 
Activities to be conducted when stabilizing the drums include the following: 
Initial drum inspection 
Drum relocation and repackaging 
Drum access 
0 Stabilization 
0 Stabilized interim storage. 
The project may store the excavated drums at other parts of the OU (rather than at the waste site) 
during remediation. If AOCs are established at other parts of the OU, an evaluation will be made 
to determine if there are any impacts to this FHC. The same fire protection measures that are in 
place during drum characterization will be in place during drum stabilization. 
3.17 WASTE TRANSPORTATION 
The transport of contaminated material requires reusable containers to be filled at the excavation 
site, surveyed and decontaminated, if required, taken to a storage area, and then hauled to ERDF 
for unloading. Transportation will be performed in accordance with WCH procedures and 
subcontract documents. 
Based on its ability to satisfy the basic functional criteria, as well as its adaptability to large or 
small waste sites, the typical ERDF transport container will be used as the design basis for 
handling contaminated soils and debris. To fulfill their intended purpose, the containers satisfy 
the following requirements: 
0 Containers are of steel construction, lined with a minimum 0.15-mm (6-mil)-thick 
form-fitting removable plastic liner. The liner shall be sized to fit inside the container, to be 
folded over, and to completely surround the maximum container load. 
0 Containers are similar to roll-ordroll-off type with open top. 
0 Container payload is up to 22.7 metric tons (25 short tons) 
e Pieces of SNF will be segregated from the low-level wastes and prepared for shipment to the 
appropriate facility . 
3.18 CLOSEOUT SAMPLING AND SURVEYING 
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Closeout sampling and surveying will be conducted after all contaminated soil and debris has 
been removed from the burial ground pits and trenches. The purpose of the closeout sampling is 
to provide a reasonable level of confidence that the RA goals have been met. At a minimum, 
four composite samples, or as required by the SAP, will be collected and analyzed for each 
unique set of contaminants of concern depending on the burial grounds specific waste streams 
and dimens ions. 
3.19 DEMOBILIZA 
Two methods of demobilization can occur during the remediation of the burial grounds: 
(1) demobilization from the waste site before closeout (where closeout is defined as the 
completion of all stabilization activities, such that the site can be unmanned), and (2) final site 
closeout followed by demobilization of the waste site. 
Demobilization from the waste site (before closeout) typically consists of the following 
activities : 
0 Excavated materials that have previously been determined to be stable are configured to 
minimize releases of inventory (e.g., dry overpacked) and are staged onsite. These activities 
will be ongoing during the remediation process. 
0 General backfilling and regrading may be performed to prevent surface ponding if 
precipitation occurs. 
A crusting agent is applied to all soil surfaces and stockpiles to provide dust control during 
the period of inactivity. 
Prior to closeout, the waste site will be evaluated by appropriate site and safety personnel to 
determine what activitieslactions are required to place the site in a condition that meets any 
controls identified in the authorization basis. 
The accident scenarios evaluated in Section 4.7 bound any accidents that might impact the site 
after it has been demobilized (prior to closeout). Activities involved with demobilization of a 
waste site after closeout will consist of decontaminating equipment, as well as those activities 
associated with the removal of fencing and boundary barriers. 
3.20 DUST S ~ P ~ E S S ~  
Two methods of dust suppression may be used for the remediation of the burial grounds. The 
first method is water application. Water is generally applied at the excavation dig face, on haul 
roads, parking lots, etc., whenever dust can be generated during the project. The second method 
is the use of crusting agents. A fixative (crusting agent) will be applied to a dig face before 
periods of inactivity longer than 24 hours when sustained wind speeds over 32.2 kmhr 
(20 mi/hr) are forecasted for the 100 Area. 
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The project will receive daily weather forecasts from the HMS, which will provide the predicted 
sustained wind velocity forecasts. Decisions to apply crusting agents will be based on these 
forecasts. In addition, the project will be on the call list for weather advisories and will use those 
reports for decision making. 
3.21 OPERATIONAL SYSTEMS 
Remediation of the burial grounds will use water to provide dust suppression during remediation 
activities. The project has two water supply sources: (1) raw river water fill stations in the 
100 Area located near the river and (2) potable water fill stations installed at the project. 
The potable water supply is not at risk of contamination from the excavation site. Potable water 
is trucked to the site for sanitary use. Potable water is not used for dust suppression. 
The dust suppression water trucks are filled through an air gap between the tank and the fill line. 
The water line also has a double check valve to prevent any backflow into the raw water system. 
The water truck may travel down haul roads within radiological buffer areas to spray the roads 
within the waste sites. Upon exiting the radiological buffer area, the water truck may be 
surveyed for contamination. The water truck will be surveyed when leaving a radiological buffer 
area for contamination control but will not be surveyed when leaving a radiological buffer area 
for dose control. 
The project will have at least one water truck onsite to apply water. Water is applied where 
appropriate, using truck nozzles, sprinkler systems, and fire hoses. Pipes may be used to direct 
water flow onsite. 
Crusting agents will be stored onsite. The agent will be mixed with water in the water trucks 
before application. 
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4.0 
MAR calculations for the! 100-D burial grounds (WCH 2006b, Determination of Material at Risk 
and Hazard Screening for 100-D/DR Burial Grounds and Remaining Sites) and 100-H Burial 
Grounds (WCH 2006c, Determination of Material at Risk and Hazard Screening for 100-H 
Burial Grounds and Remaining Sites) were performed that determined the radiological inventory 
for each burial ground to be Hazard Category 3. Because the initial hazard categorizations were 
determined to be Hazard Category 3 for each of the sites, the development of an FHC was 
required. In accordance with WCH procedures, an FHC and supporting hazard analysis must be 
prepared for any site or project that receives an initial hazard categorization of Hazard Category 
3 or above. 
This section consists of the hazard analysis and the FHC for the 118-D-1, 118-D-2, 118-D-3, 
1 18-H- 1, 11 8-H-2, and 1 18-H-3 Burial Grounds. The hazard analysis consists of a hazards 
identification phase (Section 4.1) and a hazards evaluation phase (Sections 4.2 and 4.3). The 
11 8-D-1, 11 8-0-2, 11 8-D-3, 11 8-H-1, 11 8-H-2, and 11 8-H-3 Final Hazard Categorization 
Calculation (WCH 2006a) determined the FHC to be less than hazard Category 3. 
4.1 I~ENTIFIC ATION 
The objective of the hazard identification process is to provide a basis from which to analyze the 
hazards associated with a facility. To achieve this objective, the hazard identification process 
must address the following: 
Characteristics of the inventory of hazardous substances in the facility 
Sources of energy inside the facility capable of interacting with those inventories 
Sources of energy outside the facility capable of interacting with those inventories 
Nonroutine hazards unique to the facility. 
4.2 RESEARCH 
A document search was conducted for documents related to the waste site. The index was 
reviewed and documents were inspected for pertinent information. Additional searches were 
conducted in various libraries and records holding areas for construction drawings and 
photographs for the waste site. 
Maps and engineering drawings references identified in the searches described above were 
reviewed by engineering staff to identify types and quantities of buried items and other potential 
information sources referenced therein. Pertinent references in these documents were obtained 
and reviewed as well. 
The hazards identified during the hazard identification process (Appendix A, Table A- 1) were 
generated from the above-referenced sources of information. These sources were used to 
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identify the inventories of hazardous substances within the waste sites associated with the 
remediation of the burial grounds, as well as the types of energy sources that could impact these 
inventories. Other information sources included process knowledge, interviews with staff, and 
engineering j udgment . 
The depth of detail employed during the review of site-related documentation was considered 
sufficient to allow an adequate characterization of the hazards present at the site. This research 
also included a review of the following types of information: 
Characterization reports 
Hazard assessments 
Hazard screenings 
Hazard identification documents 
Criticality evaluations 
Expedited response actions 
Previous DOE-approved safety analyses 
Hanford Site Waste Information Data System 
Remedial investigatiodfeasibility study reports or studies 
Waste characterization reports 
Excavation reports 
Closeout reports. 
4.3 ~ N V E N ~ O R Y  
Accurate inventory records listing the types and quantities of waste buried in the 100 Area burial 
grounds are not abundant. Records were not kept of the amounts or types of radionuclides 
buried as solid waste in the early days of the Hanford Project. During the 1950s and 1960s, 
some documents were issued regarding waste disposal activities, but the waste disposal records 
were not detailed, resulting in uncertainty in current knowledge of burial ground contents. 
Beginning in the late 1960s, routine reports of radioactive waste disposal in the 100 Area were 
more complete, including the land area used, the waste volume, the activity of specific 
radionuclides, and the location coordinates. 
The inventory data for the hazardous materials (both chemical and radiological) for the burial 
grounds are included as part of the hazard identification worksheets (Appendix A) and were 
taken from the Estimates of Solid Waste Buried in the 100 Area Burial Grounds (Miller and 
VVhalen 1987) study and project-specific data obtained from other burial ground experience 
(e.g., lOO-B/C burial grounds). 
FHC for  the Remediation of 118-D-I, 118-D-2, 118-0-3, 118-H-1, 118-H-2, and 118-11-3 Solid Waste Burial Grounds 
April 2007 4-2 
azard Analysis 
WCH-50 
Rev. 2 
4.3.1 Qualitative and uantitative Description of the Waste Materials 
Potential radiological contaminants associated with the contaminated soil at these sites are 
tritium, carbon- 14, calcium-4 1, cobalt-60, nickel-59, nickel-63, strontium-90, silver- 108m, 
barium- 133, cesium- 137, europium- 152, europium- 154, and plutonium-239. Tritium and 
carbon-14 come from broaching and overbore of the channels in the graphite core of the reactor 
and from disposal of depleted desiccant (silica gel) used to dry the recirculated reactor gases. 
Cobalt-60 and nickel-63 are present mainly as impurities of aluminum process tubes. 
Silver- 108m is present as an impurity of the lead-cadmium poison pieces. Strontium-90, 
cesium- 137, europium- 152, and europium- 154 are present as scaling on the aluminum process 
tubes. 
Potential radiological contaminants associated with the SNF pieces at these burial grounds are 
americium-24 1, cadmium- 1 13m, cesium- 137, europium- 152, krypton-85, niobium-94, 
palladium- 107, plutonium-238, plutonium-239, plutonium-240, plutonium-241, selenium-79, 
samarium- 15 1, strontium-90, technetium-99, uranium-23 8, and zirconium-93. The radionuclide 
inventory associated with these sites is presented, in detail, in the MAR calculations 
(WCH 2006b, 2006c) and Appendix A. 
With respect to the nonradioactive hazardous materials inventory, lead, mercury, and cadmium 
are present as lead-cadmium poison pieces, cadmium sheets, and lead bricks. Mercury is present 
as elemental mercury from failed instruments such as manometers and mercury switches. 
A detailed description of the nonradioactive hazardous materials associated with these sites can 
be found in Appendix A and the MAR calculations (WCH 2006b, 2006~). 
4.3.2 Adjustments to Material Inventories 
4.3.2.1 Liquids. Conservatively, the entire liquid inventory is considered to be at risk for all 
hazard scenarios. 
4.3.2.2 Contaminated Soil. A fractional amount of the activity from general radioactive waste 
was qualified as a noncombustible dispersible solid in the form of a powder. 
For purposes of soil removal during high winds, “Particle Resuspension: A Review,” 
(Sehmel 1980) provides a bounding depth of 10 mm (0.39 in.) for soil at risk for resuspension by 
high wind. A typical trench depth is 4,600 mm (179 in.) so a high-wind event would impact 
10/4600 or 0.2%. The amount of soil considered to be available for entrainment due to a 
high-wind event is conservatively assumed to be 10%. 
The amount of contaminated soil considered to be available for damage during a fire is 
conservatively taken to be 100%. 
For the deflagration, dumping/spilling, and dropping/impact hazards, only a small fraction of the 
noncombustible solid inventory would be expected to be involved in the hazard. The fraction of 
contaminated soil at risk in these hazards is taken to be 1% of the total soil inventory. This 
percentage is conservative and bounding based on the assumption that a 25-mm (1-in.) deep 
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layer of a single trench is less than 1% of the total volume. A deflagration, dump, spill, drop, or 
impact event would occur within a much more localized volume or surface area; therefore, the 
1% value is bounding and conservative. 
4.3.2.3 Uranium Metal Solids. The spent fuel elements are encased in cladding, though 20% 
of the fuel elements are assumed to be damaged and breached. Experience at other excavation 
sites has shown that multiple fuel elements have not been unearthed in the same excavator 
bucket load. 
For the fire hazard event, the airborne release fraction (ARF) and RF values should be applied 
only to oxide created during a fire and not to any un-oxidized metal. As discussed in 
Section 4.2.1.2 of Airborne Release Fractions and Respirable Fractions for Nonreactor 
Facilities (DOE 2000a), oxidation of uranium under fire conditions does take place. However, 
not all of the uranium in the spent fuel is expected to oxidize. 
The bounding fire at a burial ground from the standpoint of uranium metal oxidation would be a 
pool fire involving diesel fuel spilled from a piece of large equipment (e.g., excavator) or from a 
refueling truck. (Note that other scenarios are bounding for the purpose of deriving other values, 
such as the percentage of waste impacted by a fire.) The scenario would involve a spill of diesel 
onto the soil surface of the burial ground such that a pool is formed. The pool is then ignited and 
burns until the fuel is exhausted. Some fraction of the spilled diesel would be absorbed by the 
soil, which would serve to reduce the amount of fuel available to burn and, consequently, the 
duration of the fire. The burning rate of diesel is in the range of 13 to 20 cm (5 to 8 in.) of depth 
per hour (NFPA 1991, "Fire Protection Handbook"). 
Given (1) the burning rate of diesel, (2) the absorption of some fraction of the spilled diesel by 
the soil, (3) the burial ground terrain, and (4) the potential volume of a diesel spill (380 to 760 L 
[ 100 to 200 gal]), a reasonably conservative maximum duration for a diesel fuel pool fire at a 
burial ground is estimated to be 30 minutes (Le., 6.3 to 10.2 cm [2.5 to 4 in.] of pool depth 
burned). It is expected that the continuous flame region temperature for a diesel fuel pool fire at 
a burial ground would range from 900 "C to 1 100 "C (1652 "F to 2012 O F ) .  This is consistent 
with the analysis made in the Final Hazard Categorization for the Remediation of the 11 8-B-1 
and 11 8-C-1 Solid Waste Burial Grounds (WCH 2006e). 
The "Basis for Interim Operation for Fuel Supply Shutdown Facility" (Benecke 2003) evaluates 
the oxidation of uranium metal fuel in a storage building fire. An 8-hour fire duration, including 
2.5 hours at or above 1000 "C (1 832 OF), is used to determine the fraction of the uranium metal 
oxidized. The evaluation determined that 5% of the uranium metal would be oxidized in such a 
fire event. 
An investigation titled Oxidation of Uranium in Air at High Temperatures (GE 1958b) examined 
the oxidation of small (.25 to .50 in. [0.6 to 1.3 cm] in diameter by .75 to 1 in. [ 1.9 to 2.54 cm] in 
length) pieces of metallic uranium at temperatures ranging from 300 "C to 1440 "C (572 "E; to 
2624 O F ) .  The cylindrical test specimens were prepared by swaging from a Hanford Site reactor 
fuel element. Oxidation rate equations for uranium metal as a function of the area to weight ratio 
of the cylindrical specimens were determined. Using an area to weight ratio of 0.08 cm2/g 
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(0.012 in2/g) for a typical uranium metal fuel element (i.e., 260 cm2/3,200 g i40.3 in2/l 12 oz]), 
oxidation rates of about 15.5 mg U/cm2-min and 34.3 mg U/cm2-min are predicted at 995 "C 
(1 823 OF) and 1200 "C (2 192 O F )  by solving the appropriate oxidation rate equations in 
(GE 1958b). This would imply that 121 g to 267 g (4.2 oz to 9.3 oz), or 3.8% to 8.3% of the 
mass of uranium metal in a typical fuel element would be oxidized in 30 minutes. 
j 
Section 4.2.1.2.1 of DOE (2000) discusses oxidation at elevated temperatures in a fire. The 
Oxidation of Depleted Uranium Penetrators and Aerosol Dispersal at High Temperatures study 
(Elder and Tinkle 1980) is cited that involved 13 experiments, performed from 500 "C to 1000 "C 
(932 "F to 1832 OF) for durations of 2 or 4 hours. The oxidation of the uranium ranged from 
6.2% to 22.1% for the 2-hour fires (1.6 % to 5.5% per 30 minutes) and from 21.3% to 30.2% for 
the 4-hour fires (2.7% to 3.8% per 30 minutes). 
Because the burial ground fire is estimated to burn for 30 minutes, a value of 10% is chosen to 
represent the amount of uranium metal that oxidizes during the fire hazard scenario. This value 
bounds each of the references cited above. 
4.3.2.4 Noncombustible Solids. The noncombustible solids are comprised of metal reactor 
waste with surface contamination. In general, only those contaminated particles that are loose 
(i.e., not combined with the surface matrix) on the surface of the noncombustible solids are 
subject to release. The MAR is therefore reduced. 
It is assumed that 90% of the radionuclide inventory associated with the noncombustible solids 
inventory is activation products within the solid material and 10% is contamination on the 
surface of the solid material. For the entrainmentlhigh wind and fire hazards, only those portions 
of the noncombustible solid inventory that are loose are susceptible to the hazard (according to 
Section 5.1 of DOE [2000], the ARF and RF values for these two hazards are to be applied only 
to loose surface contamination and not to radionuclides integral to the bulk solid). The fraction 
of solid noncombustible MAR in these hazards is taken to be 10% (percent of material that is 
loose contamination) of the total solid noncombustible inventory. 
For the deflagration, dumpinghpilling, and dropping/impact hazards, only a small fraction of the 
noncombustible solid inventory is expected to be involved in the hazard. The fraction of solid 
noncombustible MAR in these hazards is taken to be 1% of the total solid noncombustible 
inventory. The basis for the 1% value is similar to that explained in the final paragraph 
(deflagration, dumping/spilling, and dropping/impact hazards) of Section 4.3.2.2. 
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Percent of Total Inventory Subject to Hazard 
Entrainment/ Dumping/ Dropping/ 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Spilling Impact 
Fire Deflagration High Wind 
4,3.2,5 Combustible Solids. A portion of the general radioactive waste is treated as 
combustible solids. The fraction of combustible solids available for damage during the hazard 
event of entrainmenthigh wind is taken to be 10% of the total combustible solid inventory. 
A 10% material availability for damage was selected as a conservative upper bound based on the 
fact that combustible solids are generally packaged in boxes, drums, etc., and are, therefore, 
afforded a certain self-protection against high winds. Additionally, it would be necessary for the 
material to be exposed to the winds by the excavation process. It is not credible to assume that 
the excavator would exhume more than 10% of the radioactive inventory at any given time and 
leave it exposed for entrainment by high winds. 
Soil 
U Metal 
Noncombustible 
Combustible 
U Oxide 
For the fire hazard, only a portion of the combustible solid inventory in the waste site is at risk (it 
is unlikely that a fire consumes all the unexcavated waste). Nevertheless, the fraction of solid 
combustible MAR in this hazard is conservatively taken to be 100% of the total solid 
combustible inventory. 
10% 100% 1% 1% 1% 
20% 10% 20% 5% 5% 
10% 10% 1% 1% 1% 
10% 100% 1% 1% 1% 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
For the deflagration, dumpinghpilling, and dropping/impact hazards, only a small fraction of the 
combustible solid inventory is expected to be involved in the hazard. The fraction of solid 
combustible MAR in these hazards is taken to be 1% of the total solid combustible inventory. 
The basis for the 1% value is similar to that explained in the final paragraph (deflagration, 
dumping/spilling, and droppinglimpact hazards) of Section 4.3.2.2. 
4.3.2.6 Uranium Oxide. As discussed in Section 4 of Appendix C, "Assumptions," 0.1 % of the 
total uranium fuel inventory is assumed to be uranium oxide. The thin layer of oxide is only 
present when the cladding has been breached. It is assumed that 100% of this inventory for all 
accidents is considered available for release. 
4.3.2.7 Summary of Adjustments to Material Inventory. The fraction of each waste form 
subject to damage from a given hazard (determined in the preceding subsections) is summarized 
in Table 4- 1. 
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4.4 HAZAR S I ~ E ~ T I F I E ~  
The hazard types that could affect the inventory of hazardous substances associated with the 
burial grounds are tabulated in Appendix A, Table A- 1. The hazard types and inventories, if 
applicable, were developed from the information gathered during research on the burial grounds. 
In order to establish a bounding inventory associated with SNF, historical information associated 
with the remediation of the 105-F and 105-H FSBs and 100-B/C burial grounds was reviewed. 
The FSBs and experience from past burial grounds would represent a reasonable estimate of SNF 
elements or pieces that could be encountered at a solid waste disposal site since the FSBs and 
burial grounds (Le., SNF has been found at the 11 8-B-1 and 118-C-1 Burial Grounds) were 
known to have received SNF. No historical records found to date indicate that SNF pieces were 
intentionally disposed in the solid waste burial grounds. There was 1 SNF element removed 
from the 105-D FSB, a total of 17 SNF elements or pieces were removed from the 105-F FSB, 
and a total of 8 SNF elements or pieces were removed from the 105-H FSB during remediation. 
Excavation is still ongoing at this time at the 118-B-1 and 118-C-1 waste sites, but a total of 
three confirmed SNF elementdpieces have been found at 118-B-1 and four confirmed 
elementlpieces have been found at 1 18-C- 1. All of these SW elements and pieces were 
identified to be standard fuel. Several other suspect SNF elementdpieces have been found at the 
1 18-B- 1 and 1 18-C- 1 sites but have not been characterized yet and, therefore, have not been 
confirmed as SNF. The bounding inventory assumed for SNF at each burial ground is based 
upon a maximum of 25 fuel elements (at 3.6 kg [7.9 lb]/element for a total of 90 kg [ 198.4 lb]) at 
each site. The 25-fuel element limit was based on standard elements that may be encountered in 
the burial grounds. To account for the possibility that other types of fuel elements may be 
encountered (including overbore elements, high burn-up depleted uranium elements and fuel 
from N Reactor), a Calculation of Inventory Ratios for Various Fuel Types (WCH 2006d) was 
performed to determine the equivalency between the nonstandard fuel elements and the typical 
fuel elements. This analysis concluded that 4,160 mm (163.8 in.), with corrections for 
nonstandard elements, could be accumulated, while remaining within the bounds of the hazard 
analysis. 
Based on the condition of the fuel elements found at the 105-F and 105-H FSBs and at the 
118-B-1 and 118-C- 1 Burial Grounds, it is assumed that 20% of the fuel elements are damaged. 
This damage is manifested in the form of an oxide layer that equals 0.1 % of the total inventory 
of the elements. The 0.1% oxide fraction is consistent with assumptions used for fuel at the 
105-H FSB (BHI 2000) and the 100-B/C Burial Ground FHC (WCH 2006e). The isotopic 
inventory of the standard elements was shown to be conservative for single-pass reactor elements 
during the approval process for BHI (2000) as documented by DOE-RL (2000b). The isotopes 
not included in the inventory (e.g. , uranium-23 5 )  are negligible contributors to radiological 
consequences. 
In addition to the standard fuel elements, nonstandard fuel elements were also evaluated. The 
nonstandard fuel element inventory is determined in the Calculations to Support the 100-B/C 
Fuel Element-arget White Paper (BHI 2005b) and the associated lOO-B/C Area White Paper 
for Fuel Elements and Targets (BHI 2005a). 
FHC for the Rernediation of 118-0-1, 118-0-2, 118-D-3, 118-H-1, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Solid Waste Burial Grounds 
April 2007 4-7 
Hazard Analysis 
WCH-50 
Rev. 2 
The potential radiological dose consequences of standard plutonium production elements 
compared to the nonstandard elements was evaluated in Potential Presence of Special Fuel 
Elements in 105-H Fuel Storage Basin (BHI 2002~). The standard element was determined to 
bound any airborne release event (ix., inhalation pathway, food ingestion pathway) because of 
the significantly larger inventory of plutonium (and americium) in the standard element 
compared to the nonstandard elements. The standard element was also determined to bound a 
direct dose event based on the relative cesium-137 content of each type of element and 
cesium-137 beiig responsible for about 98% of the direct dose. 
From historical documentation, N Reactor waste was disposed in the 118-D-2 and 118-D-3 
Burial Grounds. It is judged unlikely that N Reactor SNF would be found in either of these 
waste sites, but is accounted for in this document. 
Each remediation project activity can be related to a set of generic hazards. The following 
hazard types were identified as being potentially associated with the burial ground remediation 
activities : 
Radiological material 
Fissionable material 
Toxic material (heavy metals) 
Carcinogens 
Biohazards 
Corrosive material 
Explosive material 
Reactive material 
Electrical hazards 
Potentialkinetic energy hazards 
Noise hazards 
Temperature extremes 
Asphyxiates 
Seismic 
Exposure to hazardous chemicals 
External exposure to ionizing radiation 
Internal uptake of radioactive material 
Explosive concentration of gases 
Fir e/fl ammable materials 
Natural phenomena hazards. 
A number of industrial hazards are associated with the remediation of any waste site. Many 
of these hazards are common to the nonnuclear industry, and their prevention and/or mitigation 
consists of standard industrial safety practices. The controls that will be used to manage these 
routine hazards are discussed in Section 5.3. 
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azards Summary 
Following the hazards identification process, generic internal events and project activity-related 
events that could introduce energy sources to hazardous materials at risk (and thus result in a 
release of hazardous materials to the environment) were evaluated and documented in 
Appendix B, Table 13-1. The hazard evaluation process for the burial grounds is presented in 
Section 4.5. 
4.5 HAZAR EVALUATION 
A hazard evaluation workshop was held. A multidisciplinary team of DOE and contractor 
personnel completed a systematic review of the potential hazards associated with the remediation 
activities. 
The objectives of this process are as follows: 
Identify the events that could lead to releases of hazardous substances and which require 
additional quantitative analysis 
Rank these events based on potential consequences and frequency 
0 Identify engineered mitigative and preventative features that serve to control the hazard 
e Identify the commitments and administrative controls necessary to manage the hazard. 
This section evaluates the potential interactions of the hazards identified in Appendix A and the 
project activities described in Section 3.1 that could result in potential consequences to workers 
or the environment. 
azard Evaluation Summary 
The hazards evaluated in this section originated from the hazard identification process discussed 
in Appendix A. To this end, the hazard evaluation process involved a facilitated meeting with 
the following types of personnel: 
0 
0 
Experienced safety analysts 
Radiation control 
Design engineering personnel 
Field engineers 
DOE safety basis specialists. 
The hazard evaluation considered a broad range of events. Many of these events have minor 
consequences (consequence of IV or 111-3) and are adequately managed with the programmatic 
controls identified in Section 5.3. These events do not require detailed treatment in the FHC. 
Also, although certain events considered in the evaluation process have significant 
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consequences, the probability of some of the events actually occurring is improbable (i.e., any 
event with a frequency of 1 x lO?yr or less). These events also do not require detailed treatment 
in the FHC. 
The results of the hazard evaluation are presented in Appendix B, Table B-1. These hazards 
were identified as having the greatest potential consequences (Le., greatest impact to the MAR at 
the burial grounds remediation sites). The bounding hazards were identified as requiring detailed 
hazard analysis. Events that were identified as requiring a detailed hazard evaluation are 
discussed in Section 4.7. 
4.52 Applicable Activities, Exposures, and Controls 
This section presents detailed hazard evaluations for the hazards that were identified in 
Appendix B, Table B- 1, as being the bounding unmitigated release. This section also identifies 
any activities that would be bounded by the consequences of these bounding accident scenarios 
and identifies the controls that are applicable to the bounding accident scenarios. These controls 
are categorized as follows: 
e Special controls. These controls are required to maintain the assumptions used to determine 
the FHC. 
0 Project-specific controls. These controls are established to protect the workers for the 
specific accident under consideration and arise from the hazard evaluation process 
(e.g., emergency response instructions and material-handling restrictions). 
e Programmatic controls. These controls are institutional controls established for worker 
protection that apply to the activity under consideration ( e g ,  elements of the radiation 
control program, rigging procedures, and training requirements). 
Appendix B identifies several hazardous events that could lead to releases from the burial ground 
remediation activities (e.g., natural phenomena, impact from excavation equipment). Such 
events could lead to releases as a result of high winds, dumping materials, wind entrainment 
from exposed materials, release of oxide from spent fuel elements, and initiation of a fire causing 
heating of contaminated materials. The following subsections discuss the impacts of these 
release mechanisms on the materials from the remediation activities, and assess the respirable 
ARFs. 
Modified ARFs were used to adjust DOE -STD-1027 Category 3 TQs for each of the following 
accident scenarios by multiplying tabled TQ values in DOE-STD-1027 by the ARF value used to 
determine the original tabled TQ value, and dividing by the ARF appropriate for the specified 
accident scenario (Appendix C). 
One accident scenario is a result of a natural phenomena hazard not initiated by burial ground 
remediation activities. 
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During burial ground remediation activities, sections of the waste sites that have not yet 
undergone remediation will typically have protective soil overburdens to restrict releases of 
inventory. Dust mitigation measures (dust suppression) are used. The soil that is to be processed 
during remediation of the burial grounds may also require application of dust suppression prior 
to placement in containers before shipment to ERDF. These containers use protective tarps to 
limit the amount of contaminated soil that could be released to the environment. 
4.6 CONTROLS 
Controls required for any of the following hazard scenarios are identified in Section 5.0. Special 
controls required for maintaining critical assumptions identified are discussed in Section 5.1. 
Project-specific controls necessary to manage the hazard scenarios related to the burial ground 
remediation specific controls are discussed in Section 5.2. Programmatic controls are discussed in 
Section 5.3. 
4.7 BOUNDING ACCIDENT SCENARIOS AND CONSEQ 
4.7.1 Dumping 
Contaminated Soil: The respirable ARF for soil dumping used in Attachment 4 of the 
Memorandum for Distribution, Hazard Categorization of EM Inactive Waste Sites as Less Than 
Hazard Categorization 3 (Roberson 2002) is 1.OE-06. The RF value for contaminated soil is 1; 
therefore, the R value used for dumping of contaminated soil is 1.OE-06. 
Contaminated, Combustible Solids: Contaminated combustible solids may be lifted out of a 
trench and dropped. These combustible materials are typically lightweight. Consequently, they 
would generate little force during impact with surfaces. Section 5.2.3.1 of DOE (2000) states 
that no significant suspension of surface contamination is postulated for such materials. 
Dumping of contaminated combustible solids is not considered further in this evaluation. 
Contaminated, Noncombustible Solids: Contaminated, noncombustible solids may be lifted out 
of a trench and dropped, or digging equipment may impact them. Section 5.3.3 of DOE (2000) 
addresses free-fall spill and impaction stress to such solids. The bounding ARE" for shock 
vibration of contaminated noncombustible materials that do not undergo brittle fracture is 
1 .OE-03. The respirable fraction is assumed to be 1 .O; therefore, the R value used for this 
scenario is 1 .OE-03. 
Contaminated Liquid: The potential exists for containers of liquid to be found in the burial 
grounds. It is possible that such containers could be spilled during remediation activities. The 
amount of liquid is expected to be a small fraction of the total volume of the burial trenches. 
Section 3.2.3.2 of DOE (2000) indicates a spill of aqueous solutions, subjected to a 3-m (9.8-ft) 
fall distance, has a bounding R value of 1.OE-04. 
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Spent Fuel Elements: Dumping of spent fuel elements could cause an airborne release of surface 
oxide. No release from metallic portion of spent fuel elements would occur. It is assumed that 
the release of oxide is similar to that of contaminated, noncombustible solids. Therefore, the 
R value for release of oxide due to dumping is 1 .OE-03. 
4.7.2 High WindBhtrainment 
The soil entrainment rate used in Attachment 4 of Roberson (2002) is 4.OE-03 g/m2-h. 
118-D-3 Contaminated Soil: Assuming a density of 2.27 g/cm3 or 2.27Et-06 g/BCM for the 
contaminated soil at the 118-D-3 Burial Ground and a soil volume of 80,744 BCM 
(WCH 2006b), the total mass of contaminated soil at the 118-D-3 Burial Ground is 1.83Et-11 g. 
Of the six burial ground sites discussed in this document, the 118-H-1 site has the largest surface 
area of the six sites and is equal to 27,738 m2 (33,174 yd2). This site will be conservatively used 
for the surface area to maximize the rate of entrainment, but the 118-D-3 inventory will be used. 
Assuming that the entire surface area of the trenches is exposed to wind, the rate of entrainment 
of contaminated soil would be as follows: 
x = 27,738 m2 x 0.004 g/m2-h = 11 1 g/h 
Over 24 hours, this translates to 2,660 g (93 oz) of soil entrained. Therefore, the respirable ARF 
for a 24-hour period would be as follows: 
R = A R F x R F = 2 6 6 0 g /  1.83Et-11 g =  1.5E-08 
Contaminated, Combustible Solids: Contamination present on combustible solids would not be 
readily entrained by the wind because the material was deposited several decades ago and the 
contaminants are expected to be absorbed onto the materials. It is expected that the amount of 
contamination released by this mechanism would be less than the amount released through a fire. 
Therefore, the R value for entrainment is 5E-04. 
Contaminated, Noncombustible Solids : Contamination present on noncombustible solids would 
not be readily entrained by the wind because the material was deposited several decades ago. It 
is expected that the amount of contamination released by this mechanism would be less than the 
amount released through dumping. Therefore, the R value for entrainment is 1E-03. 
Contaminated Liquid: Containerized liquid would be protected from entrainment by wind. 
If liquid is spilled, a small pool of liquid could form on the soil surface. Section 3.2.4.5 of 
DOE (2000) indicates that the bounding R value for entrainment from an outdoor pool at high 
wind speeds is 4E-6/hr, or 3.2E-05 for an 8-hour duration. (Note: An 8-hour exposure is 
selected consistent with DOE-STD-3009-94, Appendix A, Section A.3.3 [DOE 2OOObl.) 
Therefore, the R value for entrainment of contaminated liquid is 3.2E-05. 
Spent Fuel Elements: No significant airborne release from spent fuel elements (metal) would 
occur due to high wind/entrainment, which is consistent with Section 4.2.4 of DOE (2000). This 
scenario is not considered further in this calculation. The airborne release of nonadherent 
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uranium oxide from the surface of a spent fuel element via high wind/entrainment is expected to 
be less than that released by a drop/impact event. Therefore, the R value for entrainment of the 
oxide is 1E-03. 
4.7.3 Deflagration 
Contaminated Soil: The soil at the burial grounds is noncombustible. A fire burning across 
either site could entrain some of the soil in the updraft, but it would be expected that the amount 
released by this mechanism would be bounded by the amount of soil released through 
entrainment. Therefore, the R value is 1.5E-08. 
Spent Fuel Elements (Oxide): The spent fuel element MAR during deflagration in the burial 
ground is limited to the pre-existent oxide. No significant airborne release from uranium metals 
is postulated, which is consistent with Section 4.2.2 of DOE (2000). The material release is 
conservatively evaluated as a venting of a pressurized powder at low pressures, consistent with 
the analysis performed in the Final Hazard Classification and Auditable Safety Analysis for the 
105-H Facility Interim Safe Storage Project (BHI 2004) and the 100-B/C burial grounds 
(WCH 2006e). Only low pressures would be produced by this event due to the lack of 
confinement for the deflagration in an exposed excavation. The bounding ARF in 
Section 5.3.2.3 of DOE (2000) is 0.005, with a respirable fraction of 0.4 for low-pressure 
powders being vented. This yields a bounding R value of 2.OE-03. 
Contaminated Combustible Solids: Contaminated combustible solids (e.g., soft waste, used 
PPE) are expected to be present. Such materials are expected to have minimal contamination 
and do not provide a rigid surface for pressurized gases to act upon. DOE (2000), 
Section 5.2.2.3, states that the bounding R value for this scenario is 1.OE-03. 
Contaminated Noncombustible Solids : Contaminated noncombustible solids are expected to be 
present. Only those contaminated particles that are loose (i.e., not combined with the surface 
matrix) on the surface of the noncombustible solids would be subject to release. Section 5.3.2.3 
of DOE (2000) indicates that the bounding R value for the release of pressurized gases over 
contaminated, noncombustible materials is 2.OE-03. 
Contaminated Liquid: The potential exists for containers of liquid to be unearthed during 
excavation activities. It is possible that a deflagration could occur during characterization 
activities. However, because the amount of flammable gases will be relatively small, the 
potential damage is anticipated to be low. Section 3.2.2.3.2 of DOE (2000) indicates that the 
bounding R value for a low-pressure deflagration venting of any solution would be 4.OE-05. 
ropping/Irnpact 
Contaminated Soil: A vehicle or excavator impact to contaminated soil could result in 
resuspension of the material. However, only a small fraction of the potentially contaminated soil 
volume could be affected. Section 4.4.3.3.2 of DOE (2000) is not directly applicable to this 
scenario due to the physical differences between the experimental conditions (powder placed on 
a plywood sheet or in a quart can within a vented metal box) and the burial ground remediation 
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activities (tens-of-thousands of kilograms of soil), but it does provide a reference point. The 
bounding R value in Section 4.4.3.3.2 of DOE (2000) is 2.OE-03. The outer areas of the large 
soil mass will shield the majority of the soil from impact stress, resulting in a bounding R value 
much less than dumping of contaminated soils (1 .OE-06). 
Contaminated Combustible Solids: Contaminated combustible solids may be lifted out of a 
trench and dropped. These combustible materials are typically lightweight. Consequently, they 
would generate little force during impact with surfaces. Section 5.3.3.2.2 of DOE (2000) states 
that solids that experience predominantly plastic deformation (e.g. metal, plastics) as opposed to 
brittle fracture, respond to vibration and shock of the substrate by flexing. Materials adhering to 
the surface are ejected by the movement depending on how the contaminant is attached to the 
surface. The bounding R value discussed in Section 5.3.3.2.2 of DOE (2000) is 1E-03, therefore, 
this will conservatively be used for this scenario. 
Contaminated Noncombustible Solids: Contaminated noncombustible solids may be lifted out of 
a trench and dropped, or digging equipment may impact them. Section 5.3.3 of DOE (2000) 
addresses free-fall spill and impaction stress to such solids. The bounding ARF for shock 
vibration of contaminated noncombustible materials that do not undergo brittle fracture is 
1 .OE-03. The respirable fraction is assumed to be 1 .O; therefore, the R value used for this 
scenario is 1 .OE-03. 
Contaminated Liquid: The potential exists for containers of liquid to be unearthed during 
excavation activities. It is possible that an impact to a container could occur during excavation 
activities. However, the amount of liquid would be expected to be a small fraction of the total 
volume of the burial trenches. The bounding R value for this scenario would be less than that for 
a free-fall spill of aqueous solution. Therefore, the R value is 1.OE-04. 
Spent Fuel Elements: No significant airborne release from solid uranium metal would result 
from dropping of spent fuel elements, which is consistent with Section 4.2.3 of DOE (2000). 
Release of any oxide, however, would be similar to that from a contaminated, noncombustible 
solid. Therefore, the R value used for this scenario for oxide is 1 .OE-03. 
4.7.5 Fire 
Contaminated Soil: The soil at the burial grounds is noncombustible. A fire burning across 
either site could entrain some of the soil in the updraft, but it would be expected that the amount 
released by this mechanism would be less than the amount of soil released through entrainment. 
Therefore, the R value is 1.5E-08. 
Contaminated Combustible Solids: This scenario would involve the ignition of soft waste by an 
external source such as a range fire or an internal source such as a vehicle fire. Contaminants 
remaining on soft waste would be well adhered after 30 to 60 years in the burial ground. Also, 
the soft waste is dispersed in a noncombustible (Le., soil, metallic components) matrix and would 
be present as compact piles. Therefore, the R value used for this scenario is 5.OE-04 as reported 
in Section 5.2.1.1 of DOE (2000) for packaged waste. 
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Contaminated Noncombustible Solids (including pre-existing oxide on spent fuel elements): 
A fire could suspend some of the surface contamination due to heating of the metallic 
components. DOE (2000), Section 5.1 assesses the release of a sparse population of particles 
attached to the surface of a noncombustible solid. The R value for this scenario is 6.OE-05. 
Contaminated Liquid: A potential initiator of an onsite fire could be ignition of gasoline or 
diesel from the excavator. It is possible for containers to be heated by a fire and, as a result, the 
liquid contents could also be heated. Section 3.1 of DOE-HDBK-3010-94 (DOE 2000a) 
indicates that the bounding values for boiling of aqueous solutions are an ARF of 2E-03 and an 
RF of 1 .O, resulting in an R value of 2E-3. 
Spent Fuel Elements (Oxide): This scenario is addressed under contaminated, noncombustible 
solids. 
Spent Fuel Elements (Metal): Section 4.1 of DOE-HDBK-3010-94 (DOE 2000a) provides ARF 
and RF values for the oxidation of uranium metal at high temperatures (SO0 "C [>932 OF]). The 
median ARF is 1E-4 and the RF is 1 .O, resulting in a R value of 1 .OE-4. These parameters are to 
be applied only to the oxide created during the fire and not to any un-oxidized portion of the 
uranium metal. The uranium that remains in metallic form is not at risk for release by thermal 
stress. 
4.8 NUCLEAR CRIT~CALI~Y 
This section documents the results of the nuclear criticality safety evaluation prepared for the 
1 18-D- 1, 1 18-D-2, 1 18-D-3, 1 18-H-1, 1 18-H-2, and 1 18-H-3 Solid Waste Burial Grounds. The 
evaluations are documented in Remediation of I1  8-0-1, 11 8-0-2 and 11 8-0-3 Burial Grounds 
(WCH 2006g) and Remediation of 11 8-H-I, 11 8-H-2 and 11 8-H-3 Burial Grounds (WCH 
2006h). It was concluded in WCH (2006g) and WCH (2006h) that non-fuel fissionable waste 
forms pose no criticality concern. Hanford Fuel Types in WCH Burial Grounds (WCH 20060 
addresses SNF and targets. Discovery of SNF elements or pieces occurred during the excavation 
and sorting operations at these sites, even though historical records did not indicate any evidence 
that SNF was disposed in the solid waste burial grounds. During remediation activities, SNF has 
been found and recovered at several facilities within the 100 Areas. The following lists the 
quantities of elements found to date at the time of this document issuance for the 118-B-1 and 
118-C-1 Burial Grounds and other sites in the 100 Area. 
1 18-€3- 1 Burial Ground - three confirmed elementdpieces (two intact and one fragment) and 
five suspect/uncharacterized elements/pieces 
1 18-C- 1 Burial Ground - four confirmed pieces and nine suspect/uncharacterized 
elementdpieces 
e 105-D FSB - one complete fuel element 
e 105-F FSB - 1'7 elementdpieces (14 intact and 3 damaged pieces) 
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0 105-H FSB - eight elements (all intact). 
All of the characterizedkonfirmed elementdpieces found to date have been standard plutonium 
production fuel elements (enriched [up to 0.947 weight % uranium-2351 or natural). Based upon 
statistical data from 105-H Fuel Storage Basin (FSB) Fuel Elementflarget Recovery 
(BHI 2002a), approximately 96% of all the fuel elements that were nm through the 
105-H Reactor were standard fuel elements. An additional evaluation (BHI 2005a), similar to 
BHI (2002a), was completed and assessed the types of SNF and targets that were used in the 
105-B and 105-C Reactors and had the potential to be found during remediation of the 1 18-B-1 
and 1 18-C- 1 Burial Ground waste sites. A 28-cm (1 1-in.)-long, 3.8-cm (1.5-in.)-diameter 
uranium enriched (0.947 weight %) fuel element was found to be used in the 105-B and 
105-C Reactors and not mentioned in the FHC document. Also, two types of overbore elements 
were used at the 105-C Reactor. The larger (and also bounding) of the two types of overbore 
elements was approximately 6 cm (2.4 in.) diameter, made of 0.80 weight % uranium-235, and 
approximately 22.6 cm (8.9 in.) long. The fuel geometry was a rod in tube design. These two 
types of fuels are addressed in criticality evaluations for the sites (WCH 2006f). It is assumed 
that the fuel types run through the 105-B and 105-C Reactors bound those used at the 105-D, 
105-DR, and 105-H Reactors and, hence, could have been disposed at the burial grounds. 
The evaluation in WCH (20060 assesses the types of SNF that possibly may be encountered 
during remediation activities and establishes a conservative limit on the total length of fuel that 
can be accumulated. The conservative length limit in the criticality safety evaluation [ 1,080 mm 
(425 in.)] is based on optimum conditions, which are not credible in any Hanford Site burial 
ground. If the length limit is not exceeded, there are no normal or credible abnormal conditions 
that could result in criticality in burial grounds. Administrative controls include the WCH 
criticality safety and emergency management programs. 
As suspected fuel elements or targets (including broken pieces considered by their fractional 
length) are discovered in the burial grounds, the elemenvpiece lengths and types will be tracked 
in accordance with special controls and project-specific controls discussed in Sections 5.1 and 
5.2, respectively. Sections 5.1 and 5.2 establish the controls necessary for the burial grounds 
spent fuel inventory. 
4.9 FINAL HAZARD CATEGORIZATION 
The hazards evaluated in this calculation are identified in Section 4.2. The FHC calculations are 
summarized below. See Appendix C for calculation details. 
Only radionuclides were used in determining the FHC since there are no other hazardous 
materials that exceed the 29 CFR 1910 or 40 CFR 68 TQs; therefore, analysis of chemical 
constituents was not included in the FHC calculation. The hazard Category 3 TQs in 
DOE (1997) are based on the release values (RV) calculated in the Technical Background 
Document to Support Final Rulemaking Pursuant to Section 102 of the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act: Radionuclides (EPA 1989). Release 
values are determined for each of four exposure pathways: food ingestion, water ingestion, 
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inhalation, and direct exposure. The TQ for a given isotope is 20 times the most restrictive RV. 
The TQ can be expressed as: 
The EPA methodology uses the following assumptions: 
1. The RV for the water ingestion pathway assumes that 100% of the material is released to 
drinking water (see EPA 1989, Appendix B.l). 
2. The RV for the inhalation pathway and the RV for the food ingestion pathway both are 
inversely proportional to a respirable ARF (see EPA 1989, Appendix A.2 and 
Appendix C. 1). 
3. The RV for direct exposure for isotopes other than noble gases assumes a point source. 
The DOE Office of Nuclear and Facility Safety Policy Nuclear Safety Technical Position 
(DOE 2002) allows that the hazard Category 3 TQs for radionuclides for which the food pathway 
and the inhalation pathway are limiting may be revised if, based on the physical and chemical 
form and available dispersive energy sources for the facility and its hazardous materials, the 
credible release fractions (ARFs) can be shown to be significantly different from the values used 
in the EPA Technical Background Document. All potential accident scenarios must be 
considered under unmitigated conditions. All pathways must be considered and the most 
limiting pathway must be used. 
Based on the guidance in DOE (2002), the revised Category 3 TQ for an isotope in a particular 
material form can be expressed as: 
Where: 
f 1 is the ratio of the respirable ARF used in the EPA analysis 
(from EPA 1989, Exhibit A-1) to the largest respirable ARF 
from any potential accident 
RVFOOD 
RVWATER 
is the release value for the food pathway from EPA (1989), 
Appendix E 
is the ratio of the fraction of material released to drinking 
water in the EPA analysis (i.e., 1) to the largest fraction of 
material released to drinking water in any potential accident 
scenario 
is the release value for the water pathway from EPA (1989), 
Appendix E 
FHC for the Remediation of 118-0-1, 118-0-2, 118-0-3, 118-H-1, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Solid Waste Burial Grounds 
April 2007 4-17 
azard Analysis 
WCH-50 
Rev. 2 
RVINH is the release value for the inhalation pathway from EPA 
(1989), Appendix E 
f3 is the ratio of the dose rate from a point source at 30 m 
(98.4 ft) to the dose rate from a distributed source of equal 
activity at 30 m (98.4 ft) 
RVDIR is the release value for the direct exposure pathway from 
EPA (1989), Appendix E 
The potential accident scenarios and corresponding RFs are identified from a hazard analysis. 
This FHC will be based on the hazard analysis in Roberson (2002) and the scenario analyses 
presented in Roberson (2002). These analyses form the basis for identifying appropriate 
respirable ARFs. The RFs will be from DOE (2000), Roberson (2002), or other analyses 
previously approved by DOE. Equation 2 will be used to generate revised TQs for each 
constituent present at the burial ground. 
The FHC is conducted as follows: the adjusted inventory of radionuclides for each material form 
and accident scenario is divided by the set of Category 3 revised TQs for that form and accident 
scenario to get a Category 3 TQ ratio for each isotope. These Category 3 TQ ratios are summed 
over all isotopes to get a sum-of-ratios value for each combination of facility, material form, and 
accident scenario. 
Because a given accident can impact more than one material form, the sum-of-ratios are then 
summed across the material forms for each accident scenario. If the Category 3 sum-of-ratios for 
every accident scenario for a given facility is below 1, the FHC is determined to be below 
Category 3 for that facility. (The occurrence of two or more accident scenarios at once is judged 
to be highly unlikely and is not considered in this document.) If the Category 3 sum-of-ratios 
value for any accident scenario for a given facility is greater than 1, then the Category 3 revised 
TQ has been exceeded and a revised Category 2 determination must be made. 
Using the revised TQ values as described above, the final sum-of-the-ratios for the bounding 
burial ground (Le., the 118-D-3 Burial Ground) is shown below in Table 4-2. Since the total sum 
of the ratios value for all of the waste forms for each accident scenario is below 1, the FHC for 
all of the burial grounds is below Category 3. 
FHC for the Reinediation of 118-0-1, 118-D-2, 118-0-3, 118-H-I, 118-ti-2, and 118-H-3 Solid Waste Burial Grounds 
April 2007 4-18 
Hazard Analysis 
Deflagration 
3.43E-04 
3.32E-03 
1.29E-03 
1.96E-03 
4.36E-02 
Insignificant 
5.053-02 
WCH-50 
Rev. 2 
Dropping / 
Impact Fire 
3.46E-04 3.43E-02 
4.65E-03 5 .O 1 E-02 
6.79E-02 1.29E-03 
2.06E-02 2.5 1E-02 
1.3 9E-03 2.18E-02 
Insignificant 2.26E-0 1 
4.873-02 4.05E-01 
Table 4-2. Maximum Sum-of-the- 
Waste Form Dumping Entrainment I ~ 
Soil 1 3.46E-04 1 3.43E-03 
Liquid I 4.65E-03 I 3.14E-03 
Combustibles I Insignificant I 6.79E-03 
Noncombustibles I 2.06E-02 1 2.06E-01 
Spent Fuel Elements (Oxide) I 2.18E-02 1 2.18E-02 
Spent Fuel Elements (Metal) I Insignificant I Insignificant 
Sum I 4.743-02 I 2.41E-01 
1 
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5.1 SPECIAL CONTROLS 
Special controls are derived from the assumptions made in the FHC that are required to ensure 
that the FHC remains valid. These controls will be incorporated into the appropriate work 
implementing instructions developed for the project. Therefore, the special controls for burial 
grounds are as follows: 
0 
The waste forms encountered at these sites are limited to contaminated soil, miscellaneous 
contaminated combustible solids, noncombustible solids, liquids, SNF oxide, SNF metal, and 
gases, including compressed gas cylinders and tritium associated with waste. 
As shown in WCH (2006d), the bounding length of fuel for 25 elements was calculated to be 
416 cm (163.8 in.). The discovery of more than the equivalent of 416 cm (163.8 in.) of SNF 
(with diameter of approximately 3.8 cm [1.5 in.]), at any of the 118-D-1, 118-D-2, 118-D-3, 
1 18-H-2 or 1 18-H-3 solid waste burial grounds (including broken pieces considered by their 
fractional length) will require shutdown of remediation operations at the affected location. 
The bounding fuel length determination considered Single Pass Reactor fuel elementsltargets 
with diameters of up to 3.8 cm (1.5 in.), including high burn-up depleted uranium fuel 
elements. If fuel is found with a diameter larger than 3.8 cm (1.5 in.) (i.e., N Reactor fuel or 
Overbore fuel), then WCH (2006d) provides conversion factors for these element types: 
2.54 cm (1 in.) of N Reactor outer fuel would equal 25.4 cm (10 in.) of fuel, 2.54 cm (1 in.) 
of N Reactor inner fuel would equal 11.9 cm (4.7 in.), and 2.54 cm (1 in.) of Overbore fuel 
would equal 6.6 cm (2.6 in.) of fuel analyzed in this document. Pieces of SNF of 
indeterminate type or diameter will be assumed to be a piece of N Reactor outer fuel element 
and the appropriate correction factor ( lox)  will be applied. 
Operations may resume at the affected site once the inventory of exposed SNF elements is 
reduced to below the equivalent of 416 cm (163.8 in.) by shipment of the SNF to an offsite 
SNF staging or storage facility (e.g., FSB at 100-K). Alternatively, SNF may be shipped 
offsite to maintain the running inventory below the equivalent of 416 cm (163.8 in.) without 
shutdown of operations. In either case, the DOE Project Manager and Facility 
Representative shall be notified of the date and quantity shipped, but no further evaluation by 
DOE is required (DOE-RL 2006a). 
A drum handling plan shall be developed prior to the start of remediation. 
If any of the following conditions is encountered, the situation will be treated as a discovery 
under the FHC evaluation process as described in Sections 1.4 or 5.3.5: 
Waste forms found that are different than those as identified above 
Inventories for each waste form that are determined to be more than what was assumed. 0 
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5.2 PRO JECT-SPECIFIC CONTR 
Proj ect-specific controls are established for the protection of workers that apply specifically to 
the activity under consideration. These controls are derived from the hazard evaluation and 
engineering judgment. These controls will be flowed down into the appropriate work 
implementing instructions developed for the project. Based on the hazard evaluation, the 
following project-specific controls have been identified: 
Provision of fire protection features for drum staging areas (e.g., separation, berrnsldikes) as 
determined under the fire protection program 
Addition of appropriate stabilization materials (e.g., oil, sand, grout) to dnimslcontainers 
Use of intrinsically safe or nonsparking materials when opening sealed dmmslcontainers 
Use of dust suppressantslfixatives as appropriate 
As stated in WCH (2006f), "There are no normal or credible abnormal conditions with fuel 
types used in Hanford production reactors that could result in criticality at WCH Burial 
Grounds if the critically safe total length of 425 inches for all fuel elements and suspected 
pieces is not exceeded." As discussed above in Section 5.1, the bounding length of fuel for 
accident analysis was calculated to be 416 cm (163.8 in.). Therefore, the bounding fuel 
length for the accident analysis always bounds the critically safe length limit of 1079.5 cm 
(425 in.) of SNF, and fuel length will not have to be tracked for criticality purposes. 
5.3 P R O G R A ~ A ~ I C  CONTROLS 
5.3.1 Conduct of Operations 
Conduct of operations is imposed to ensure that work is performed in a controlled and organized 
manner, that all facets of work activities have been considered, and that necessary documentation 
is maintained. 
The Washington Closure Hanford Conduct of Operations Applicability Matrix (WCH 2007) 
presents a graded approach to DOE Order 5480.19, Conduct of Operations Requirements for 
DOE Facilities. The performance of field activities and soil remediation is governed by the 
Remedial Action Project Manager's Implementing Instructions (PMII) (BHI 2005d), applicable 
field support instructions, and specific work instructions. The PMII is based on a graded 
approach to the conduct of operations authorized by DOE Order 5480.19. The PMII are 
applicable to all WCH personnel, assigned or matrixed, who perform activities under the 
responsibility and direction of the RA Project Manager. The applicability matrix is issued and 
maintained by the RA Project Manager and identifies elements of the DOE order that apply to 
project activities, the implementing documents, and any deviations or exceptions to the DOE 
orders and guidelines. 
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Conduct of operations strongly emphasizes technical competency, workplace discipline, and 
personal accountability to ensure a high level of performance during all activities. Project 
personnel must fully comply with the PMII. If conflict arises with other instructions or 
directions, work shall be safely stopped until resolution is achieved. Safety is the first priority, 
and all planning shall include appropriate safety analyses to identify potential safety and health 
risks and the methods to appropriately mitigate these risks. Workers will not start work until 
approved safety procedures, instructions, and directions are provided for nonroutine operations. 
Conduct of operations requires workers to be alert and aware of conditions affecting the job site. 
Operators and workers conducting field activities should be notified of changes in the work area 
status, abnormalities, and difficulties encountered in performing project operations. Similarly, 
operators and workers shall notify the chain of command of any unexpected situations. 
In accordance with the severity of a finding (i.e., emergency condition), notification 
requirements will be expanded to include upper tier management and regulatory agencies. 
5.3.2 Radiological Protection 
The radiological controls and protection program is defined in DOE-approved programs and 
WCH-approved procedures. This program implements River Corridor Closure Contract policy 
to maintain radiological exposures to levels that are ALARA and to ensure adequate protection 
of workers. The WCH Radiological Protection Program meets the requirements of 10 CJ?R 835. 
Appropriate dosimetry, radiological work permits, PPE, ALARA planning, periodic surveys, and 
Radiological Control (RadCon) technical support will be provided. 
Standard WCH controls for work in radiological areas are assessed as being adequate to control 
RA project activities. These controls support the planning that identifies the specific conditions 
and govern the specific requirements for an activity, periodic radiation and contamination 
surveys of the work area, radiological material handling, and periodic or continuous observation 
of the work by RadCon. The ALARA planning process will identify shielding requirements, 
contamination control requirements (including local ventilation controls), radiation monitoring 
requirements, and other RadCon requirements for the individual tasks conducted during the 
course of remediation of the burial grounds. 
Measures are also taken to minimize the possibility of releases to the environment. Near-field air 
monitoring and commitments with the Washington State Department of Health will address the 
radionuclide inventory and activities that could cause potential release of this inventory, but not 
to the exclusion of 10 CFR 835 requirements. 
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5.3.3 Occupational Health and Safety Controls 
Remediation activities will be controlled by the site-specific health and safety plan, as required 
by established WClWRiver Corridor Closure Project procedures. A site-specific health and 
safety plan will be written for the remediation of the burial grounds to address the health and 
safety hazards of each phase of site operation and will include the requirements of a site health 
and safety plan for hazardous waste operations and/or construction activities, as specified in 
29 CFR 1910.120. 
Before work begins, a pre-job briefing is held with the affected workers. This briefing will include 
reviews of the hazards that may be encountered and the associated requirements. Throughout an 
activity, daily briefings may also be held, as well as special briefings before major evolutions. 
Operations during the remediation of the burial grounds that involve potentially significant 
nonradiological hazards include the following: 
Asbestos cleanup 
Hot work 
Lead cleanup 
Cleanup of polychlorinated biphenyls 
Biological (insect bites and snakes) 
Temperature extremes 
Working in close proximity to moving equipment 
Possible exposure to organic and inorganic chemicals 
Uneven working surfaces 
Excavation 
Noise. 
5.3.4 Training Requirements and Qualifications 
The experience and capabilities of the operating staff are extremely important in maintaining 
worker and environmental safety. Burial grounds remediation requires the employment of 
workers dedicated to the project for the duration of the radiological efforts. Day-to-day 
knowledge of ongoing operations, month-to-month understanding of conditions encountered, and 
ongoing understanding of lessons learned is vital to continued safe operation. 
Training requirements will ensure that personnel have been instructed in the technologies to 
work safely in and around radiological areas and to maintain their individual radiation exposure 
and the radiation exposures of others ALARA. Standardized core courses and training material 
will be presented, and site-specific information and technologies will be added to adequately 
train workers. 
RadCon technicians must complete and be current in qualification training. Nonradiological 
control technician radiological workers must meet the training (Le., General Employee 
Radiological Training, RadWorker I, RadWorker 11) requirements stipulated in applicable 
RadCon procedures; this is based on areas to be entered and the types of activities performed. 
FHC for the Remediation of 118-D-I, 118-0-2, 118-0-3, 118-H-I, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Solid Waste Burial Grounds 
April 2007 5-4 
Controls and Commitments 
WCH-50 
Rev. 2 
These training courses require the successful completion of examinations to demonstrate 
understanding of theoretical and classroom material. 
Safety of crane operations is enhanced by operator training (only trained and qualified operators 
that meet the subcontractor’s safety plan and training requirements are allowed to operate the 
cranes) and periodic maintenance and inspection of the cranes in accordance with the site safety 
plan and procedures. 
Specialized training will be provided, as needed, to instruct workers in the use of nonstandard 
equipment, in the performance of abnormal operations, and in the hazards of specific activities. 
Specialized training may be provided by on-the-job training activities, by classroom instruction 
and testing, or by pre-job briefings. The depth of training in any discipline will be 
commensurate with the degree of hazard involved and the knowledge required for task 
performance. 
Some site remediation project activities will require the acquisition of expert services, as 
opposed to project staff training. The assaying of waste packages by specialized methods are 
examples of activities requiring expert assistance. 
The WCH training program provides workers with the knowledge and skills necessary to safely 
execute assigned duties. A graded approach is used to ensure that workers receive a level of 
training commensurate with their responsibilities that complies with applicable requirements. 
5.3.5 Configuration Control 
Established configuratiodchange control processes ensure that proposed changes are reviewed in 
relation to the specified commitments. Discovered conditions will be evaluated under the FHC 
evaluation process so that stabilization and/or recovery actions may be identified and 
implemented, as appropriate. WCH off-normal event procedures describe the reporting process 
and protocol applicable to such a discovery. 
5.3.6 Quality Assurance 
The WCH Quality Assurance Program Plan consolidates the quality program requirements of the 
WCH prime contract and applicable regulation and DOE orders. It also describes how the 
quality program requirements are implemented through a system of manuals and procedures. 
The Quality Assurance Program Plan has been reviewed and approved by DOE as meeting the 
requirements of 10 CFR 830.120. 
5.3.7 Fire Protection. 
The WCH Fire Protection Program complies with the appropriate requirements of applicable 
CFR and National Fire Protection Association criteria, as well as the additional requirements of 
DOE Headquarters and the Richland Operations Office directives included in the WCH contract. 
The WCH Fire Protection Program was developed to the guidance of the DOE Fire Protection 
Handbook (DOE 1996a). The fire protection implementing procedures are grouped into the 
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following major areas: management and administration, fire protection design, fire protection 
systems, fire prevention procedures, and special hazard protection procedures. 
Each major area contains individual implementing procedures that address the full range of 
hazards and controls in accordance with the appropriate guidance of DOE (1996a). 
5.3.8 Emergency Management 
The WCH Emergency Management Program (including preparedness, planning, and response) 
contains the administrative responsibilities for compliance with the Hanford Emergency 
Management Plan (DOE-RL, 1999). The program contains emergency action plans for 
WCH-managed projects. An emergency action plan will be developed to include the 118-D-1, 
118-D-2, 11 8-D-3, 118-H-1, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Burial Grounds and will be part of Vol. 2 
when developed. The emergency response actions within the emergency action plan will be 
provided to recognize incidents and/or abnormal conditions, initiate initial protective actions, and 
mdke the proper notifications. The emergency action plan will be consistent with Hanford Site 
emergency procedures and will meet the requirements of DOE-RL (1 999), applicable 
DOE orders, and state and federal regulations. 
All emergency planning and preparedness activities will be consistent with planning and 
preparedness actions undertaken by other Hanford Site contractors and similar projects. 
Activities will be in a manner that ensures the health and safety of workers and the public and the 
protection of the environment in the event of an abnormal incident or emergency at the burial 
grounds. 
Project response to any emergencies (project or neighboring project incident) will be to evacuate 
personnel to a safe location and initiate the required responsibilities of the Building Emergency 
Director and other project personnel in support of the Incident Command System. 
The WCH Emergency Management Program is based on a graded approach and is 
commensurate with the hazards and consequences associated with the projects/facilities and 
activities managed by WCH (involving radioactive and nonradioactive hazardous materials) 
and/or neighboring facilities. 
5.3.9 Access Control 
Because of the nature of activities conducted at the burial grounds, various administrative 
controls will be implemented to ensure public health and safety. Personnel who have unescorted 
access to the burial grounds remediation site must meet special training requirements 
(i.e. , 24-Hour Hazardous Worker Training, Radiological Worker I1 Training, pre-job briefing, 
and required site and activity-specific reading). These training requirements provide adequate 
assurance of worker safety. 
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6. 
10 CFR 830, “Quality Assurance Requirements,” Code of Federal Regulations, as amended. 
10 CFR 835, “Occupational Radiation Protection,” Code of Federal Regulations, as amended. 
29 CFR 19 10, “Occupational Safety and Health Standards,’’ Code of Federal Regulations, 
as amended. 
40 CFR 68, “Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions,” Code of Federal Regulations, 
as amended. 
40 CFR 268, “Land Disposal Restrictions,” Code of Federal Regulations, as amended. 
Benecke, M. W., 2003, Basis for Interim Operation for Fuel Supply Shutdown Facility, 
HNF- 10 108, Rev. 0, Fluor Hanford, Richland, Washington. 
BHI, 2000, Final Hazard Classification and Auditable Safety Analysis for the 105-H Facility 
Interim Safe Storage Project, BHI-01350, Rev. 1, Bechtel Hanford, Inc., Richland, 
Washington. 
BHI 2002a, 105-H Fuel Storage Basin (FSB) Fuel Element / Target Recovery, CCN 05455 10, 
October 3, 2002, Bechtel Hanford, Inc., Richland, Washington. 
B HI, 2002b, Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility Waste Acceptance Criteria, 
BHI-00139, Rev. 4, Bechtel Hanford, Inc., Richland, Washington. 
BHI, 2002c, Potential Presence of Special Fuel Elements in 105-H Fuel Storage Basin, 
MOC-2002-00 10, September 18,2002, Bechtel Hanford, Inc., Richland, Washington. 
BHI, 2004, Final Hazard Classification and Auditable Safety Analysis for the 105-H Facility 
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Washington. 
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118-D-1, 118-D-2,118-D- 
BURIAL GROUND 
HAZARD IDENTIFICATI 
Table A-1 has six colums; the column headings and content are described as follows: 
Column 1 - Hazard Type: This column identifies the following types of hazards 
investigated : radio logic a1 (including radioactive material and direct radiation) , fissile 
material, toxic hazards, carcinogenic hazards, biohazards, asphyxiates, 
flammable/combustible material, reactive material, explosive material, electrical energy, 
thermal energy, kinetic energy, noise, seismic, and high wind and water intrusion. 
Column 2 - Location: This column identifies the location where these activities are to be 
performed. 
orm: This column specifies the forrn of the hazard type. This column is not 
intended to provide a detailed identification of the chemical (e.g., oxide) or physical form of 
the hazard type (e.g., crystalline). Such detail is not considered at the hazard identification 
stage of a safety analysis. 
Column 4 - Quantity: This column quantifies the hazard. Measured values are presented 
when relevant and available. 
Column 5 - Remarks: This column presents information that provides a better 
understanding of the hazard type, location, forrn, and quantity. 
eferences: This column lists the information sources used to identify the 
location, form, and quantity of a given hazard type. 
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Hazard 
Type 
tadiological 
~~ 
Contaminated dispersible 
material, including broach 
dust, desiccant, soil, and 
soft waste.b Miscellaneous 
contaminated 
nondispersible debris, 
including aluminum tubes 
and tube film, aluminum 
spacers, irradiated lead- 
cadmium pieces, lead, 
splines, 25 metallic fuel 
elements, oxide, and 
miscellaneous wastes.c 
Table A-1. 11 8-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-l, 11 8-H-2, and 11 8-H-3 Burial Grounds Remediation 
Hazard Identification Table. (12 Pages) 
Location 
dl burial 
round 
itesa 
Form Quantity 
Bounding inventory for each site 
f Total j 
i Excluding j SNF 1 
Isotope 1 SNF 1 Inventory 1 
j Inventory f (Ci) 1 
j (Ci) i 
................................................................. $ .................................................................... ..................................................................... : 
Ag-l08m j 2.56E-02 / ................................................................. r .......................................................................................................................................... : 
Am-241 f 1.02E+00 f 2.96Et-00 1 
................................................................. ‘ ..................................................................... L ..................................................................... : Ba-133 2.66E-02 f 
C-14 1 1.01Et-00 j ................................................................. i. .................................................................... i. .................................................................... : 
Cd-113m f 1 3.87E-03 i 
................................................................. ~ .................................................................... ..................................................................... : Ca-41 \ 7.00E-03 j 
CO-60 f 2.OOE-01 j .................................................................. * .................................................................... 4 ..................................................................... : 
Cs-137 1 1.33E+02 f 1.26Et-02 f 
Eu-152 , 1.80E-01 f 5.33E-04 f 
Eu-154 1.27E-01 i 
.................................................................. j ..................................................................... (. ..................................................................... : 
.................................................................. .................................................................... ~ ..................................................................... : 
Eu-155 f 1.33E-01 ’ 
: 
Kr-85 i 4.77E+00 2.74Et-00 j 
Nb-94 3.21E-02 1 4.00E-03 i 
.................................................................. I ..................................................................... + ..................................................................... : 
.................................................................. .................................................................... ..................................................................... Ni-59 L j 6.14Et-00 * f : 
Ni-63 1 2.29Et-01 1 
Pd-107 j f 1.00E-04 j 
.................................................................. .................................................................... ...................................................................... I 
Pu-238 1 5.22E-02 8.54E-02 1 .................................................................. ~ .................................................................... ~ ...................................................................... 
Pu-239 i 6.32E-02 j 6.00Et-00 j 
Pu-240 f . 1.5OE+OO 
.................................................................. I ..................................................................... 1 ..................................................................... : 
Pu-241 f 1.95Et-01 f 
Se-79 1 5.59E-01 . 1 1.00E-03 1 
Sm-151 f f 1.71Et-00 f 
.................................................................. ‘ ..................................................................... * ..................................................................... : 
.................................................................. .................................................................... ~ ...................................................................... 
Sr-90 1 1.41E+00 ! 1.24Et-02 
Tc-99 1 9.99E-02 j 5.00E+00 .................................................................. <.....................................................................* ............................................... : 
U-235 f 7.51E-02 f 
U-238 1 7.66E-02 1 3.00E-02 1 .................................................................. < ........................................................................................................................................... : 
Zr-93 j f 1.00E-02 1 
Remarks 
Issumptions: 
1 3.6 kg assumed mass 
per fuel element, 25 
fuel elements, for a 
total of 90 kg (198 lb) 
of fuel. 
20% of the elements 
are assumed to be 
damaged, of which 
0.1% is oxidized and 
available for release. 
References 
)100D-CA-N0050 
:WCH 2006a) and 
IWCH 2006b) 
1100H-CA-NO027 
Table A-1. 11 8-D-1311 8-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-l, 11 8-H-2, and 11 8-H-3 Burial Grounds Remediation 
Hazard Identification Table. (12 Pages) 
Hazard 
Type 
Quantity Remarks References Location Form 
:ontaminated debris mixed 
vith soil, including 
iluminum tubes and tube 
ilm, aluminum spacers, 
rradiated lead-cadmium 
ieces, lead, splines, fuel 
dements or pieces, and soft 
vaste. b 
The criticality screening 
and evaluation identifies 
specific controls 
associated with handling 
and storage of standard 
he1 (controls are also 
established for other types 
of fuels not expected to 
be encountered) if found 
during the remediation of 
these six sites. 
1. 0100D-CA-NO050 
(WCH 2006a) and 
(WCH 2006b) 
Evaluations 
and 
and OOOOX-CA- 
NO011 (WCH 
2006c) 
0 100H-CA-NO027 
2. Criticality 
0100D-CE-NO008 
0100H-CE-NO003 
;issionable 
naterial 
ill burial 
;round 
ites 
Bounding burial ground 
Nonfuel (Ci) Fuel (Ci) Isotope 
Am-24 1 
Pu-23 8 
Pu-239 
Pu-240 
Pu-24 1 
U-235 
U-23 8 
1.02Et-00 
5.22E-02 
6.32E-02 
-- 
-- 
7.5 1E-02 
'7.66E-02 
2.96E+OO 
8.54E-02 
6.00E+00 
1.5OEt-00 
1.95E+01 
-- 
3.00E--02 
I11 burial 
ground 
lites 
Zontaminated soil and solic 
vastes (e.g., boron, 
:admiurn, mercury from 
:hermometers, 
nanometers), lead sheets, 
)ricks, and lead wool. 
The mass values were 
converted to kilograms 
from the tons values that 
are presented in Miller 
and Wahlen (1987). 
The nonradiological 
inventory sum of 
fractions are above unity 
for 40 CFR 302.4, 
Table 302.4 RQs. The 
TQs listed in 
29 CFR 1910.119, 
Appendix A and 
40 CFR 68.130, Tables 1 
through 4 do not 
have TQs for the 
nonradiological 
substances found in the 
burial grounds, therefore 
would increases in the 
quantities listed would 
not affect the 
categorization. 
1. 40 CFR 355 
2. 0100D-CA-NO050 
(WCH 2006a) and 
(WCH 2006b) 
0100H-CA-NO027 
roxic 
naterial 
List of all chemicals 
contaminants in bounding 
Contaminant 
burial ground (kg) 
f 8.54Et-03 
f 3.01Et-05 
j 2.25E+04 
, ...................................................................................... 
....................................................................................... 
f Cadmium f 
f Lead 
, Mercury 1 
> ................................................................ : 
> ................................................................. 
f Arsenic I f 8,43E+02 
I 3.48E+03 
, ...................................................................................... 
/ Chromium f 
L ................................................................. 
! Barium 1 2.73E+04 
Selenium I 
Silver 
TPH 
................................................................ : 
................................................................ : 
................................................................ ! 
f 2.57E+02 
f 5.13Et-01 
j 4.05E+03 
, ...................................................................................... 
x ...................................................................................... 
Hazard 
Type 
zarcinogens 
Table A-1. 11 8-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-l, 11 8-H-2, and 11 8-H-3 Burial Grounds Remediation 
Hazard Identification Table. (12 Pages) 
Location 
111 burial 
;round 
ites 
Form 
zadmium, lead, and 
lotentially other 
undocumented) 
:ontaminants in soil and as 
Iarious forms of solid 
waste. 
Quantity 
Carcinogen 
Cadmium 1 
Lead 
Mercury j 
Arsenic f 
............................................................. : 
............................................................. ‘! 
.............................................................. : 
chromium / 
Barium 
Selenium 1 
Silver 
TPH 
............................................................... 
.............................................................. : 
.............................................................. : 
............................................................... 
............................................................... 
List of all chemicals 
contaminants in bounding 
b u i k g )  
. 8.54Et-03 / . 3.01Et-05 
1 2.25Et-04 
I 8.43Et-02 ’ 3.48Et-03 
L ................................................................... 
> ................................................................... 
~ ................................................................... 
.................................................................... 
1 2.73E+04 
f 2.57Et-02 
f 5.13Et-01 
/ 4.05Et-03 
, ................................................................... 
i. ................................................................... 
.................................................................... 
..................................................................... 
Remarks 
The mass values reported 
were converted to 
kilograms fi-om the “tons” 
values that are presented 
in the cited reference. 
Cadmium and cadmium 
compounds are “known to 
be human carcinogens.” 
Lead in the acetate or 
phosphate forms is 
“reasonably anticipated to 
be a human carcinogen” 
The nonradiological 
inventory sum of 
fractions are above unity 
for 40 CFR 302.4, 
Table 302.4 RQs. The 
TQs listed in 
29 CFR 1910.119, 
Appendix A and 
40 CFR 68.130, Tables 1 
through 4 do not 
have TQs for the 
nonradiological 
substances found in the 
burial grounds. 
References 
)100D-CA-N0050 
:WCH 2006a) and 
:WCH 2006b) 
1100H-CA-0027 
Hazard 
liohazards 
Type 
Re marks 
isphyxiates 
References 
'lammable 
naterial 
Information based on 
past experience on 
'remediation of burial 
grounds (e.g., 
100-B/C) 
Table A-1. 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Burial Grounds Remediation 
Hazard Identification Table. (12 Pages) 
The potential for the 
;ollection of asphyxiate 
;ases to dangerous 
;oncentrations is not 
xedible because of the 
size of the waste site. 
4ctivities will be carried 
mt in outdoor, well- 
ventilated areas. 
Location 
Information based on 
past experience on 
remediation of burial 
grounds (e.g., 
1 00-B/C) 
411 burial 
;round 
sites 
sause a significant release 
Df hazardous substances 
due to the lack of 
Gombustibles, especially 
vegetation that is 
necessary to propagate a 
Eire within the 
remediation site. 
411 burial 
ground 
sites 
All burial 
ground 
sites 
All burial 
ground 
sites 
Form 
nsecthodent bites and 
xcrement. 
Ieavier-than-air gases. 
tange fire or onsite fire. 
Miscellaneous 
combustibles , including 
plastic, masking tape, 
paper, clothing, and used 
rags. Pyrophoric material. 
Quantity 
Jndefined quantities. 
&antities of such materials will be kept to the 
ninimum needed to support the project. The 
Following are estimatedhepresentative quantities 
%re not meant to be bounding quantities: 
4cetylene 45 kg (100 lb) 
Propane 400 L (106 gal) 
Minimal quantities of vegetation and combustible 
materials. Radiation area remedial action activities 
will include steps taken to ensure that most of the 
site remains vegetation free before and during 
remediation. Limited quantities of sagebrush and 
grasses. 
Soft waste is conservatively assumed to make up 
more than 75% of the waste volume in the trenches 
but contain a small percentage (5%) of the total 
radionuclide inventory. 
rhese hazards are 
:outinely encountered in 
ndustry , 
Miller and Wahlen, 
Section 4.10, 
Tables A.l, B.l, B.2, 
and 11 
1987, WHC-EP-0087, 
Hazard 
Type 
Zorrosive 
naterial 
Table A-1. 118-D-1,118-D-2,11S-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Burial Grounds Remediation 
Hazard Identification Table. (12 Pages) 
Location 
ill burial 
;round 
ites 
411 burial 
ground 
lites 
Form 
iuels and oils. 
Various residual liquids 
md solids waste items. 
Quantity 
&antities of such materials will be kept to the 
ninimum needed to support the project. The 
ollowing are estimatedrepresentative quantities 
ire not meant to be bounding quantities: 
'lanxnables 
Sasoline - 190 L (50 gal) 
liesel - 7,600 L (2,000 gal 
Lubricating Oil - 570 : (150 gal) 
Lubricating Grease - 360 kg (800 lb) 
?aints, solvents, adhesives, cleaners, etc. - 380 L 
:lo0 gal) 
4ntifreeze - 450 L (120 gal) 
3rake Fluid - 19 L (5 gal) 
!lydraulic/transmission fluid - 760 L (200 gal) 
Zlompressed Gases 
4cetylene - 45 kg (100 lb) 
3xygen - 45 kg (100 lb) 
?ropane - 400 L (106 gal) 
Lecords do not indicate that specific liquid wastes 
were disposed of at this site. 
Remarks 
'uels and oils are found 
n vehicles brought onsite 
is part of the remediation 
ictivities. 
rhese materials will not 
)e stored close to the site. 
Some liquids have been 
Found in minimal 
pantities at other similar 
)urial grounds. 
References 
[nformation based on 
3ast experience on 
:emediation of burial 
;rounds (e.g., 
100-B/C) 
1. Miller and Wahlen, 
0087, Section 4.10, 
Tables A.1, B.1, 
B.2, and 11 
?. Information based 
on past experience 
on remediation of 
burial grounds 
(e.g., lOO-B/C) 
1987, WCH-EP- 
Hazard 
Type 
Sxplosive 
naterial 
Quantity 
teat tive 
Remarks 
Table A-1. 11 8-D-1,~18-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Burial Grounds Remediation 
Hazard Identification Table. (12 Pages) 
Mercury f 2.25E+04 
... Arsenic f 8.43E+02 I 
Chromium f 3.48Et-03 f 
Barium i 2.73E+04 
/ 2.57E+02 1 Selenium 
Silver j 5.13E+01 f 
TPH 1 4.05Et-03 
............................................................................................................................................... : 
...................................................................... .i .......................................................................... : 
....................................................................... a .......................................................................... : 
.................................................................................................................................................. : 
Location 
tellurium. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, hydrogen 
peroxide, and acids. 
411 burial 
;round 
sites 
All burial 
ground 
sites 
All burial 
ground 
sites 
Form 
Zanisters and pressurized 
bottles of oxy-acetylene, 
iropane, oxygen, and 
psoline in equipment fuel 
a r k s  and in other approved 
torage containers. 
iluminum pieces, spacers, 
plines, and tubes. 
,eadcadmium pieces, 
,pacers, and shielding. 
)uantities of such materials will be kept to the 
ninimum needed to support the project. The 
ollowing are estimatedrepresentative quantities: 
3asoline - 190 L (50 gal) 
Xesel - 7,600 L (2,000 gal) 
'aints, solvents, adhesives, cleaners, etc. - 380 L 
100 gal) 
icetylene - 45 kg (1 00 lb) 
lxygen - 45 kg (100 lb) 
'ropane - 400 L (106 gal) 
None. 
hydrocarbons. Ignition 
may occur if powders are 
mixed with halogens, 
carbon disulfide, or 
Incompatible with strong 
...................................................................... .1 .......................................................................... : 
/ 3.01Et-05 I 
...................................................................... ~ .......................................................................... : 
Lead oxidizers; elemental 
sulfur, selenium, and 
References 
Information based on 
past experience on 
remediation of burial 
grounds (e.g., 
100-B/C) 
Miller and Wahlen, 
3087, Table 11 
'WCH 2006a) and 
100H-CA-NO027 
:WCH 2006b) 
1987, WHC-EP- 
3100D-CA-NO050 
1. Miller and Wahlen, 
1987, WHC-EP- 
0087, Table 11 
and 100-NR-1 
designs and 
experience 
(WCH 2006a) and 
(WCH 2006b) 
2. Based on 300-FF-1 
3. 0100D-CA-NO050 
0 100H-CA-NO027 
Hazard 
Type 
electrical 
Linetic 
nergy 
Cinetic and 
Jotential 
mergy 
Table A-1. 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 11 8-H-3 Burial Grounds Remediation 
Hazard Identification Table. (12 Pages) 
Location 
ill burial 
;round 
ites 
I11 burial 
;round 
ites 
411 burial 
Sround 
sites 
Form 
'rimarily supply lines 
utside of the excavation 
ence for office trailers and 
nalytical needs. Some 
vaste sites have high- 
roltage lines that need to be 
aken into consideration 
)rior to initiating work 
ictivities. 
'ressurized gas bottles 
e. g . , oxy-acetylene) . 
Spilling loads of soillfalling 
:quipment, dropped 
'Ecology Block," or 
nachinery, vehicle 
.mpacting the contaminated 
soil, combustible and 
ioncombustible solids 
including fuel elements 
juring remediation 
xtivities. 
Quantity 
Temporary low-voltage generators, portable 
welders, and/or light plants may be used within or 
adjacent to the site. High-voltage power lines may 
need to deactivated or rerouted. 
Such materials will be kept to the minimum needed 
to support the project (see explosive material). 
Project estimates are not meant to be bounding 
quantities: bucket volume of 6.5 m3 (8.5 yd3) of 
soil. 
Remarks 
rhese hazards are 
routinely encountered in 
industry. 
A pressurized missile 
sould strike a patch of 
sontaminated soil, 
resulting in a release of 
material. Heavy 
machinery could collide 
with the tanks causing a 
catastrophic failure/ 
explosion of tank and 
potential struck by 
hazard, as well as ''pufl" 
release of contaminated 
soil. 
A falling load could cause 
a puff-type release of 
readily breathable 
contaminated soils to be 
suspended in air or could 
collide with contaminated 
combustibles or 
noncombustibles. 
References 
nformation based on 
last experience on 
Semediation of burial 
;rounds (e.g., 
100-B/C) 
Based on information 
From the site technical 
representative for 
1 00-B/C project 
Hazard 
Type 
Linetic and 
lotential 
:nergy 
cont .) 
ligh wind 
Table A-1. 11 8-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 11 8-H-3 Burial Grounds Remediation 
Hazard Identification Table. (12 Pages) 
Location 
i l l  burial 
ground 
;ites 
411 burial 
zround 
sites 
Form 
4ircraft impact. 
Machinery/equipment. 
High wind of sufficient 
velocity to suspend 
Zontaminated soil. 
Quantity Remarks 
Y/A The Hanford Site is 
subject to very limited 
aircraft traffic due to 
relative location of 
airports and normal air 
traffic patterns. 
Undefined quantities. These hazards are 
routinely encountered in 
industry. 
~~ 
The maximum peak gust wind speed at Hanford 
was 129 km/hr (80 mph) (1972). The annual 
average for number of days with peak gusts in 
excess of 80 km/hr (50 mph) is 5.0 days. 
Winds in excess of 40 krn/hr (25 mph sustained) 
occur slightly more than 1% of the time, on an 
annual basis. 
Some fraction of the dry, 
contaminated soils will be 
suspended in air. 
High winds could cause 
debris to be thrown (a 
missile), causing a kinetic 
energy hazard or causing 
a “puff’ release if this 
material strikes 
contaminated soil. 
References 
IOE-RL, 1996, 
rables B-14 and B-15 
-- 
loitink et al., 2005, 
”NL-  15 160 
Hazard 
Type 
Vater 
ntrusion 
Table A-1. 11 8-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-l, 11 8-H-2, and 11 8-H-3 Burial Grounds Remediation 
Hazard Identification Table. (12 Pages) 
Location 
111 burial 
;round 
ites 
Form 
iquids used for dust or fire 
ippression. 
looding from the 
lolumbia River. 
Quantity 
Jndefined quantities. 
The maximum floods on record occurred in 1894 
2nd 1948, with peak flows at the Hanford Site 
xtimated at 2 1,000 m3/s (27,468 yd3/s) and 
20,000 m3/s, (26,160 yd3/s) respectively 
[Neitzel 1997). These floods occurred before the 
Priest Rapids Dam and several other upriver dams 
had been constructed. The flow regulation 
resulting from the upriver dams significantly 
lessens the projected intensity of the potential 
1,000-year flood to about 12,400 m3/s, 
[ 16,2 19 yd3/s) called a 1,000-year regulated flood. 
The regulated flood of 1997 was just under this 
level. Thus, a 1,000-year flood would not inundate 
any of the reactor areas or 100 Area burial grounds 
(DOE-RL 2005). 
Remarks 
The arid-to-semiarid 
Aimate suggests that 
ittle, if any, surface water 
will accumulate within the 
:xcavation. Most 
xecipitation is lost through 
:vapotranspiration. In 
iddition, the transmissive 
iature of the surface soils 
2llows rapid infiltration of 
xecipitation. 
Zonsequently, little water 
yemains to generate 
surface runoff. 
The quantities of water 
xed  for dust or fire 
suppression will be 
relatively minimal. 
Spread of contamination 
Zould occur. 
The probable maximum 
flood of the Columbia 
River is not anticipated to 
inundate the lOO-D/DR or 
100-H Area. 
References 
. . Neitzel, D. A., 
1997 
!. DOE-RL, 2005 
Hazard 
Type 
Jatural 
Ihenornena 
Table A-1. 118-D-1 
Location 
411 burial 
;round 
;ites 
11 S-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-l, 11 8-H-2, and 11 8-H-3 Burial Grounds Remediation 
Hazard Identification Table. (12 Pages) 
Form 
{ainwater, snow, and ice. 
Quantity 1 Remarks 
\Tot applicable. Spread of contamination 
could occur. 
The arid-to-semiarid 
climate suggests that 
little, if any, surface water 
will accumulate within 
the excavation. Most 
precipitation is lost 
through 
evapotranspiration. In 
addition, the transmissive 
nature of the surface soils 
allows rapid infiltration oJ 
precipitation. 
Consequently, little water 
remains to generate 
surface runoff. 
References 
IOE-RL, 2005 
' I  . 
h) 
W 
Hazard 
Type 
Jatural 
henomena 
:ant .) 
Table A-1. 11 8-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-l, 11 8-H-2, and 118-H-3 Burial Grounds Remediation 
Hazard Identification Table. (12 Pages) 
Location 
ill burial 
;round 
ites 
Form 
Seismic event. 
Quantity 
i portion of the waste site could be impacted. 
Ash fall from volcanic 
activity. 
Undefined quantities. During the May 18, 1980 
eruption of Mount St. Helens, about 7.6 rnm 
(0.3 in.) of ash was deposited at the Hanford Site. 
This resulted in a wet ash loading of only 
20.4 kg/m2 (4.2 lb/ft2). 
Remarks 
Falling debris, equipment, 
and heavy machinery 
could impact contaminated 
soil and result in a puff- 
like release. 
The severity of a seismic 
event at the Hanford Site 
is not anticipated to result 
in significant impacts to 
waste site structures. 
The effects of a seismic 
event on the Hanford Site 
or other facilities and 
projects would be much 
more significant than 
those consequences that 
would occur at the 
100-D/DR and 100-H 
Burial Grounds. 
It is not anticipated that 
multiple accident events 
would be initiated as a 
result of a seismic event. 
Historically, only 
minimal amounts of ash 
accumulation resulting 
from volcanic activity 
have occurred at the 
Hanford Site. This could 
result in coating of 
exposed surfaces at the 
excavation site; however, 
it would not result in a 
release of material. 
References 
Hazard 
Type 
qatural 
)henomena 
cont.) 
Remarks 
Zxp o sure 
References 
Table A-1 . 11 8-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-l, 11 8 H-2, and 11 8-]Hi-3 Burial Grounds Remediation 
Hazard Identification Table. (12 Pages) 
Temperature extremes 
range from -29 to 46°C 
(-20 to 115°F). 
Location 
Hoitink, D. J. et a1 
2005, PNNL-15 160, 
ill burial 
;round 
ites 
Lightning could initiate a 
brush fire. See remarks 
for flammability and 
kinetidpotential energy 
hazard types. 
ill burial 
ground 
iites 
Hoitink, D. J. et al., 
2005, PNNL-15160, 
Form 
Various programmatic 
and safety and health 
controls are in place to 
protect the worker 
Extreme temperatures. 
0 100D-CA-NO050 
(WCH 2006a) and 
0 100H-CA-NO027 
(WCH 2006b) 
Lightning. 
Radiological and hazardous 
materials exposure from 
debridmaterial (including 
direct exposure to high- 
energy gamma emitters 
such as cobalt-60). 
Exposed hardware included 
wire with graphite, spacers, 
pipes, and bottles. 
Radiological dose rates 
from SNF. 
Quantity 
Undefined quantities. 
The average number of thunderstorms at the 
Hanford Site is 10, primarily occurring in June, 
July, and August. 
Surveys of partially exposed hardware at the 
1 18-B-1 site produced radiological exposure rate 
estimates that ranged from 500 rnIUhr to 30 Whr, 
on contact. These elevated exposure rates were 
found intermittently, not consistently, and were 
only associated with various parts of internal 
reactor hardware as they were unearthed. Similar 
exposure rates are expected at the lOO-D/DR and 
100-H Burial Grounds. 
Legacy SNF found at other burial grounds and fkel 
storage basins have experience dose rates from 
cesium-137 of up to 150 Whr, but are commonly 30 
to 40 Whr on average. 
a “All burial ground sites” include the 1 18-D-1, 1 18-D-2, 1 18-D-3, 1 18-H-1, 1 18-H-2, and 1 18-H-3 Burial Ground waste sites. 
Soft waste includes paper, masking tape, plastic, wiping rags, etc. 
Miscellaneous waste includes gunbarrels, nozzles, pigtails, horizontal control rods, vertical safety rods, aluminum thimbles, and miscellaneous reactor 
maintenance tools. 
CFR = Code of Federal Regulations 
N/A = not applicable 
RQ = reportable quantity 
SNF = spent nuclear fuel 
TQ = threshold quantity 
Appendix A - 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, 
and 118-H-3 Burial Grounds Remediation Project WCH-50 
dentification Table Rev. 2 
REFERENCES 
29 CFR 19 10, “Occupational Safety and Health Standards,” Code of Federal Regulations, 
as amended. 
40 CFR 68, “Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions,” Code of Federal Regulations, 
as amended. 
40 CFR 3 02, “Designation, Reportable Quantities, and Notification,” Code of Federal 
Regulations, as amended. 
40 CFR 355, “List of Extremely Hazardous Substances and Their Threshold Planning 
Quantities,” Code of Federal Regulations, as amended. 
DOE-RL, 1996, Appendix B, Table B-14, Accident Analysis for Aircraft Crash into Hazardous 
Facilities, DOE-STD-30- 1496, US.  Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office, 
Richland, Washington. 
DOE-RL, 2005, Remedial Design RepodRemedial Action Work Plan for the 100 Area, 
DOERL-96-17, Rev. 5, U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office, 
Richland, Washington. 
Hoitink, D. J., J. V. Ramsdell, K. W. Burk, and W. J. Shaw, 2005, Hanford Site Climatological 
Data Summa y 2004 With Historical Data, PNNL- 15 160, Pacific Northwest National 
Laboratory, Richland, Washington. 
Miller, R. L. and R. K. Whalen, 1987, Estimates of Solid Waste Buried in the 100 Area Burial 
Grounds, Tables 9, 10, 11 and B.7, WHC-EP-0087, Westinghouse Hanford Company, 
Richland, Washington. 
Neitzel, D. A. (Ed.), 1997, Hanford Site National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
Characterization, PNNL-64 1 5, Rev. 9, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, 
Washington. 
WCH, 2006a, Determination of Material at Risk and Hazard Screening for 100-D/DR Burial 
Grounds and Remaining Sites, 01 00D-CA-N0050, Rev. 1, Washington Closure Hanford, 
Richland, Washington. 
WCH, 2006b, Determination of Material at Risk and Hazard Screening for 100-H Burial 
Grounds and Remaining Sites, 01 00H-CA-N0027, Rev. 1, Washington Closure Hanford, 
Richland, Washington. 
FHC for  the Reinediation of 11 8-0-1, 11 8-0-2, 11 8-0-3, 11 8-11-1, 11 8-1-1-2, and I1  8-H-3 Solid Waste Burial Grounds 
April 2007 A-14 
Appendix A - 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H=1,118-H-2, 
Hazard ~ d e n t ~ ~ c a t i o n  Table Rev. 2 
urial Grounds Remed WCH-50 
WCH, 2006c, Evaluations and Comparisons of Various Spent Nuclear Fuel Inventories, 
0000X-CA-NO0 1 1, Rev. 0, Washington Closure Hanford, Richland, Washington. 
FHC for the Rernediation of I 18-D- I, I 18-0-2, I 18-0-3, I 18-H-I, I 18-H-2, and I 18-H-3 Solid Taste Burial Grounds 
April 2007 A-1 5 
Appendix A - 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H=1,118-H-2, 
and 118-33-3 Burial Grounds Remediation Project 
Hazard Ident fication Table 
WCH-50 
Rev. 2 
FHC for the Remediation of 11 8-0-1, 11 8-0-2, 11 8-D-3, 11 8-H-1, 11 8-H-2, and 11 8-H-3 Solid Waste Burial Grounds 
April 2007 A-16 
WCH-50 
Rev. 2 
APPENDIX B 
-19118-D-29 118- -3,118-H-19118- -2,AND 118- 
AL GROUNDS 
HAZARD EVALUATION TABLE 
FHC for the Remediation of I 18-0-1, I1 8-0-2, I 18-0-3, I1 8-H-1, 118-H-2, and I 18-H-3 Solid Waste Burial Grounds 
April 2007 B -i 
WCH-50 
Rev. 2 
FHC for  the Rernediation of 11 8-0-1, 11 8-1)-2, I1 8-0-3, I 1  8-H-I, 11 8-H-2, and 11 8-H-3 Solid Waste Burial Grounds 
April 2007 B-ii 
- 1 18-D-1,118-D-2, 11 8-D-3,l18-H-lI, 11 8- 
Burial Grounds Remediation Project WCH-50 
Hazard Evaluation Table Rev. 2 
APPENDIX 
118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,1 
BURIAL GROUN S IRIEIMEDIAT 
VALUATION 
B.l GENERAL METHODOLOGY 
All events that could result in a potential release of hazardous substances were evaluated using 
the following approach: 
Events were grouped into three categories: operationaVintema1 events, natural phenomena 
events, and extemal/man-made events. 
Events that were not applicable (e.g., flooding due to probable maximum flood, failure of 
engineered ventilation or filtration systems) were noted as not applicable (N/A). 
Frequency, Consequence, and Risk rankings were not assigned for events (such as loss of 
power to equipment) that could not result in a release of hazardous substances. These events 
are noted as not evaluated (N/E) in the corresponding colums. 
Consequence and Risk rankings were not assigned to events with an assigned unmitigated 
frequency of D, beyond extremely unlikely. N/E is noted in the corresponding columns. 
B.l.1 Frequency Ranks 
Frequency ranks were assigned using the following guidelines and the event frequency rank 
chart shown below. 
The frequency of the initiating event is the unrnitigatedfrequency. 
Initiating events that involved human error were assigned an unmitigated frequency rank 
of A. 
Initiating events that involved failure of an active component were assigned an unmitigated 
frequency rank of A. 
Initiating events that involved failure of a passive component, were assigned an unmitigated 
frequency rank of B. 
Fire initiators involving use of an ignition source (e.g., vehicle exhaust systems, compressed 
gas torches) were .assigned a frequency rank of A. 
FHC for  the Remediation of 118-0-1, 118-0-2, 118-0-3, 118-11-1, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Solid Waste Burial Grounds 
April 2007 B- 1 
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Unlikely 
Extremely unlikely 
0 Frequency assigned to natural phenomenon events assigned consistent with frequenc y of 
applicable evaluation basis event. 
B Not anticipated to occur during the life of the facility 1E-04 to 1E-02 
C Probably will not occur in the life of the facility 1E-06 to 1E-04 
0 Events that would not result in a potential release of hazardous substances (e.g., loss of 
power caused by vehicle accident) were not evaluated for frequency. 
Beyond extremely unlikely 
Event Frequency Ranks. 
D All other events <1E-06 
Term 
Term Rank Dose Range 
High 1 >25 rem TEDE 
Moderate 2 1 to 25 remTEDE 
Low 3 0.1 to 1 rem TEDE 
Negligible 4 <0.1 rem TEDE 
I Rank I 
Concentration Range 
>ERPG-2/TEEL-2 
ERPG- l/TEEL- 1 to ERPG-2/TEEL-2 
<ERPG- l/TEEL- 1 to ERPG-2/TEEL-2 
KERPG- 1 /TEEL- 1 
Description Frequency Range I (yr-1) 
I Anticipated I A I May occur several times in the life of the facility I >1E-02 I 
B.2 CONSEQUENCE RANKS 
Consequence ranks for the public, co-located worker, and facility worker were assigned based on 
anticipated unmitigated dose using the following charts. For events that were assigned a 
frequency of beyond extremely unlikely (event frequency D), the consequences were not 
evaluated. 
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Appendix B - 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,ll8-H-l, 118-H-2, 
-3 Burial Grounds Remediation Project 
Hazard Evaluation Table 
Term Rank 
High 1 
Moderate 2 
Low 3 
Negligible 4 
WCH-50 
Rev. 2 
Dose Range Concentration Range 
>lo0 rem TEDE >ERPG-3/TEEL-3 
25 to 100 rem TEDE 
1 to 25 rem TEDE 
<1 remTEDE 
ERPG-2/TEEL-2 to ERPG-3/TEEL-3 
<ERPG-l/TEEL-l to ERPG-2/TEEL-2 
<ERPG- 1 /TEEL- 1 
Consequence Rank 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Facility Worker Consequence Ranks. 
Frequency Rank 
A B C D 
I I I1 I11 
I I1 I11 IV 
I11 I11 IV IV 
IV IV Iv IV 
Term I Rank I Exposure to Radioactivity or Other Hazardous Materials Characterization 
1 High Severe exposure resulting in prompt fatality or significant exposure (>lo0 rem TEDE or severe injury) 
I Moderate I 2 I Moderate exposure (10 to 100 rem TEDE, reversible health effects) I 
lLow1 3 I Low exposure (1 to 10 rem TEDE, rninor health effects) I 
INenlifiible I 4 I<Low I 
TEDE = total effective dose equivalent 
B.2.1 Risk Ranks 
Unmitigated frequency and consequence ranks were used to determine unmitigated risk ranks in 
accordance with the following chart. 
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Table B-1. Evaluation of Haz rds Associated with the 11 8-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 11 8-H-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Event Item Summary Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
Type Number Initiator Location Affected Hazard Event Description Frequency Consequence Risk s s c s  Admin 
OPERATIONALdINTERNAL EVENTS (INITIATORS INTERNAL TO REMEDIATION ACTIVITIES) 
Fire 
Fire 
I A  
1B 
nproper 
ontrol of 
;nition 
ources 
lehicle 
nal function 
ill sites 
411 sites 
Soils, debris, and 
3rums/containers 
:ontaminated with 
hazardous 
substances 
(radiological, 
fissionable, 
reactive, 
carcinogenic, 
toxics, corrosive, 
flammable/ 
combustible). 
Fuel storage tanks, 
cylinders, cabinets 
containing 
flammable/ 
combustible 
liquids. 
See 1A 
Welding, cutting, grinding operations or 
improper control of other ignition sources 
[such as smoking) ignites 
flammable/combustible materials used or 
generated during remediation, resulting in an 
internal fire. The fire could result in a 
release of hazardous substances via 
entrainment. 
The fire could also cause an explosion (see 
item 2C). 
The fire could also cause an internal missile 
(see item 3A). 
Vehicle malfunction causes vehicle fire. 
Vehicle fire ignites combustible/flammable 
material used or generated during 
remediation. The fire could result in a 
release of hazardous substances via 
entrainment . 
The fire could also cause an explosion (see 
item 2C). 
The fire could also cause an internal missile 
(see item 3A). 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
GVorker: A 
Public: B 
Coloc. 
Worker: B 
Facility 
Worker: B 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV 
IV 
IV 
IV 
IV 
IV 
3ackflash arrestors 
Ind pressure 
egulators on 
velding equipment 
3raded/graveled 
oadways minimize 
pread of fire (M). 
Graded/graveled 
roadways minimize 
spread of fire (M). 
Separation of roads 
from remediation 
areas may prevent 
vehicle fire from 
causing release of 
hazardous substances 
(PI. 
rrained personnel (P). 
Safety/Fire Protection 
'rogram (see Note 1). 
lanford Fire 
Department response 
iadiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
'M) * 
ioutine vehicle 
naintenance (P). 
<afety/Fire Protection 
'rogram (see Note 1). 
lanford Fire 
Department response 
MI. 
iadiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 11 8-D-l, l l 8-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-l, 11 8-H-2, and 11 8-H-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Event 
Type 
Item 
iumber 
Summary Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
Initiator Location Affected Hazard Event Description Frequency zonsequence Risk SSCs Admin 
iee 1A Human error causes vehicle impact to 
flammable liquid storage tanks, cabinets, or 
pressurized gas cylinders, causing breach of 
tanMcabinets/cylinders and pooling of 
flammable/combustible liquids or gases. 
Introduction of an ignition source causes a 
fire resulting in a release of hazardous 
substances via entrainment. 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
IV 
IV 
Fire 1 c  'chicle 
ccident 
\I1 sites 
The fire could also cause an explosion (see 
item 2C). 
The fire could also cause an internal missile 
(see item 3A). 
:yIinders/cabinets. 
1 Awayfrom 
remediation areas 
reduces potential 
involvement of 
wastes (P) (M). 
1 In areas cleared of 
vegetation 
minimizes spread 
of fire (M). 
(one. Fire 1D lhemical 
eactionl 
utoignition 
If 
lyrophori c 
naterial 
411 sites See 1A Rapid oxidation of pyrophoric material (e.g., 
zirconium) occurs during handling of debris 
resulting in autoignition and a fire resulting 
in a release of hazardous substances via 
en trainmen t . 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
;afety/Fire Protection 
'rogram (see Note 1). 
tadi ation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
Should fire occur with facility workers in the 
area, the release would not be confined and 
would be expected to disperse with air 
currents. Workers would move away, 
upwind, or evacuate the immediate area. 
Exposure to facility workers as a result of a 
fire is judged to be negligible. 
Although zirconium is a pyrophoric material, 
records indicate it is present as individual 
metal pieces from decladding events and 
process tube replacement, not as finely 
divided powderdfines required for explosive 
reactions. The potential for explosion and 
generation of an internal missile is judged 
negligible. 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 11 8-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 11 8-H-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
sscs 
Use of intrinsically 
safehonsparking 
materials when 
sealed 
drums/containers (P). 
Event 
TY Pe Admin 
Safety/Fire Protection 
Program (see Note 1). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Explosion/ 
Flash Fire 
(see 
Note 3) 
2A 
llumber 
Item t- Initiator 
Radiolytic or 
chemical 
decomposi- 
tion of waste 
(hydrogen) 
Location 
411 sites 
Summary 
Affected Hazard 
lee 1A 
Event Description 
Radiolytic decomposition of water or 
hydrocarbon materials (e.g., mineral oil) or 
chemical decomposition in sealed 
drumskontainers produces hydrogen. 
Inadvertent ignition during opening or 
handling of drums/containers results in 
burning or explosion/deflagration and release 
of hazardous substances via entrainment. 
Should ignition occur, a localized rapid burn 
(not rupture of the drum or ejection of its 
contents) is anticipated. 
Unmitigated Risk 
Frequency 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
zonsequence 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Worker: 1 
- 
Risk 
IV 
I11 
- 
I 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,11.8-H-2, and 118-H-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Event 
Type 
zxplosion/ 
Flash Fire 
(see 
Note 3) 
Item 
lumber 
2B 
Initiator 
lultiple 
auses of 
ooled 
ammable/ 
ombustible 
apors/ 
ases 
Location 
dl sites 
Summary 
Affected Hazard 
;ee IA 
Event Description 
4 pool of flammable/combustible 
/apors/gases is caused by: 
B Vehicle accident (item 1 C) 
Human error during refueling operations, 
handling or use of flammable/combustible 
gases 
tankdcylinders. 
I Deterioratioddamage of storage 
[nadvertent introduction of an ignition sourct 
3auses an explosion/deflagsation resulting in 
a release of hazardous substances via 
mtsainment . 
The explosion may also result in an intesnal 
missile (see item 3B). 
Although the frequency of an inadvertent 
release of flammable/combustible gases is 
anticipated due to human error, the 
frequency of an explosion that would result 
from these initiators is judged to be 
extremely unlikely. The remediation project 
uses relatively small volumes of 
flammable/combustible gases; accordingly, 
the potential for a release of a significant 
quantity of gas as a result of a human ersor is 
small. In addition, the gases are not stored ir 
confined areas or buildings. The gases 
would be expected to rapidly disperse, 
thereby preventing accumulations at 
concentrations that would result in an 
explosion. Should ignition occur, a small, 
localized flash fire is more likely than an 
explosion. 
Unmitigated Risk 
’requency 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
:onsequence 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Risk 
IV 
IV 
IV 
Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
sscs 
;torage 
ankk ylinderl 
abinet construction/ 
naterials provides 
esistance to damage/ 
leterioration (P). 
iiting storage tanks/ 
ylinders/cabinets. 
Away from 
remediation areas 
minimizes 
potential for 
involvement with 
waste. 
In areas cleared of 
vegetation 
minimizes spread 
of fire (M). 
In unconfined 
outdoor areas 
minimizes 
collection of 
vapordgases (P). 
3ackflow preventers 
PI. 
JL-listed pumping 
quipment (P). 
liking or double- 
valled tanks to 
ontain liquids (P). 
Admin 
,icensed vehicle 
)peratom (P). 
<afety/Fire Protection 
Isogram (see Note 1). 
-Ianford Fire 
lepartment response 
Zadiation Protection 
’rogram (see Note 2). 
‘M) . 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 11 8-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 11 8-H-3 
Burial Ground Rernediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Unmitigated Risk Event 
TY Pe 
Item 
'umber 
Summary I Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
'requency :onsequence ~ i s k l  SSCs Admin Initiator Location Affected Hazard Event Description 
4 fire imparts energy sufficient to heat and 
iressurize fuel tanks, gas cylinders, 
lammable liquid storage cabinets, or sealed 
Irums/containers, causing loss of integrity. 
f i e  rupture/explosion results in a release an( 
3urning of contents, including hazardous 
xbstances if present, via entrainment. 
f ie explosion may also result in an internal 
nissile (see item 3B). 
"he potential for a fire imparting energy 
sufficient to cause rapid pressurization and 
rupture/explosion of tanks, cylinders, drums. 
3r containers is judged unlikely. The 
2ontained materials provide a heat sink that 
will retard the heatup and pressurization 
rates, reducing the probability of catastrophi 
failure of the container, and violent ejection 
of contents. Vents may also be present (sucl 
as tanks and cylinders) or may be created by 
the heat up (such as popping of drum lids) 
that would further reduce the potential for 
catastrophic failure and ejection. 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Faci 1 i ty 
Worker: 4 
IV 
IV 
IV 
3anford Fire 
lepartment response 
MI. 
;afety/Fire Protection 
'rogram (see Note 1). 
Zadiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
?xplosion/ 
Flash Fire 
(see 
Note 3) 
2c ire .I1 sites ee 1A 'ublic: B 
Coloc. 
Vorker: B 
Facility 
Yorker: B 
Storage 
tank/cylinder/ 
cabinet construction/ 
materials provides 
some protection (P). 
Proper venting of 
tankdcabinets 
provides some 
protection (P). 
Siting storage tanks/ 
cylinderdcabinets 
away from 
remediation areas 
lessens probability of 
involvement wlwaste 
(M). 
Siting storage tanks/ 
cylinders/cabinets or 
drums in areas 
cleared of 
vegetation/ 
combustibles may 
prevent their 
involvement with 
fire (P). 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV 
IV 
Jse of dust 
;uppressants/fixatives 
In contaminated 
;oils/debris (M). 
SafetyIFire Protection 
'rogram (see Note 1). 
Spill response 
irocedures (M). 
Zadiati on Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
Internal 
Missile 
3A ;ire dl sites ;ee 1A Fire damages a pressurized cylinder, causing 
an internal missile. The internal missile 
impacts contaminated soil or debris, 
resulting in a puff-like release of hazardous 
substances via entrainment. 
The internal missile may also impactlrupture 
one or more waste drumdcontainers or fuel 
storage tanks/ cabinets, resulting in an 
airborne release of hazardous substances an( 
spilling of contents (see item 9). 
The internal missile could also cause a 
secondary fire, explosion, spill, or release of 
material. 
Public: B 
Coloc. 
Norker: B 
Facility 
Worker: B 
Drumlcontainer 
construction/material 
s provides some 
protection (M). 
tank/cylinder/ 
cabinet construction/ 
materials provides 
some protection (P). 
Siting storage tanks/ 
c ylinders/cabinets 
away from 
remediation areas 
lessens probability of 
involvement w/waste 
Iv Storage 
IV 
IV 
IV 
Drudcontainer Use of dust 
construction/material suppressants/fixatives 
s provides some on contaminated 
protection (M). soilddebris (M). 
Siting storage tanks/ Spill response 
cylinders/cabinets procedures (M). 
away from 
remediatioll areas 
lessens probability of 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Lee 1A A vehicle accident impacts equipment or 
obstructions, causing an internal missile. 
The missile may impact contaminated soil or 
debris, resulting in a puff-like release of 
hazardous substances via entrainment. 
An internal missile may also result in a 
rupturing of one or more drundcontainers, 
resulting in an airborne release of materials 
Drudcontainer 
construction/material 
s provides some 
protection 
Spill response (M). 
Of dust 
suppressants/fixatives 
on contaminated 
soilddebris (M). 
Maintaining roadways 
free of obstructions 
( 0  
Separation of normal 
roadways from active 
remediation and 
staging areas (P). 
Licensed vehicle 
operators (P). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 11 8-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-l, 11 8 H-2, and 11 8-H-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Unmitigated Risk Event 
TY Pe 
Item 
iumber 
Summary I Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
Affected Hazard I Event Description prequency Zonsequence Risk1 SSCs I Admin Initiator Location 
Public: B 
Coloc. 
Norker: B 
Facility 
Norker: B 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Internal 
Missile 
3B ixplosion ill sites ee 1A An explosion causes an internal missile that 
may impact contaminated soil or debris, 
resulting in a puff-like release of hazardous 
substances via entrainment. 
An internal missile may also result in a 
rupturing of one or more drumdcontainers, 
resulting in an airborne release of materials 
and/or spilling of drudcontainer contents 
(see item 9). 
The internal missile could also cause a 
secondary fire, explosion, spill, or release of 
material. 
linvolvekent w/waste I 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Norker: A 
Facility 
Norker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV 
IV 
IV 
Internal 
Missile 
3 c  lehicle 
ccident 
411 sites 
Table B-l* Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 118-H-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) Event 
Type 
Item 
'umber 
Summary 
Event Description 'requency :onsequence sscs Admin Initiator Location Affected Hazard 
'ublic: A 
Coloc. 
Vorker: A 
Facility 
Vorker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV 
IV 
IV 
,afety/Fire Protection 
'rogram (see Note 1). 
Jse of dust 
uppressants/fixatives 
In contaminated 
oilddebris (M). 
Ladiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
Internal 
Missile 
3D [uman error 11 sites ee 1A ;as cylinder 
onstruction/material 
provides some 
n-otection (P). 
Irudcontainer 
:onstruction/material 
provides some 
,rotection (M). 
;iting storage tanks/ 
:ylinders/cabinets 
iway from 
emediation areas 
essens probability of 
nvolvement w/waste 
Mishandling of pressurized cylinders causes 
Juncture or damage, resulting in an internal 
nissile that may impact contaminated soil or 
jebris resulting in a puff-like release of 
iazardous substances via entrainment. 
4n internal missile may also impact and 
-upture one or more drums/containers, 
-esulting in an airborne release of materials 
md/or spilling of drurdcontainer contents 
[see item 9). 
An internal missile may also cause a 
secondary fire, explosion, spill, or release of 
hazardous substances. 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Norker: A 
Facility 
Norker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
3ting size reduction/ 
Iecontamination 
)perations and 
dectric supply lines 
iway from heavy 
raffic areas reduces 
rehicle accident 
)otential (P). 
ladiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
Loss of 
Power 
4A rehicle 
ccident 
~11 sites ,ee 1A IV 
IV 
IV 
Vehicle accident or other human error causes 
loss of power to electrically powered 
equipment. 
Although the majority of project activities 
are conducted outside and do not involve the 
use of filtered or negative pressure- 
controlled areas, some project activities such 
as waste size reduction and decontamination 
may use temporary enclosures, filters, and 
exhaust fans to minimize worker exposure. 
In these cases, a loss of electrical power 
would lead to a loss of negative pressure, an( 
work would be suspended within the 
enclosure until power was restored. Because 
these activities do not require continuous 
manned operation, suspension of work 
would not initiate events that could lead to a 
significant release. Although the loss of 
negative pressure could lead to a small 
release of contamination outside the 
temporary enclosure, the energy driving the 
release is very low and the consequence of 
such a release is judged negligible. 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-l, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Event 
TY Pe 
Item 
Jumber 
Summary Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
Initiator Location Affected Hazard Event Description hxquency :onsequence Risk sscs Admin 
Loss of 
Power 
4B equipment 
ailure 
ill sites ee 1A Failure of portable electrical generators 
causes loss of power to electrically powered 
equipment. Although the majority of project 
activities are conducted outside and do not 
involve the use of filtered or negative 
pressure-controlled areas, some project 
activities such as waste size reduction and 
decontamination may use temporary 
enclosures, filters, and exhaust fans to 
minimize worker exposure. In these cases, a 
loss of electrical power would lead to a loss 
of negative pressure, and work would be 
suspended within the enclosure until power 
was restored. Because these activities do not 
require continuous manned operation, 
suspension of work would not initiate events 
that could lead to a significant release. 
Although the loss of negative pressure could 
lead to a small release of contamination 
outside the temporary enclosure, the energy 
driving the release is very low and the 
consequence of such a release is judged 
negligible. 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Norker: A 
Facility 
Norker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 .  
'reventive 
naintenance of 
lortable generators 
educes the 
ikelihood of 
;enerator failure (P). 
cadiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
IV 
rv 
IV 
IV 
IV 
IV 
Loss of 
Ventilation 
5 <quipment 
ailure 
A11 sites See 1A Although the majority of project activities 
are conducted outside and do not involve the 
use of filtered or negative pressure- 
controlled areas, some project activities such 
as waste size reduction and decontamination 
may use temporary enclosures, filters, and 
exhaust fans to minimize worker exposure. 
Mechanical equipment failure could result in 
the release of a small amount of 
contamination from inside a temporary 
enclosure. Detection of equipment failure 
would result in a suspension of work within 
the enclosure until the equipment was 
repaired. Because these activities do not 
require continuous manned operation, 
suspension of work would not initiate events 
that could lead to a significant release. 
Although the equipment failure could lead to 
a small release of contamination outside the 
temporary enclosure, the energy driving the 
release is very low and the consequence of 
such a release is judged negligible. 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Norker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
'reventive 
naintenance of 
)ortable exhausters 
educes the 
ikelihood of 
nechanical failure 
PI. 
cadiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 11 8-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 11 8-H-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Summary 
Affected Hazard 
See 1A 
iee 1A 
Event 
TY Pe Event Description 
Although the majority of project activities 
are conducted outside and do not involve the 
use of filtered or negative pressure- 
controlled areas, some project activities such 
as waste size reduction and decontamination 
may use temporary enclosures, filters, and 
exhaust fans to minimize worker exposure. 
Failure of a passive filter could result in the 
release of a small amount of contamination 
from inside a temporary enclosure. 
Detection of filter failure would result in a 
suspension of work within the enclosure 
until the filter was replaced. Because these 
activities do not require continuous manned 
operation, suspension of work would not 
initiate events that could lead to a significant 
release. Although the filter failure could lead 
to a small release of contamination outside 
the temporary enclosure, the energy driving 
the release is very low and the consequence 
of such a release is judged negligible. 
Human error in rigging, lifting, or operating 
equipment causes load of soil, debris, or 
drumkontainers to be dropped. 
Drop of soil or debris results in a puff-like 
release of hazardous substances via 
entrainment. 
Drop of drurdcontainer results in rupture of 
drum, release of hazardous substances via 
entrainment, and spillage of contents (see 
item 9). 
Effect on fuel elements. 
Filter 
Failure 
>rum/container 
onstruction/material 
provides some 
lrotection (M). 
Dropped 
Load 
Trained equipment 
operators and riggers 
(P). 
Use of dust 
suppressantshixatives 
on contaminated 
soils/debris (M). 
Spill response (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Item 
?umber 
6 
7A 
Initiator 
?Iter failure 
h m a n  err01 
Location 
All sites 
ill sites 
Unmitigated Risk 
'requency 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Norker: A 
Facility 
Norker: A 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
:onsequence 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
- 
Risk 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
- 
IV 
IV 
IV 
Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
sscs 
'reventive 
iaintenance of 
ortable exhausters 
:duces the 
kelihood of filter 
ailure (P). 
Admin 
cadi ation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
lirborne filtration 
ystems efficiency 
ested (P). 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 11 8-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-l, 11 8-H-2, and 11 8-H-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) Event 
TY Pe 
Item 
lumber 
Summary 
?requency :onsequence Risk sscs Admin Initiator Location Affected Hazard Event Description 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
Irudcontainer 
onstruction/material 
provides some 
irotection (M). 
Routine maintenance/ 
inspection of 
equipment (P). 
Use of dust 
suppressantshixatives 
on contaminated 
soils/debris (M). 
Spill response (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
7B .quipment 
iilure 
~ 1 1  sites ee 1A Equipment failure causes load of soil, debris, 
3r drumdcontainers to be dropped. 
Drop of soil or debris results in a puff-like 
pelease of hazardous substances via 
mtrainment . 
Drop of drudcontainer results in rupture of 
h m ,  release of hazardous substances via 
Entrainment and spillage of contents (see 
item 9). 
Effect on fuel elements. 
Dropped 
Load 
Impact of 
Heavy 
Loads 
itaging of excavated 
Irums/containers 
.way from heavy 
raffic areas (P). 
Trained equipment 
operators and riggers 
( 0  
Use of dust 
suppressants/fixatives 
on contaminated 
soils/debris (M). 
Spill response (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
8A Iuman error ill sites ee 1A Human error causes overturned vehicle or 
drop of heavy load/equipment. Impact on 
soil or debris results in a puff-like release of 
hazardous substances via entrainment. 
Impact on drums/containers result in rupture 
of drudcontainers, release of hazardous 
substances via entrainment, and spillage of 
contents (see item 9). 
Effect on fuel elements. 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Ill sites lee 1A Equipment failure causes overturned vehicle 
or drop of heavy equipment. Impact on soil 
or debris results in a puff-like release of 
hazardous substances via entrainment. 
Impact on drums/containers result in rupture 
of drumkontainers, release of hazardous 
substances via entrainment, and spillage of 
contents (see item 9). 
Effect on fuel elements. 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Routine maintenance/ 
inspection of 
equipment (P). 
Use of dust 
suppressants/fixatives 
on contaminated 
soilddebris (M). 
Spill response (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Impact of 
Heavy 
Loads 
8B 3quipment 
ailure 
Iedicated staging 
rea for excavated 
Irums/ containers 
lway from heavy 
raffic areas (P). 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 118-H-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Unmitigated Risk Event 
Type 
Item 
umber 
Summary I Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
I 
iisk sscs Q-equency :onsequence Admin Initiator Location Affected Hazard Event Description 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Norker: A 
Facility 
Vorker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Trained equipment 
operators and riggers 
(PI. 
Licensed vehicle 
operators (P). 
Refueling instructions 
(PI. 
Routine maintenance/ 
inspection of 
equipment and 
vehicles (P). 
Use of dust 
suppressants/fixatives 
on contaminated 
soilddebris (M). 
Spill response (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Spills 9 lultiple 
%uses 
ill sites ee 1A 1 Human error (vehicle accidents) 
1 Internal missiles 
Human error (dropped load/impact of 
heavy load) 
heavy load) 
B Equipment failure (dropped load/impact of 
nay result in spill of hazardous substances, 
iirborne release via entrainment, and spills 
If other liquids/solids. 
Spills of liquids from containers could result 
in a fire (see item 1D). 
IV Double-walled tanks 
provide some 
IV protection (P). 
Dikes, catch basins, 
other retention 
devices prevent 
spread (M). 
Staging of excavated 
drums/containers 
away from heavy 
traffic areas lessens 
potential for some 
spills (P). 
Drudcon tainer 
construction/material 
s provides some 
protection (M). 
Iv 
IV None. iee 1A Environmental exposure causes corrosion of 
drums/containers resulting in failure of 
drumskontainers during excavation, 
handling, or storage. 
Failure of drums/containers results in release 
of hazardous substances via entrainment and 
spill of contents (see item 9). 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Placing corroded 
drums/containers into 
overpacks may 
prevent subsequent 
failure of deteriorated 
drums (P). 
Spill response (M). 
Periodic inspection of 
drums/containers and 
overpacks for 
deterioration (P). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Corrosion 10 hviron- 
nental 
xposure 
1\11 sites 
IV 
IV 
N/A N/A NIA 
- 
N/A N/A Structural 
Fatigue 
11 N/A N/A N/A Although drums/containers provide some 
protection from a spill or release of contents, 
engineered structures (such as buildings and 
ventilation systems) subject to structural 
fatigue are not relied on to prevent or 
mitigate a release of hazardous substances 
during remediation. 
Table B-1 . Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 11 8-D-1 , 11 8-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-l, 11 8-H-2, and 11 8-H-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Event 
Type 
Chemical 
Reaction 
Nuclear 
Criticality 
Item 
Jumber 
12 
13 
Initiator 
ixcavation, 
andling, 
torage 
;issionable 
naterial 
Location 
ill sites 
i l l  sites 
Summary 
Affected Hazard 
'ee 1A 
;ee 1A 
Event Description 
ixcavation, handling, or storage of soils, 
ebris, or drumskontainers may expose 
(aste materials that are reactive with air or 
icompatible with other materials. This 
xposure could cause a chemical reaction 
hat would result in a release of hazardous 
ubstances via entrainment or spill. 
%e reaction could also result in a fire. 
;ee item 1D for autoignition ofpyrophoric 
naterials. 
:oncentrations of chemicals found in 
irumskontainers are generally greater than 
oncentrations found in soils and debris. 
4 criticality screening performed for the 
vaste site inventories concluded the 
oncentrations of fissionable materials were 
uch that the remediation activities could be 
:xecuted with no criticality impact. 
:ombinations of standard and non-standard 
ilements and targets are allowed provided 
he sum of the Eractions from each type 
ogether does not exceed unity. Using this 
,asis, there are no normal or credible 
ibnormal conditions that could result in 
riticality in either in a burial ground or in 
eparated batches. 
Unmitigated Risk 
Trequency 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Norker: A 
Facility 
Norker: A 
Public: D 
Coloc. 
Worker: C 
Facility 
Worker: C 
:onsequence 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Tot evaluated 
- 
Risk 
IV 
IV 
IV 
Not 
valu- 
ated 
Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
sscs Admin 
Irudcontainers Adding blanketing or 
:onstruction/material stabilizing substances 
, may prevent (e.g., water, sand, 
:xposure to air or grout mineral oil) to 
Ither incompatible pyrophoric materials 
naterials (P). ( 0  
Use of drudcontainer 
overpacks to prevent 
loss of blanketing 
liquids. 
Segregation of waste 
streams may prevent 
exposure to 
incompatible materials 
Hanford Fire 
Department response 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
( 0  
(M). 
\lot evaluated. Criticality Safety 
Program. 
Table I3-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 118-H-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Storage tanks 
:onstructi on/materi a1 
i provides some 
irotection (P). 
Dikes to contain 
;pilled liquids (M). 
Double-walled tanks 
nay prevent spill 
:PI* 
Siting storage tanks 
iway from heavy 
raffic would reduce 
irobability of vehicle 
iccident (P). 
Event 
Type 
Internal 
Flooding 
Pipe or 
Vessel 
Rupture 
Licensed vehicle 
operators (P), 
Hanford Fire 
Department response 
(M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Item 
lumber 
14 
15A 
Initia 
'ire/du: 
uppres 
Jehicle 
icciden 
Location 
S I  sites 
All sites 
Summary 
Affected Hazard 
!ee 1A 
;ee 1A 
Event Description 
ixcess water used to suppress fires or dust 
auses accumulations that migrate beyond 
le  remediation area, resulting in spread of 
ontamination. 
Vehicle impact to fuel storage tanks, gas 
cylinders, or associated piping results in 
rupture, spill of contents, and possible fire. 
See item 1C for evaluation of fire. 
See item 9 for evaluation of spill. 
Unmitigated Risk 
kquency 
Public: B 
Coloc. 
Norker: B 
Facility 
Norker: B 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Norker: A 
Facility 
Norker: A 
Zonsequence 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
- 
Risk 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
- 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
iunoff control Hanford Fire 
neasures, as Department practices 
likes) (P). water inside waste site 
Periodic radiological 
surveys would identifj 
spread of 
con tamination within 
the remediation area 
Limited source of dust 
suppression water 
(tanker truck) (P). 
Remediation of 
contamination spread 
beyond boundaries 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
(M). 
;ee 1A Blocked vent or relief valves cause over- 
pressurization (or internal vacuum during 
pumping) that results in rupture or fuel 
storage tanks or associated piping, spill of 
contents, and possible fire. 
See item 1C for evaluation of fire. 
See item 9 for evaluation of spill. 
Table B-1, Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-l, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) Event 
TY Pe 
Summary Item 
(umber 
15B 
Affected Hazard I Event Description Frequency Zonsequence Risk sscs Admin Initiator Location 
All sites Public: B 
Coloc. 
Worker: B 
Facility 
Worker: B 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV 
IV 
IV 
Protective coatings 
on 
tank& ylinders/pipin 
g prevent corrosion 
( 0  
Periodic inspections of 
vesselshanks for 
degradation (P). 
Safety/Fire Protection 
Program (see Note 1). 
Spill response (M). 
Hanford Fire 
Department response 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
(M). 
iee 1A Environmental exposure causes corrosion of 
fuel storage tanks, gas cylinders, or 
associated piping that results in rupture, spill 
of contents, and possible fire. 
:orrosion 
h e r  
wessuriza- 
ion or 
)locked vent 
Pipe os 
Vessel 
Rupture 
Pipe or 
Vessel 
Rupture 
See item 1C for evaluation of fire. 
See item 9 for evaluation of spill. 
Public: B 
Coloc. 
Worker: B 
Facility 
Worker: B 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV, 
IV 
IV 
- 
Provision of proper 
vents and reliefs to 
prevent over- 
pressurization or 
negative pressure 
during pumping (P). 
UL-listed pumping 
equipment (P). 
Periodic inspections of 
ventdreliefs for 
obstruction (P). 
Safety/Fire Protection 
Program (see Note 1). 
Spill response (M). 
Hanford Fire 
Department response 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
(MI. 
15C ill sites 
I 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 11 8-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-l , 11 8-H-2, and 11 8-W-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Event Item Summary Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
Type Number Event Description Frequency Consequence Risk s s c s  Admin Initiator Location Affected Hazard 
NATURAL PHENOMENA EVENTS (Events initiated by NPH) 
Lightning 
Induced 
VVaste Site 
Fire 
16 dghtning 
trike in 
Jaste site 
ill sites ee 1A 4 direct lightning strike in the waste site 
:odd ignite flammable/combustible 
naterials used or generated during 
emediation activities, resulting in a waste 
ite fire. The fire could result in a release of 
iazardous substances via entrainment. 
5. direct lightning strike could also impart 
:nough energy to result in an explosion (see 
tem 19). 
5. direct lightning strike could also impart 
:nough energy to result in an internal missile 
see item 20). 
Public: C 
Coloc. 
Worker: C 
Facility 
Worker: C 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV 
IV 
IV 
Proper grounding of Safety/Fire Protection 
flammable liquid Program (see Note 1). 
storage tanks (P). 
Hanford Fire 
UL-listed pumping Department response 
equipment (P). (M). 
Proper venting of Clearing remediation 
storage tanks/ area of vegetation/ 
flammable liquid combustibles (P) (M). /z;"" cabinets (P) 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Graded/graveled 
roadways provide 
fire break (P) (M). 
Storage 
tank/cylinder/ 
cabinet construction/ 
materials provides 
some protection (P) 
(MI. 
Siting storage tanks/ 
cylinderdcabinets in 
cleared areas away 
from remediation 
areas (P) (M). 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-l, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Event 
TY Pe 
Summary Unmitigated Risk I Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) item 
lumber 
18 
initiator Location Affected Hazard Event Description hquency zonsequence sscs Risk 
IV 
IV 
Admin 
:learing remediation 
irea of vegetation/ 
:ombustibles (M). 
{anford Fire 
lepartment response 
SafetyIFire Protection 
'rogram (see Note 1). 
Ldiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
MI. 
ee 1A i proximate lightning strike could initiate a 
ange fire that enters the waste site. The 
ange fire could ignite 
lammable/combustible materials used or 
,enerated during remediation activities. The 
ire could result in a release of hazardous 
ubstances via entrainment of hazardous 
ubstances. 
Lightning 
Induced 
iange Fire 
dghtning 
trike in 
icinity 
ill sites Public: A 
Coloc. 
Norker: A 
Facility 
Norker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Graded/graveled 
roadways providt 
fire break (P). 
Storage 
Iv tankhylinderl 
cabinet construction/ 
materials provides 
some protection (P). 
Proper venting of 
tankdcabinets 
provides some 
protection (P). 
Siting storage tanks/ 
cylinderslcabinets 
away from 
remediation areas 
(MI. 
Siting storage tanks/ 
cylinders/cabinets in 
areas cleared of 
vegetation/ 
combustibles (P). 
Lightning 
Induced 
Explosion 
19 ightning 
trike in 
vaste site 
ill sites Public: C 
Coloc. 
Norker: C 
Facility 
Norker: C 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
'eriodic fire safety 
nspections for proper 
:rounding, venting 
P). 
Ianford Fire 
Iepartment response 
lafety/Fire Protection 
'rogram (see Note 1). 
kadiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
M). 
lee 1A A direct lighting strike on fuel tankdgas 
cylindedstorage cabinets causes an 
explosion that results in a release of 
hazardous substances via entrainment. 
The explosion could also initiate a waste site 
fire (see item 17). 
The explosion could also result in an internal 
missile (see item 20). 
IV Proper grounding of 
flammable liquid 
IV storage tanks (P). 
Proper venting of 
Iv storage tanks (P). 
Siting storage tanks/ 
cylinders/cabinets 
away from 
remediation areas 
lessens potential 
involvement of 
wastes (M). 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 118-H-3 
urial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) Event 
TY Pe 
Item 
lumber 
Summary - 
Risk 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
Event Description 'requency :onsequence Admin Initiator Location Affected Hazard sscs 
itorage 
anklcylinderl 
,abinet construction/ 
naterials provides 
ome protection (P). 
;iting storage tanks/ 
:ylinders/cabinets 
iway from 
emediation areas 
essens potential 
nvolvement of 
vastes (M). 
?ublic: C 
Coloc. 
Yorker: C 
Facility 
Yorker: C 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Use of dust 
suppressants/fixatives 
on contaminated 
soils/debris (M). 
Spill response (M). 
Hanford Fire 
Department response 
Safety/Fire Protection 
Program (see Note 1). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
(M). 
Lightning 
Induced 
Missile 
20 ightning 
trike in 
vaste site 
.I1 sites ee 1A 4 direct lightning strike causes an internal 
nissile that may impact contaminated soil or 
jebris resulting in a puff-like release of 
iazardous substances via entrainment. 
4n internal missile may also result in a 
wpturing of one or more drumslcontainers, 
Fuel tanks/cylinders/ cabinets resulting in an 
iirborne release of materials and spill of 
;ontents (see item 9). 
The internal missile could also cause a 
secondary fire, explosion, spill, or release of 
mat eri a1 . 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
N/A 
\Jane. Routine radiological 
surveys for spread of 
contamination (M). 
Remediation of 
contamination areas 
(M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
F 1 o o d i n g 21A Vatural 
xecipi tation 
d1 sites iee 1A Heavy precipitation (rain or snow) causes 
localized puddles and flooding of the 
remediation areas, resulting in spread of 
hazardous substances from remediation area. 
Due to arid climate and high soil 
permeability, the potential for this 
occurrence is judged low. 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Norker: A 
Facility 
Norker: A 
Heavy 
-ains/snow 
ne1 t 
-esulting in 
srobable 
maximum 
flood 
ill sites ;ee 1A The flow regulation resulting from the 
upriver dams significantly lessens the 
projected intensity of the potential 
1,000-year flood to about 12,400 m3 /s, 
called a 1,000-year regulated flood. The 
regulated flood of 1997 was just under this 
level. Thus, a 1,000-year flood would not 
inundate any of the reactor areas or 100 Are2 
burial grounds (DOE 2002) because of the 
regulated flows. 
N/A N/A N/A NIA Flooding- 
PMF 
21B 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 118-H-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) Event 
TY Pe 
Summary Item 
Jumber 
21c  
- 
Risk 7requency Zonsequence sscs Admin Location Affected Hazard Event Description 
;ee 1A A flood caused by a 50% breach of the 
Grand Coulee Dam, caused by sabotage or 
Initiator 
!reach of 
ams 
Public: D 
Coloc. 
Norker: D 
Facility 
Norker: D 
\lot evaluated Not 
valu- 
ated 
- 
IV 
IV 
IV 
\lot evaluated. \lot evaluated. Flooding- 
Cata- 
strophic 
,I1 sites 
war. This breach would cause a flow 
estimated at 600,000 m3 /s and would cause 
significant flooding, including (for the 
Hanford Reach area) the remainder of the 
100 Areas, West Lake and Gable Mountain 
Pond, the 300 Area, and nearly all of 
Richland, Washington (DOE 1996). The 
potential effects from this scenario on waste 
sites have not been considered further 
because ". . .a breach under these conditions 
would indicate an emergency situation in 
which there might be other overriding major -~ I concerns" (Neikel 1997). 
I 
Airborne 
Release 
lnduced by 
High Wind 
iigh wind 111 sites Public: A 
Coloc. 
Vorker: A 
Facility 
Vorker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
\lone. Jse of dust 
;uppressants/fixatives 
In contaminated 
;oils/debris (M). 
suspension of 
emediation activities 
luring high winds (P). 
ioutine air monitoring 
iadiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
PI. 
.tem 1A 
:Ontarninated 
lebris 
High winds suspend contaminated soil or 
removable surface contamination on debris, 
resulting in airborne release via entrainment. 
High winds could spread contamination to 
offsite receptors. 
22A 
22B Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV 
IV 
IV 
Irumhontainers and 
Iverpacks provide 
wotection from 
ipilling contents 
:MI. 
'rohibition on 
,tacking of drums may 
)revent tipover (P) or 
Iamage to drums (M). 
Jse of dust 
,uppressants/fixatives 
)n contaminated 
,oils/debris (M). 
iadiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
Airborne 
Release/ 
Spill 
Induced by 
High Wind 
Event 
3igh wind ill sites [tem 1A 
:Ontarninated 
3rums/containers receptors. 
High winds could suspend removable surfacf 
contamination from drums. High winds 
could spread contamination to offsite 
See item 9 for evaluation of spill. 
Tipover of drums/containers as a result of 
high wind is not anticipated due to their low 
center of gravity, mass, and geometry. 
Risk 
IV 
IV 
IV 
sscs 
Drudcontainer and 
overpack 
construction 
materials provide 
some physical 
protection (M). 
Storage 
tanklc ylin d er/ 
cabinet construction/ 
materials provides 
some protection (P). 
Siting storage tanks/ 
cylinders/cabinets 
away fi-om 
remediation areas 
lessens potential 
involvement of 
wastes (M). 
Affected Hazard Event Description 
tem IA 
'ontaminated 
lebris 
Seismic event causes ground movement and 
shaking of exposed remediation soils and 
debris, resulting in generation of minimal 
amounts of airborne hazardous substances as 
dust and spread of contamination. 
Due to excavation layback requirements 
(rudrise limited to 1 S:l) and moisture 
content, a seismic event is not anticipated to 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 11 8-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 118-H-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Event 
TY Pe 
Item 
hmber 
Unmitigated Risk I Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
Initiator Location ?requency Consequence Adrnin 
Internal 
Missile 
[nduced by 
High wind 
Event 
22c  ligh wind ill sites tem 1A 
2ontaminated 
Irums/containers 
Public: B 
Coloc. 
Worker: B 
Facility 
Worker: B 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Housekeeping of 
remediation area 
minimizes 
unnecessary materials 
that could become 
missiles (P). 
Spill response (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
High winds could generate missile that may 
result in puncturinghpturing one or more 
drumskontainers or fuel 
tanks/cylinders/cabinets resulting in an 
airborne release of hazardous substances and 
spilling of con tents. Wind-generated 
missiles that result in damage to 
drums/containers or fuel 
tanks/cylinders/cabinets and subsequent spill 
are not anticipated. Based on DOE (2002), 
Table 3-2, regarding wind design criteria, it 
is believed that the frequency of a peak gust 
wind speed sufficient to generate a missile 
that could breach a drum/ containers is less 
than 1 E-O2/yr on the Hanford Site. 
See item 3B for evaluation of internal 
missile. 
Airborne 
Release 
Induced by 
Seismic 
Event 
23A 3arthquake ill sites Public: C 
Coloc. 
Worker: C 
Facility 
Worker: C 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV /None. Excavation layback 
requirements prevent 
slope shifts (P) (M). 
Hanford Emergency 
Response (M). 
Remediation of 
:ontamination spread 
$4). 
Use of dust 
;uppressants/fixatives 
m contaminated 
;oils/debris (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
IV 
IV 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 11 8-D-l, l l 8-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-l, 11 8-H-2, and 11 8-H-3 
Burial Ground Rernediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) Event 
Type 
Item 
lumber 
Summary 
Frequency zonsequence Risk sscs Admin Initiator Location Affected Hazard Event Description 
Public: C 
Coloc. 
Worker: C 
Facility 
Worker: C 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV 
IV 
IV 
Low center of 
gravity of 
remediation 
equipment provides 
some protection (M). 
Staging of excavated 
drumdcon tainers 
away from heavy 
traffic areas 
minimizes potential 
damage (M). 
Use of dust 
suppressants/fixatives 
3n contaminated 
soils/debris (M). 
Hanford Emergency 
Response (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Impact of 
Heavy 
Load 
nduced by 
Seismic 
Event 
23B iarthquake ,I1 sites :em 1A 
Lemediation 
quipment 
Seismic event causes ground movement and 
shaking of excavation equipment, and impact 
to soils, debris, drums/containers. 
Overturn of remediation equipment, resulting 
in heavy load impact to soils, debris, and 
drumskontainers is not anticipated due to the 
low center of gravity of remediation 
equipment. 
See items 8A and 8B for evaluation of heavy 
load impacts. 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
Storage 
tanklcylinded 
cabinet construction/ 
materials provide 
some protection from 
damage (P). 
Use of double-walled 
tanks if appropriate 
(MI. 
Spill response (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Rupture of 
Pipes/ 
Vessels 
Lnduced by 
Seismic 
Event 
3arthquake dl sites tem 1A Seismic event causes ground movement and 
shaking of fuel storage 
tanks/cylinders/cabinets, resulting in rupture 
and spill of contents. 
Breach of fuel storage tanks/cylinders is not 
anticipated due to construction and low 
center of gravity. 
Public: C 
Coloc. 
Worker: C 
Facility 
Worker: C 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
23C 
23D 
he1 storage tanks/ 
ylindedcabinets 
ill sites tem 1A 
>rums/containers 
Seismic event causes minor ground 
movement and shaking of drums/containers, 
that may result in tipover, rupture of 
drundcontainers, airborne release, and 
spillage of drundcontainer contents (see item 
Tipover or sliding of drums/containers 
during earthquakes is not anticipated. 
BHI (2002), evaluated the seismic stability 
of drums in the staging area at ERDF and 
concluded slidinghipover would not occur 
during the design basis event. 
9). 
Public: C 
Coloc. 
Worker: C 
Facility 
Worker: C 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Drumlcontainer and 
overpacks 
construction and 
materials provide 
protection from 
rupture (P) and 
spilling contents if 
tipped over. (M). 
Prohibition on 
stacking of drums 
lessens potential for 
tipover (P). 
Prohibition, on 
stacking of drums 
lessen damage to 
hums (M). 
Spill response (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Rupture of 
Drums/ 
Containers 
Induced by 
Seismic 
Event 
3arthquake 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 11 8-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 11 8-H-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) Event 
Type 
Item 
lumber 
Summary - 
Risk 
Not 
walu 
ated 
Frequency ’onsequence sscs Admin 
\lot evaluated. 
Location Affected Hazard I Event Description Initiator 
;now fall Jot evaluated. Vot evaluated Public: D 
Coloc. 
Worker: C 
Facility 
Worker: D 
.tem 1A Snow blankets soil, debris, and drums with 
sufficient load to cause release of hazardous 
substances. 
Buildup of snow on excavated 
drumdcontainers is not anticipated to result 
in dead loads sufficient to collapse or breach 
drumdcontainers. 
Buildup of snow on fuel 
tanks/cylinders/cabinets is not anticipated to 
result in dead loads sufficient to collapse or 
breach them. 
Collapse of 
Drums/ 
Container, 
Fuel Tanks, 
Cylinders 
[nduced by 
Snow Load 
dl sites 
ill sites 
24 
25 
Drums/containers 
Fuel tanks/ 
:ylinders/ cabinets 
Not 
:valu 
ated 
\Tot evaluated. Public: D 
Coloc. 
Worker: C 
Facility 
Worker: i: 
Vot evaluated 4ot evaluated. Jolcanic 
Ictivity 
item 1A 
Drums/containers hazardous substances. 
Fuel tanks/ 
V1inders/cabinets drums/containers, fuel 
Volcanic ash blankets soil, debris, and drums 
with sufficient load to cause release of 
Buildup of ash on excavated 
tanks/cylinders/cabinets is not anticipated to 
result in dead loads sufficient to collapse or 
breach drumdcontainers. 
Collapse of 
Drums/ 
Containers, 
Fuel Tanks, 
Cylinders 
Induced by 
Ash fall 
Event Item Summary Unmitigated Risk 
Type Number 
Initiator Location Affected Hazard Event Description Frequency Consequence Risk 
tange Fire 
Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
s s c s  Admin 
Range Fire 
IV 
IV 
Waste Sit€ 
Fire 
Storage drums/tanks/ Remediation/storage 
flammable liquid areas cleared of 
storage cabinets vegetation (P) (M). 
26A 
Graded roaddfire 
lines inhibit spread 
of fire into 
remediation areas (P) 
(MI. 
tankdcabinets 
provides Some 
protection (P) (M). 
Siting storage tanks/ 
cylinders/cabinets 
Proper venting of 
away from 
remediation areas 
(P) (M). 
Siting storage tanks/ 
cylindershabinets in 
areas cleared of 
vegetation/ 
combustibles (P). 
26B 
(M). 
Flammable storage 
cabinets 
Hanford Emergency 
Hanford Fire 
Department response 
(M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Response Plan (MI. 
26C Not 
valu- 
ated 
'ehicle or 
.ansporta- 
on accident 
Not evaluated. 
'roximate 
iircraft crasl 
Zircraft 
:rash in the 
waste site 
111 sites 
411 sites 
i l l  sites 
;ee 1A 
See 1A 
See 1A 
i vehicle or transportation accident could 
nitiate a range fire that enters the waste site. 
The range fire could ignite 
lammable/combustible materials used or 
;enerated during remediation activities. 
3quipment fuel/oil, drums holding 
lammable liquids, etc., would be available 
o propagate a fire. The fire could result in a 
elease of hazardous substances via 
:n trainment. 
4n aircraft crash could initiate a range fire 
hat enters the waste site (see item 26A). 
The Hanford Site is subject to very limited 
aircraft traffic due to relative location of 
airports and normal air traffic patterns. 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Vorker: A 
Facility 
Vorker: A 
Public: B 
Coloc. 
Vorker: B 
Facility 
Vorker: B 
Public: D 
Coloc. 
Vorker: C 
Facility 
Vorker: C 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Vot evaluated 
construction 
materials provide Minimization and 
IV some resistance (P). proper storage of I I combustible materials 
Not evaluated. 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) Summary Unmitigated Risk Item 
lumber 
Event 
Type 
Explosion 
- 
Risk 
Not 
valu- 
ated 
- Admin Location Affected Hazard Event Description Frequency Zonsequence Initiator sscs 
Jo t evaluated. ill sites k e  1A ]The Hanford Site is subject to very limited 
3ircraft traffic due to relative location of 
zirports and normal air traffic patterns. 
Public: D 
Coloc. 
Worker: D 
Facility 
Worker: D 
Jot evaluated Jot evaluated. 27A Aircraft 
:rash in the 
waste site 
\lot evaluated Not 
valu- 
ated 
\Tot evaluated. Jot evaluated. Explosion 27B Aircraft 
crash in 
vicinity of 
waste site 
I11 sites see I A  An aircraft crash in the proximate vicinity of 
the remediation area could result in an 
explosion and pressure pulse. 
Given the energy associated with such a 
crash, the resulting pressure pulse is judged 
insufficient to damage drums/containers, fuel 
tanks/cylinders/cabinets resulting in a release 
of hazardous substances. 
Public: D 
Coloc. 
Worker: D 
Facility 
Worker: D 
IV 
IV 
IV 
\lone. \lone. Loss of 
Power 
28 Vehicle or 
transporta- 
tion accident 
i l l  sites See IA A vehicle or transportation accident causes a 
loss of power supply to the remediation site, 
resulting in possible interruption in 
remediation work. 
Loss of power does not result in release of 
hazardous substances as electrically powered 
systems are not relied upon to prevent or 
mitigate releases. 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 11 8-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-l, 11 8-H-2, and 11 8-H-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Affected Hazard 
NIA 
Event 
Type Event Description 
Accident at nearby facility causes an 
airborne release of toxic materials. 
Depending on concentration and wind 
directionlstability, the release may result in 
deposition of hazardous substances in the 
remediation area. Interaction of the released 
substances with existing hazardous 
substances in the waste sites is not 
anticipated. 
Initiation of emergency procedures at the 
nearby facility would result in the 
appropriate notification or evacuation of 
remediation workers. 
Release of 
Hazardous 
Substances 
Item 
(umber 
29 
Initiator 
iccident at 
iearby 
acility 
Location 
I11 sites 
Unmitigated Risk 
i'requency 
Public: C 
Coloc. 
Norker: C 
Facility 
Norker: C 
Consequence 
'ublic: 4 
:010c. 
Norker: 4 
Tacili ty 
Norker: 4 
Risk 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
sscs 
done. 
Admin 
janford Emergency 
iesponse Program. 
iadiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
Event Item Summary Unmitigated Risk 
Type Number- 
Initiator I Location I Affected Hazard I Event Description Frequency I Consequence I Risk 
M zo c L C W  
Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
s s c s  I Admin 
- -  
U 
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postulated accident scenarios, not only fire and deflagration are now analyzed. Pagination has significantly changed. 
WCH-DE-019 (0411 4/2006) *Obtain Calc. No. from R&DC and Form from lntranet 
April 2007 c- 1 
WCH-50 
Rev. 2 
Washington Closure Nanford, LLC. 
Originator: T.J. Rodovsky vL 
Project: DiDWH Field Remediation Job No.:, I465 
!, 11 8-D-3.118-H-1.1 
020 Rev. No.: 1 
Date: -7 - pc;' 
Sheet No.: 1 of 38 
i 1.0 Table of Contents 
3 SECTION 
4 1 .O Table of Contents 
5 2.0 Results: 
6 3.0 Purpose: 
7 4.0 Assumptions 
8 5.0 Methodology: 
9 6.0 Hazard Analysis - Determination of Release Values Associated Release Mechanisms 
IO 6.1 Dumping 
11 6.2 High WindlEntrainment 
12 6.3 Deflagration 
13 6.4 Dropping/lmpact 
14 6.5 Fire 
15 6.6 Summary of Release Values Used in This Calculation 
16 7.0 Adjustments to Material Inventories 
17 7.1 Liquids 
18 7.2 Contaminated Soil 
19 7.3 Uranium Metal Solids 
20 7.4 Non-combustible Solids 
21 7.5 Combustible Solids 
22 7.6 Uranium Oxide 
23 7.7 Summary of Adjustments to Material Inventory 
24 7.8 Radionuclide Inventory - (For the Bounding 1 18-D-3 Site) 
25 8.0 References 
26 9.0 Calculation of Revised TQ Values 
27 10.1 Spent Fuel Elements (Oxide) - Fire, Dumping, Entrainment, Dropping/lmpact 
28 10.2 Spent Fuel Elements (Oxide) - Deflagration 
29 10.3 Spent Fuel Elements (Metal) - Fire 
30 10.4 Soil - Deflagration and Fire 
31 10.5 Combustible Materials - Deflagration, Droppingllmpact and Fire 
32 10.6 Noncombustible Materials - Deflagration, Dumping and Dropping/lmpact 
33 10.7 Noncombustible Materials - Fire & Entrainment 
34 10.8 Liquid - Deflagration & Entrainment 
35 10.9 Liquid -- Fire, Dumping & Droppingllmpact 
36 10.10 Soil - Dumping, Droppingllmpact & Entrainment 
37 10.1 1 Combustable Materials - Entrainment 
2 
SHEET NO 
1 of 38 
2 of 38 
2 of 38 
2 of 38 
3 of 38 
6 of 38 
7 of 38 
8 of 38 
9 of 38 
10 of 38 
10 of 38 
12 of 38 
13 of 38 
13 of 38 
13 of 38 
13 of 38 
14 of 38 
14 of 38 
14 of 38 
15 of 38 
16 of 38 
17 of 38 
19 of 38 
28 of 38 
29 of 38 
30 of 38 
31 of38 
32 of 38 
33 of 38 
34 of 38 
35 of 38 
36 of 38 
37 of 38 
38 of 38 
01 00X-CA-N0020~FHC~RevO~rnarkup -41Caic (1) (TOC) 
April 2007 c-2  
WCH-50 
Rev. 2 
Washington Closure Hanford, LLC. 
Rev. No.: 1 Originator: T.J.Rodovsky 9’ Date: ‘I I ?  lab Calc. No.: 0100X-CA-NO020 
Project: DlDRlH Field Remediation Job No.: 14655 Checked: J. D. Ludowise $.A Date: ~1-7 -8 .4  
Subject: 118-D-1.118-D-2.118-D-3,118-H-1.118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Final Hazard Catesorization Calculation8 Sheet NO.: 2 0f38 
IRevised TQs) 
-1. $ 8-D-2. 118-D-3,118-H-1.1 8-H-2, 
I 2.0 Results: 
L 
3 The 1027 Category 3 sum-of-the-ratios for the 1 1 BPI, 1 18-D2,118-D-3,118-H-l, 1 18-H-2, and I 1 8-H-3 Burial Grounds is summarized below for 
4 all the postulated events for the bounding waste site (the 11843-3). The sums of the Category 3 TQ ratios for each waste form and hazard scenario 
5 are listed below. 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
1 18 The above sum of the ratios values are conservatively based on all the postulated events that impact the inventory of each of the waste forms. 19 Since the sum of all of the waste forms for each accident scenario is below 1, the designation for each of the burial grounds is below Category 3. 
20 
21 3.0 Purpose: 
22 
23 The purpose of this calculation is to evaluate radionuclide constituents to determine the Final Hazard Categorization (FHC) for the 11 8-0-1, 118-D- 
24 2, 1 1843-3, 118-H-1, 11 8-H-2, and 118-H-3 Burial Grounds. 
26 4.0 Assumptions 
25 
27 
28 
29 The burial grounds contain a mixture of materials contaminated with radionuclides. These materials are particulate materials (e.g.. soil, oxide from 
30 damaged spent fuel elements), noncombustible solids (e.g., metals, concrete), and combustible solids (e.g., wood, paper, cardboard) that may be 
31 either containerized or loose within the burial ground. A potential also exists for containerized liquids to be present within the burial grounds. 
32 
33 
34 
35 The accident scenarios analyzed for this site are high wind, fire, deflagration, dumping and droppinglimpact events, which are assumed to cause a 
36 release of contaminated material. 
37 
38 Past excavations at the 100 Area burial grounds have unearthed spent nuclear fuel elements (Le. 118-El and 118-C-1). This calculation 
39 conseivatively assumes a bounding inventory of 25 spent fuel elements at each waste site. This number is based on the number of ”standard” 
40 plutonium production elements (25) found during remediation of the 105-F and 105-H Fuel Storage Basins (FSB). Based on the condition of the 
41 fuel elements found at the 105-F and 105H FSBs and at the 118-8-1 and 118-C-I Burial Grounds, it is assumed that 20% of the fuel elements are 
42 damaged. This damage is manifested in the form of an oxide layer that equals 0.1 % of the total inventwy of the elements. The 0.1 % oxide fraction 
43 is consistent with assumptions used for fuel at 105-H FSB (BHI 2000) and the lOO-B/C Burial Ground ASA (BHI 2005~). The inventory of the 
44 standard elements was shown to be conseivative for single-pass reactor elements during the approval process for BHI (2000) as documented by 
45 CCN 084171. The isotopes not included in the inventory (e.g., U-235) are negligible contributors to radiological consequences. 
46 
47 
48 
49 In addition to the standard fuel elements, non standard fuel elements were also evaluated. The non-standard fuel element inventory is determined 
50 in calculation BHI 2005a and the associated white paper BHi 2005b. 
52 MOC-2002-0010, “Potential Presence of Special Fuel Elements in 105H Fuel Storage Basin,” [BHI 2002c] evaluated the potential radiological dose 
53 consequences of standard plutonium production elements compared to the non-standard elements. The standard element was determined to 
54 bound any airborne release event (ie., inhalation pathway, food ingestion pathway) because of the significantly larger inventory of plutonium (and 
55 americium) in the standard element compared to the non-standard elements. The standard element was also determined to bound a direct dose 
56 event based on the relative Cs-137 content of each type of element and Cs-137 being responsible for about 98% of the direct dose. 
57 
51 
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Dumping/ 
Spilling Event 
Dumpingldropping of 
contaminated soil during 
excavation activities 
causing a release. 
Release of oxide materials 
could occur as a result of 
a droplimpact. 
No significant airborne 
Washington Closure Hanford, LLC. 
Dropping I Impact 
Excavation equipment or 
vehicles could impact 
contaminated soil and 
cause an airborne 
r w e  
Excavation equipment 
could impact the fuel 
elements causing a 
release of existing oxide. 
No significant airborne 
Y 
Project: DlDRlH Field Remediatlon Job No.: - 14655 
Subject: 118-D-1,118-02, ' 
Calculation (Revised TQsl 
7 
8 
1 4.0 Assumptions (continued) 
2 
3 Accident scenarios for dumping, entrainment, deflagration, droppinglimpact, and fire are evaluated in this calculation. 
4 Assumptions for each of these events are induded in the following table: 
Waste~ype 1 Wind) Event initiator) Deflagration Event 
Soil IHigh winds impact and ]Fire event is judged to IDeflagration event is judged to 
I I 
5 
61 I tntrainment (High I h re  tvent (due to any 1 
No significant release of 
contaminated materials 
from this type of solid 
(e.g., soft wastes) is 
expected due to high 
surface area to mass 
catin 
Damageldropping of 
contaminated materials 
could result in a release of 
loose surface 
contamination. 
Dumpingldropping of 
containerized liquid during 
excavation activities could 
occur causing a release. 
Vehiclelequipment 
impact to packaged, 
contaminated soft waste: 
could result in a 
suspension of loose 
surface contamination. 
Excavation equipment or 
vehicle could impact 
buried debris causing a 
release of loose surface 
contamination. 
Excavation equipment or 
vehicles could impact 
containerized liquid and 
cause a release. 
resuspend contaminated have negligible impact have negligible impact on 
soil during excavation on contaminated soil. contaminated soil. 
activities. 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
16 
17 
Contaminated, High wind event could Fire has the potential to Pressure rise resulting from a 
Noncombustible resuspend loose surface heat these solids deflagration of flammable 
Solids contamination from buried causing a release of gaslair mixture during 
debris. surface Contamination. excavation activities could 
Majority of waste will be cause a release of surface 
protected fFom heat of contamination. 
fire due to location below 
e. 
Containerized High wind could cause a Fire event has the Deflagration event has the 
liquids spill of containerized potential to impact potential to impact 
liquids. containerized liquids and containerized liquids and cause 
cause a release. a release. 
deflagration of flammable 
gaslair mixture during 
excavation activities could 
cause a release of existing 
20 Element (Metal) release. 
21 
29 the burial grounds. materials. 
deflagration of flammable 
gaslair mixture during 
excavation activities could 
cause a release of surface 
contamination. 
release. release. 
51 Contaminated inventories, which were used in the initial hazard categorization, are documented in calculation 01 00D-CA-NO050 
52 (WCH 2006b) for the 100-D sites and 0100H-CA-0027 (WCH 2006a) for the 100-H sites . Only radionuclides are used in 
53 determining the FHC; therefore, analysis of chemical constituents is not included in this FHC calculation. 
54 
55 SteR 2: Calculate the revised TQ values (TQRF& 
56 
57 
58 The hazard Category 3 threshold quantities (TQ) in DOE-STD-1027-92 (DOE, 1997) are based on the release values (RV) 
59 calculated in (EPA, 1989.) Release values are determined for each of four exposure pathways: food ingestion, water ingestion, 
60 inhalation, and direct exposure. The TQ for a given isotope is 20 times the most restrictive RV. The TQ can be expressed as: 
61 
62 TQ = 20 x MIN { RVFOOD, RVWATER, RVINH, RVDIR 1 (1 1 
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Calculation (Revised TQsl 
I 5.0 Methodology (continued): 
2 
3 Step 2: Continued 
4 
5 The EPA methodology uses the following assumptions: 
6 
7 1) The RV for the water ingestion pathway assumes that 100% of the material is released to drinking water (see EPA, 1989 Appendix 
8 B.1) 
9 2) The RV for the inhalation pathway and the RV for the food ingestion pathway both are inversely proportional to a respirable 
IO airborne release fraction (see EPA, 1989 Appendix A.2 and Appendix C.1). 
11 3) The RV for direct exposure for isotopes other than noble gases assumes a point source 
12 
13 The DOE Office of Nuclear and Facility Safety Policy Nuclear Safety Technical Position, NSTP 2002-2 (DOE, 2002), allows that the 
14 hazard Category 3 TQs for radionuclides for which the food pathway and the inhalation pathway are limiting may be revised if, based 
15 on the physical and chemical form and available dispersive energy sources for the facility and its hazardous materials, the credible 
16 release fractions (airborne release fractions) can be shown to be significantly different from the values used in the EPA Technical 
17 Background Document. All potential accident scenarios must be considered under unmitigated conditions. All pathways must be 
18 considered and the most limiting pathway must be used. 
19 
20 
21 Based on the guidance in NSTP 2002-2, the revised Category 3 TQ for an isotope in a particular material form can be expressed as: 
22 
23 
24 
25 Where fl 
26 
27 from any potential accident 
28 
29 
30 
31 any potential accident scenario 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 Appendix E 
38 
39 The potential accident scenarios and corresponding release fractions are identified from a hazard analysis. This final hazard 
40 categorization will be based on the hazard analysis in Roberson (2002) and the scenario analyses presented in WCH 2005a. These 
41 analyses form the basis for identifying appropriate respirable airborne release fractions. The release fractions will be from DOE-HDBK- 
42 3010-94 (DOE, 2000)’ Roberson (2002), or other analyses previously approved by DOE. Equation 2 will be used to generate revised 
43 TQs for each constituent present at each burial ground. 
44 
T Q R M ~ ~  = 20 x MIN { fi x RVFOOD, f2 x RVWATER, fi X RVINH, f3 X RVD~R 1 (2) 
is the ratio of the respirable airborne release fraction used in the EPA analysis 
(from EPA, 1989 Exhibit A-1) to the largest respirable airborne release fraction 
is the release value for the food pathway from EPA, 1989 Appendix E 
is the ratio of the fraction of material released to drinking water in the EPA 
analysis (i.e., 1) to the largest fraction of material released to drinking water in 
is the release value for the water pathway from EPA, 1989 Appendix E 
is the release value for the inhalation pathway from EPA, 1989 Appendix E 
is the ratio of the dose rate from a point source at 30 meters to the dose rate 
from a distributed source of equal activity at 30 meters 
is the release value for the direct exposure pathway from EPA, 1989 
RVFOOD 
f2 
RVwAER 
RV~NH 
f3 
RVD~R 
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3 Step 2: Continued 
4 
Rev. No.: 0 
Sheet No.: 5 of 36 
Date: 2/21/2006 
5 The total inventory of radionuclides in each material form is compared to the revised TQs for that form using the sum of the ratios. The 
6 final hazard categorization is based on the accident scenario yielding the bounding (i.e, maximum) sum-of-the-ratios. Since it is 
7 possible that a specific accident scenario could impact several waste forms (Le., combustibles, noncombustibles, and spent fuel 
8 elements), the individual sum-of-the-ratios for all waste forms have been combined to determine the bounding sum-of-the-ratios. 
9 
10 For conservatism, this final categorization will assume that f2 is equal to 1 although there is no potential for releases to drinking water in 
11 the vicinity of the waste site. It will also assume that f3 is equal to I ,  although the point source model is quite conservative for the large 
12 distributed sources present at the Burial Grounds. 
13 
14 
15 The adjustment factor f, can be expressed as: f, = REPAIRHA. 
17 Where, 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 this hazard analysis. 
24 In general, the respirable release fraction (R) is the product of the airborne release fraction (ARF) and the release fraction (RF), or R = 
25 ARF x RF. 
27 Step 3: Determine the final hazard categorization for each waste site. 
28 
29 The inventories for each constituent are divided by the revised TQ values. The individual waste form (or combined waste forms 
30 impacted by a specific accident) yielding the bounding sum-of-the ratios for each waste site is compared to 1.  15 the sum of the ratios is 
31 above I using the revised TQ, then the revised TQ has been exceeded and the FHC for the waste site is determined to be Category 3. 
32 If the sum of the ratios is below 1, the FHC is determined to be below Category 3. 
16 
REPA is the respirable release fraction for a hazardous material element (e.g., cobalt, aluminum, strontium) 
from EPA (1989), Exhibit A-I. 
RHA is the respirable release fraction for a particular hazardous material for the potential hazard identified in 
23 
26 
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1 6.0 Hazard Analysis - Determination of Release Values Associated Release Mechanisms 
3 Waste Site Descriptions 
5 118-D-1 (100-D Burial Ground Number I )  - The 1 18-D-1 Burial Ground is an inactive solid waste site that operated from 1944 to 1967. 
6 The 137- by 114-m (450- by 3754) site was located approximately 274 m (900 ft) south of the 105 DR Building. The burial ground was 
7 used to dispose of irradiated reactor parts, dummies, thimbles, rods, gun barrels, and other contaminated solid waste. The burial ground 
8 contains several trenches running north and south, but the exact number is unknown. The trenches were 91 by 6 by 6 m (300 by 20 by 
9 20 ft) deep with a 6-m (204) space between them. The unit received an estimated 10,000 m3 of wastes. The burial ground was divided 
IO into four sections to allowing grouping of like waste in each section (Hanford Drawing H-1-4046). 
12 118-D-2 (100-D Burial Ground Number 2) -The 118-D-2 Burial Ground is an inactive solid waste site that operated from 1949 to 1970. 
13 The 305- by 109- by 6 m (1,000 by 357 by 20-ft)deep site is located approximately 823 m (2,700 ft) southwest of the 105DR Building. 
l 4  The burial ground was used for disposal of an estimated 10.000 m3 of miscellaneous contaminated solid waste, irradiated dummies, 
l5 splines, rods, thimbles, and gun barrels. It is divided into four sections to allow grouping of like wastes (Hanford Drawing H-1-4046). 
18 Beginning in April 1966, 100-N Area low-level radioactive solid wastes were also buried at this site. The site containsseveral trenches 
1~ running east-west (the exact number is unknown) and five disposal pits. The trenches are 20 m (66 ft) wide at the surface, 6 m (20 R) 
20 wide at the bottom, and 6 m (20 ft) deep. Each trench is composed of two small pits, constructed with railroad ties, with interior 
21 dimensions of about I .8 by 1.8 m (6 by 6 ft), placed within an excavation 7.3 by 7.3 m (24 by 24 ft) deep. All were covered with 1.8 m (6 
22 ft) of soil. Historical documents report that there was a fire in this burial ground in March of 1958 (reference HW-55462). The fire was 
23 difficult to extinguish and required large volumes of water (several tank truck loads) to put out, therefore, contaminants could potentially 
24 have been washed to the soil column beneath this burial ground. 
26 118-D-3 (100-D Burial Ground Number 3) -The 118-D-3 Burial Ground is an inactive solid waste site that operated from 1956 to 1973. 
27 This burial ground was located approximately 107 m (350 ft) east of the 105-DR Building. Typically, trenches were 61 by 6 by 6 m (200 
28 by 20 by 20 ft) deep, and the spacing between trenches was not uniform. This burial ground was divided up into five sections to allow 
29 grouping of like wastes (Hanford Drawing H-1-4046). It also contained a burning pit that was used for the disposal of low-level 
30 radioactive combustible wastes, The burial ground was used for the disposal of miscellaneous contaminated solid wastes and irradiated 
2 
4 
1 1  
16 
17 
25 
31 dummies, splines, rods, thimbles, and gun barrels. 
33 The site was also used for disposal of 100-N solid wastes, extending the eastern boundary. Two additional solid waste burial ground 
34 sites in or very near this burial ground are considered a part of it. These being the Minor Construction burial ground number 2 and the 
35 "grave." The Minor Construction burial ground number 2 was a trench dug in 1953 to receive contaminated thimbles, rod guides, and 
36 miscellaneous waste removed from the 105-DR Reactor during an extended Ball 3X shortage. The contaminated wastes were then 
37 covered with 1.8 m (6 fl) of dirt. The "grave" was a small trench dug in March 1954 to receive effluent water from the number one DR 
38 west effluent expansion box during repairs. The trench received specific wastes and was covered as soon as the waste was received. 
39 is assumed that the trench was dug very near the expansion box and should be located in the northwest corner of the burial ground. 
41 118-H-I (100-H Burial Ground Number 1) - 118-H-1 is an inactive mixed solid waste burial site that is recognized as having been the 
32 
40 
It 
42 primary burial ground for the 100-H Area. It is located approximately 396 m (1,300 ft) southwest of the 105 H Reactor Building. This site 
43 operated from 1949 until 1965 and received an estimated 10,000 m3 of waste from 100-H Reactor operations. The site received reactor 
44 process tubing, dummy fuel elements, contaminated lead brick, and other reactor hardware. The burial ground was enlarged in 1955. 
45 The total dimensions were 21 3 m (700 ft) long by 107 m (350 ft) wide and 61 m (20 ft) deep. The numerous trenches in the easthest- 
46 oriented burial ground run north to south. Trench layout details may be seen on Hanford Site Drawing H-1-13484. Cross-sectional 
47 details and wooden crib design are provided on Hanford Site Drawing P-3475. The site is primarily backfilled with 1.8 m (6 ft) of soil 
48 cover. Near the southwest corner, portions of several horizontal controls rods are buried in slit trenches with 0.6 to 1.2 m (2 to 4 ft) of 
49 soil cover. A fire at the site occurred in October of 1960 (HW-67054). 
50 
51 118-H-2 (100-H Burial Ground Number 2) (H-I Loop Burial Ground) (P-I3 Pit) - 118-H-2 is an inactive, solid mixed waste burial 
52 ground located approximately 457 m (1,500 ft) west of the 105-H Reactor Building. The site operated from 1955 to 1965 to receive a 
53 small volume of contaminated and activated test material and contaminated pipe. The burial ground was about 43 m (140 ft) long, 15.2 
51 m (50 ft) wide. and 4.6 m 115 ft', deet, when excavated in 1955. 
55 
56 
57 Two concrete vaults were placed in the excavation to receive activated and contaminated hardware associated with an experimental 
58 reactor test facility, reportedly on behalf of the US. Navy. The easternmost vault was used for this purpose in 1955 when a test loop, or 
59 "stainless steel double tube" was transferred from the reactor to this vault for burial after several years of irradiation. Additional 
60 information on the "P-13" assembly project can be found in HW-36063 and HW-46124. The second vault, constructed in 1958 to the 
61 west of the first vault, was intended for a similar use but was not used in the program. A small quantity of contaminated pipe was placed 
62 in it at the time of reactor deactivation in 1965. Both vaults were filled with gravel and the excavation was backfilled to grade. Additional 
63 clean soil has since been added to form a berm that rises approximately 0.9 m (3 R) above grade over the burial ground. 
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I 6.0 Hazard Analysis - Determination of Release Values Associated Release Mechanisms 
2 
3 Waste Site Descriptions (continued): 
4 
5 1 18-H-3 (Construction Burial Ground) - The I 18-H-3 Burial Ground is an inactive solid mixed waste burial ground located 
approximately 24.4 m (800 ft) southeast of the 105-H Reactor Building. It operated from 1953 to 1957 and received approximately 3,000 
m3 of reactor components and hardware, including lengths of contaminated 16 in. pipe that were used as chutes for the removal of 
reactor vertical safety rod thimbles and other components from reactor modification programs. The burial ground is 91 m (300 ft) long, 
61 m (200 ft) wide, and 6 m (20 ft) deep. It consists of multiple northkouth running trenches that have been backfilled to grade with 
9 approximately 1.8 m (6 ft) of soil. 
10 
I I Accident Scenarios Evaluated: 
12 
13 This FHC calculation evaluates several types of accident scenarios including dumpinglentrainment of contaminated materials, 
14 deflagration impacting waste and spent fuel elements, droppinglimpact of burial ground contents including fuel elements, and exposure 
15 of the burial ground contents to a fire. Each of these scenarios is summarized in the following sections: 
17 6.1 DumDing 
19 Contaminated Soil: The respirable ARF for soil dumping used in Roberson (2002) Attachment 4 is 1 .OE-06. The RF value for 
20 contaminated soil is 1; therefore, the R value used for dumping of contaminated soil is I .OE-06. 
21 
z? Contaminated, Combustible Solids: Contaminated combustible solids may be lifted out of a trench and dropped. These combustible 
23 materials are typically lightweight. Consequently, they would generate little force during impact with surfaces. DOE (2000), Section 
24 5.2.3.1, states that no significant suspension of surface contamination is postulated for such materials. Dumping of contaminated 
25 combustible solids is not considered further in this calculation. 
27 Contaminated, Noncombustible Solids: Contaminated, noncombustible solids may be lifted out of a trench and dropped, or digging 
28 equipment may impact them. DOE (ZOOO), Section 5.3.3, addresses free-fall spill and impaction stress to such solids. The bounding 
29 ARF for shock-vibration of contaminated noncombustible materials that do not undergo brittle fracture is I .OE-03. The respirable fraction 
30 is assumed to be 1.0; therefore, the R value used for this scenario is 1.0E-03. 
16 
18 
26 
31 
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I 6.0 Hazard Analysis - Determination of Release Values Associated Release Mechanisms 
2 
3 6.1 Dumpina (continued) 
5 Contaminated liauid: The potential exists for containers of liquid to be found in the burial grounds. It is possible that such containers 
could be spilled during remediation activities. The amount of liquid is expected to be a small fraction of the total volume of the burial 
8 trenches. Section 3.2.3.2 of DOE (2000) indicates that a spill of aqueous solutions, subjected to a 3-m fall distance, has a bounding fL 
9 value of 1.OE-M. 
4 
10 
11 Srsent Fuel Elements: Dumping of spent fuel elements could cause an airborne release of surface oxide. No release from metallic 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
$0 
$1 
12 
13 
14 
(5 
$6 
t7 
18 
19 
50 
>I 
52 
53 
54 
i5 
portion of spent fuel elements would occur. It is assumed that the release of oxide is similar to that of contaminated, non-combustible 
solids. Therefore, the R value for release of oxide due to dumpinq is 1 .OE-03. 
6.2 High WindlEntrainment 
The soil entrainment rate used in Attachment 4 of Robemn (2002) is 4.OE-03 g/m2-h. The surface areas for the six sites discussed in 
this calculation are shown below and were obtained from historical design drawing of the sites. 
1 18-0-1 : 9,009 square-meters 
118-D-2 12,970 square-meters 
1 18-0-3: 16,455 square-meters 
118-H-1: 27,738 squaremeters 
118-H-2: 1,941 square-meters 
1 18-H-3: 1 1,748 squaremeters 
Of the six burial ground sites discussed in this calculation, the 11 8-H-1 site has the largest surface area of this six sites. This site will be 
conservatively used to maximum the rate of intrainment value, but the 1 18-0-3 inventory will be used because it has the bounding 
inventory. 
118-0-3 Contaminated Soil: Assuming a density of 2.27 g/cm3 or 2.27E+06 g / K M  for the contaminated soil at the 118-D-3 Burial 
Ground, and a soil volume of 80744 BCM (01 00D-CA-N0050), the total mass of contaminated soil at the 11843-3 Burial Ground is 
1.83E+1 lg. As discussed above, the surface area of the 118-H-1 burial trenches is 27,738 m2. Assuming that the entire surface area 
of the trenches is exposed to wind, the rate of entrainment of contaminated soil would be as follows: 
Over 24 hours, this translates to 2660 g of soil entrained. Therefore, the respirable ARF for a 24-hour period would be as follows: 
x = 27,733 m2 x 0.004 g/m2-h = 11 1 g/h 
R =ARF x RF = 2660 g /1.83E+11 g = 1.5E-08 
Therefore, the entrainment value above will be used in this calculation; R = 1.5E-8. 
Contaminated, Combustible Solids: Contamination present on combustible solids would not be readily entrained by the wind because 
the material was deposited several decades ago and the contaminants are expected to be absorbed onto the materials. It is expected 
that the amount of contamination released by this mechanism would be less than the amount released through a fire. Therefore, the R 
value for entrainment is e 5E-04. 
Contaminated, Noncombustible Solids: Contamination present on noncombustible solids would not be readily entrained by the wind 
because the material was deposited several decades ago. It is expected that the amount of contamination released by this mechanism 
would be less than the amount released through dumping. Therefore, the R value for entrainment is IE-03. 
Contaminated Liauid: Containerized liquid would be protected from entrainment by wind. If liquid is spilled, a small pool of liquid could 
form on the soil surface. Section 3.2.4.5 of DOE (2000) indicates that the bounding R value for entrainment from an outdoor pod at 
high windspeeds is 4E-6kr, or 3.2E-05 for an 8hr  duration. [Note: An 8-hr exposure is selected consistent with DOE-STD-3009-94, 
Appendix A, Section A.3.3.1. Therefore, the R value for entrainment of contaminated liquid is 3.2E-05. 
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I 6.0 Hazard Analysis - Determination of Release Values Associated Release Mechanisms 
2 
3 Spent Fuel Elements: No significant airborne release from spent fuel elements (metal) would occur due to high wind/entrainment, which 
4 is consistent with Section 4.2.4 of DOE (2000). This scenario is not considered further in this calculation. The airborne release of non- 
5 adherent uranium oxide from the surface of a spent fuel element via high wind/entrainment is expected to be less than that released by a 
6 droplimpact event. Therefore, the R value for entrainment of the oxide is : 1 E-03. 
7 
8 6.3 Deflaaration 
9 
i o  Contaminated soil: The soil at the burial grounds is noncombustible. A fire burning across either site could entrain some of the soil in 
11 the updraft, but it would be expected that the amount released by this mechanism would be bounded by the amount of soil released 
12 through entrainment. Therefore, the R value is 1.5E-08. 
14 Spent Fuel Elements (oxide): The spent fuel element material at risk during deflagration in the burial ground is limited to the pre-existent 
15 oxide. No significant airborne release of uranium metal is postulated, which is consistent with Section 4.2.2 of DOE (2000). The material 
16 release is conservatively evaluated as a venting of a pressurized powder at low pressures, consistent with the analysis performed for the 
18 exposed excavation. The bounding airborne release fraction in Section 5.3.2.3 of DOE (2000) is 0.005, with a respirable fraction of 0.4 
IS for low-pressure powders being vented. This yields a boundina R value of 2.OE-03. 
21 Contaminated, Combustible Solids: Contaminated combustible solids (e.g., soft waste, used PPE) are expected to be present. Such 
22 materials are expected to have minimal contamination and do not provide a rigid surface for pressurized gases to act upon. DO€ (2000), 
23 Section 5.2.2.3, states that the bounding R value for this scenario is 1 .OE-03. 
25 Contaminated, Noncombustible Solids: Contaminated noncombustible solids are expected to be present. Only those contaminated 
26 particles that are loose (i.e., not adhered tightly to the bulk solid) on the surface of the noncombustible solids would be subject to release. 
27 Section 5.3.2.3 of DOE (2000) indicates that the bounding R value for the release of pressurized aases over contaminated, 
28 noncombustible materials is 2.0E-03. 
30 Contaminated liauid: The potential exists for containers of liquid to be unearthed during excavation activities. It is possible that a 
31 deflagration could occur during characterization activities that affects liquids. However, because the amount of flammable gases will be 
32 relatively small, the potential damage is expected to be low and localized. Section 3.2.2.3.2 of DOE (2000) indicates that the boundina 
33 R value for a low-pressure deflagration ventina of any solution would be 4.OE-05. 
13 
17 105H facility (BHI 2003a). Only low pressures would be produced by this event due to the la& of confinement for the deflagration in an I 
20 
24 
29 
34 
35 
36 
37 
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I 6.0 Hazard Analysis - Determination of Release Values Associated Release Mechanisms 
L 
3 6.4 DroDDinallmpact 
5 Contaminated Soil: A vehicle or excavator impact to contaminated soil could result in resuspension of the material. However, only a 
6 Small fraction of the potentially contaminated soil volume could be affected. Section 4.4.3.3.2 of DOE (2000) is not directly applicable 
7 to this scenario due to the physical differences between the experimental conditions (powder placed on a plywood sheet or in a quart 
8 can within a vented metal box) and the burial ground remediation activities (tens-of-thousands of kg of soil), but it does provide a 
9 reference point. The bounding R value in Section 4.4.3.3.2 of DOE (2000) is 2E-3. The outer areas of the large soil mass will shield 
10 the majority of the soil from impact stress, resulting in a boundina R value much less than dumpina of contaminated soils (c1.OE- 
11 06). 
12 
13 Contaminated, Combustible Solids: Contaminated combustible solids may be lifted out of a trench and dropped. These combustible 
14 materials are typically lightweight. Consequently, they would generate little force during impact with surfaces. Section 5.2.3.2 of DOE 
15 (2000) states that solids that experience predominatly plastic deformation (e.g. metal, plastics) as opposed to brittle fracture, respond 
16 to vibration and shock of the substrate by flexing. Materials adhering to the surface are ejected by the movement depending on how 
17 the contaminant is attached to the surface. The bounding R value discussed in Section 5.3.3.2.2 is lE-03, therefore, this will be 
18 used for this scenario. 
19 
20 Contaminated, Noncombustible Solids: Contaminated, noncombustible solids may be lifted out of a trench and dropped, or digging 
21 equipment may impact them. DOE (2000), Section 5.3.3, addresses free-fall spill and impaction stress to such solids. The bounding 
22 ARF for shock-vibration of contaminated noncombustible materials that do not undergo brittle fracture is 1 .OE-03. The respirable 
23 fraction is assumed to be 1 .O; therefore, the R value used for this 
24 scenario is I .OE-03. 
26 Contaminated licruid: The potential exists for containers of liquid to be unearthed during excavation activities. It is possible that an 
27 impact to a container could occur during excavation activities. However, the amount of liquid would expected to be a small fraction of 
28 the total volume of the burial trenches. The bounding R value for this scenario would be less than that for a free-fall spill of aqueous 
29 solution. Therefore, the R value is e 1E-04. 
31 Soent Fuel Elements: No significant airborne release from solid uranium metal would result from dropping of spent fuel elements, 
32 which is consistent with Section 4.2.3 of DOE (2000). Release of any oxide, however, would be similar to that from a contaminated, 
33 noncombustible solid. Therefore, the R value used for this scenario for oxide is 1 .OE-03. 
34 
35 6.5 Fire 
36 
37 Contaminated soil: The soil at the burial grounds is noncombustible. A fire burning across either site could entrain some of the soil in 
38 the updraft, but it would be expected that the amount released by this mechanism would be bounded by the amount of soil released 
39 through entrainment. Therefore, the R value is 1.5E-08. 
4 
25 
30 
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1 6.0 Hazard Analysis - Determination of Release Values Associated Release Mechanisms 
2 
3 Contaminated, Combustible Solids: This scenario would involve the ignition of soft waste by an external source such as a range fire or 
4 an internal source such as a vehicle fire. Contaminants remaining on soft waste would be well adhered after 30-60 years in the burial 
5 ground. Also, the soft waste is dispersed in a non-combustible (Le., soil, metallic components) matrix and would be present as 
6 compact piles. Therefore, the R value used for this scenario is 5.OE-04 as reported in Section 5.2.1.1 of DOE (2000) for 
7 packased waste. 
9 Contaminated, Noncombustible Solids (includinq ore-existinq oxide on spent fuel elements) A fire could suspend some of the surface 
8 
IO contamination due to heating of the metallic components. DOE (2000), Section 5.1 (page 5-5) assesses the release of a sparse 
11 population of particles attached to the surface of a noncombustible solid. The R value for this scenario is 6.OE-05. 
12 
13 Contaminated liquid: A potential initiator of an on-site fire could be ignition of gasoline or diesel from the excavator. It is possible for 
14 containers to be heated by a fire and, as a result, the liquid contents could also be heated. Section 3.1 of DOE-HDBK-3010-94 (DOE 
15 2000) indicates that the bounding values for boiling of aqueous solutions are an ARF of 2E-03 and an RF of 1.0, resulting in an R value 
16 Of 2E-3. 
17 
18 Spent Fuel Elements (Oxide): This scenario is addressed under contaminated, non-combustible solids. 
19 
20 Spent Fuel Elements (metal): Section 4.1 of DOE-HDBK-3010-94 (DOE 2000) provides ARF and RF values for the oxidation of 
21 uranium metal at high temperatures (>50OOC). The median ARF is 1 E 4  and the RF is 1 .O, resulting in an R value of I.0E-4. These 
22 parameters are to be applied only to the oxide created during the fire and not to any un-oxidized portion of the uranium metal. The 
23 uranium that remains in metallic form is not at risk for release by thermal stress. 
24 
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I 6.0 Hazard Analysis - Determination of Release Values Associated Release Mechanisms 
2 
3 6.6 Summarv of Release Values Used in This Calculation 
Spent Fuel Element Insignificant Insignificant lnsignifican Insignificant 1 .OE-04 
(Metal) 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Evaluation of the release values in the above table shows that no significant release from the spent fuel element (metal) is postulated 
except for a fire. 
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1 7.0 Adjustments to Material Inventories 
2 
3 7.1 Liquids 
4 
5 Conservatively, the entire liquid inventory is considered to be at risk for all hazard scenarios. 
7 7.2 Contaminated Soil 
9 A fractional amount of the activity from general radioactive waste was qualified as a noncombustible dispersible solid in the form of a powder. 
6 
8 
10 
11 For purposes of soil removal during high winds Sehmel (1 980) provides a bounding depth of 10 mm for soil at risk for resuspension by high wind. A 
12 typical trench depth is 4600 mm, so a high wind event would impact 1014600 or 0.2%. The amount of soil considered to be available for entrainment 
13 due to a high wind event is conservatively assumed to be 10%. 
15 The amount of contaminated soil considered to be available for damage duringa fire is conservatively taken to be 100%. 
17 For the deflagration, dumping/spilling, and droppinghmpact hazards, only a small fraction of the noncombustible solid inventory would be expected to 
18 be involved in the hazard. The fraction of contaminated soil at risk in these hazards is taken to be 1% of the total soil inventory. This percentage is 
19 conservative and bounding based on the assumption that a 25 mm deep layer of a single trench is less than 1% of the total volume. A deflagration, 
20 dump, spill, drop, or impact event would occur within a much more localized volume or surface area: therefore, the 1% value is bounding and 
21 conservative. 
22 
23 7.3 Uranium Metal Solids 
25 The spent fuel elements are encased in cladding, though 20% of the fuel elements are assumed to be damaged and breached. Experience at other 
26 excavation sites has shown that multiple fuel elements have not been unearthed in the same excavator bucket load. 
28 For the fire hazard event, the ARF and RF values should be applied only to oxide created during a fire and not to any un-oxidized metal. As discussed 
29 in Section 4.2.1.2 of DOE-HDBK-3010-94 (DOE 2000), oxidation of uranium under fire conditions does take place. However, not all of the uranium in 
30 the spent fuel is expected to oxidize. 
32 The bounding fire at a burial ground from the standpoint of uranium metal oxidation would be a pool fire involving diesel fuel spilled from a piece of 
33 large equipment (e.g., excavator) or from a refueling truck. (Note that other scenarios are bounding for the purpose of deriving other values, such as 
34 the percentage of waste impacted by a fire.) The scenario would involve a spill of diesel onto the soil surface of the burial ground such that a pool is 
35 formed. The pool is then ignited and bums until the fuel is exhausted. Some fraction of the spilled diesel would be absorbed by the soil, which would 
36 serve to reduce the amount of fuel available to burn and, consequently, the duration of the fire. The burning rate of diesel is in the range of 5 to 8 in. 
37 (13 to 20 cm) of depth per hour (NFPA 1991). 
38 
39 Given (I) the burning rate of diesel, (2) the absorption of some fraction of the spilled diesel by the soil, (3) the burial ground terrain and (4) the potential 
40 volume of a diesel spill (100-200 gal.), a reasonably conservative maximum duration for a diesel fuel pool fire at a burial ground is estimated to be 30 
41 minutes (Le., 2.5 to 4 in. of pool depth burned). It is expected that the continuous flame region temperature for a diesel fuel pool fire at a burial ground 
42 would range from 900 "C to 1100 OC. This is consistent with the analysis made for the 11 8-8-111 184-1 burial grounds (BHI 2005d). 
43 
14 
$6 
24 
27 
31 
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1 7.3 Uranium Metal Solids (continued) 
2 
3 The "Basis for Interim Operation for Fuel Supply Shutdown Facility" (Benecke 2003) evaluates the oxidation of uranium metal fuel in a storage building 
4 fire. An 8-hr fire duration, including 2.5 hours at or above 7000 O C .  is used to determine the fraction of the uranium metal oxidized. The evaluation 
5 determined that 5% of the uranium metal would be oxidized in such a fire event. 
7 An investigation titled "Oxidation of Uranium in Air at High Temperatures" (GE 1958) examined the oxidation of small (1/4 to 1l2 inch in diameter by 
8 314 to 1 inch in length) pieces of metallic uranium at temperatures ranging from 3OOOC to 1440 OC. The cylindrical test specimens were prepared by 
9 swaging from a Hanford reactor fuel element. Oxidation rate equations for uranium metal as a function of the area to weight ratio of the cylindrical 
10 specimens were determined. Using an area to weight ratio of 0.08 cm2/g for a typical uranium metal fuel element (Le., 260cm2/3,200g), oxidation 
" rates of about 15.5 mg U/cmz-min and 34.3 mg U/cmz-min are predicted at 995 OC and 1200 "C by solving the appropriate oxidation rate equations in 
l2 (GE 1958). This would imply that 121 g to 267 g* or 3.8% to 8.3% of the mass of uranium metal in a typical fuel element would be oxidized in 30 
l3 minutes. 
6 
14 
15 
16 Section 4.2.1.2.1 of DOE-HDBK-3010-94 (DOE 2000) discusses oxidation at elevated temperatures in a fire. A study by Elder and Tinkle is cited that 
17 involved 13 experiments, performed from 50O0C to 1000 O C  for durations of 2 or 4 hours. The oxidation of the uranium ranged from 6.2% to 22.1% for 
18 the 2-hour fires (1.6 % to 5.5% per 30 minutes) and from 21.3% to 30.2% for the 4-hour fires (2.7% to 3.8% per 30 minutes). 
19 
20 Because the burial ground fire is estimated to burn for 30 minutes, a value of 10% is chosen to represent the amount of uranium metal that oxidizes 
21 during the fire hazard scenario. This value bounds the each of the references cited above. 
22 
23 7.4 Non-combustible Solids 
25 The noncombustible solids are comprised of metal reactor waste with surface contarnination. In general, only those contaminated particles that are 
26 loose (Le., not combined with the surface matrix) on the surface of the noncombustible solids are subject to release. The material at risk is therefore 
27 reduced. 
29 It is assumed that 90% of the radionuclide inventory associated with the non-combustable solids inventory is activation products within the solid 
30 material and 10% is contamination on the surface of the solid material. For the entrainment l high wind and fire hazards, only those portions of the 
31 noncombustible solid inventory that are loose are susceptible to the hazard (according to Section 5.1 of DOE-HDBK-3010-94 [DOE 20003, the ARF 
32 and RF values for these two hazards are to be applied only to loose surface contamination and not to radionuclides integral to the bulk solid). The 
33 fraction of solid noncombustible material at risk in these hazards is taken to be 10% (percent of material that is loose contamination) of the total solid 
34 
35 For the deflagration, dumping / spilling, and dropping l impact hazards, only a small fraction of the noncombustible solid inventory is expected to be 
36 involved in the hazard. The fraction of solid noncombustible material at risk in these hazards is taken to be 1% of the total solid noncombustible 
37 inventory. The basis for the 1% value is similar to that explained in the final paragraph (deflagration, dumpinglspilling, and droppinglimpact hazards) 
38 of Section 7.2. 
39 
40 7.5 Combustible Solids 
42 A portion of the general radioactive waste is treated as combustible solids. The fraction of combustible solids available for damage during the hazard 
43 event of entrainment / high wind is taken to be 10% of the total combustible solid inventory. A 10% material availability for damage was selected as a 
44 conservative upper bound based on the fact that combustible solids are generally packaged in boxes, drums, etc and are, therefore, afforded a 
45 certain self-protection against high winds. Additionally, it would be necessary for the material to be exposed to the winds by the excavation process. 
46 It is not credible to assume that the excavator would exhume more than 10% of the radioactive inventory at any given time and leave it exposed for 
47 entrainment by high winds. 
48 
49 For the fire hazard, only a portion of the combustible solid inventory in the waste site is at risk (it is unlikely that a fire consumes all the un-excavated 
50 waste). Nevertheless, the fraction of solid combustible material at risk in this hazard is conservatively taken to be 100% of the total solid combustible 
51 inventory, 
53 For the deflagration, dumping l spilling, and dropping / impact hazards, only a small fraction of the combustible solid inventory is expected to be 
54 involved in the hazard. The fraction of solid combustible material at risk in these hazards is taken to be 1% of the total solid combustible inventory. 
55 The basis for the 1% value is similar to that explained in the final paragraph (deflagration, durnpinglspilling, and droppinglimpact hazards) of Section 
56 7.2. 
57 
58 7.6 Uranium Oxide 
59 
60 As discussed in Section 4, "Assumptions", 0.1% of the total uranium fuel inventory is assumed to be uranium oxide. The thin layer of oxide is only 
61 present when the cladding has been breached. It is assumed that 100% of this inventory for all accdients is considered available for release. 
24 
28 
41 
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1 7.7 Summary of Adiustments to Material inventory 
L 
3 The fraction of each waste form subject to damage from a given hazard (determined in the preceding subsections) is summarized in the table beiow. 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
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Radionuclide Combustible combustible Soil Liquid 
Inventory Inventory Inventory Inventory Inventory 
(Ci)(” ( Ci)(5l (Cif” 3 Isotope (Ci) (tip 
Washington Closure 
Spent Fuel Element Inventory 
(25 Fuel Elements) 
Total 0.1% Oxide 
(C j)W) (Ci)‘+ I 
2 
4 Ag-l08m 9.59E+00 4.8OE-01 7.66E+00 1.35E+00 
5 Am-241 1.02E+00 5.09E-02 8.13E-01 1.43E-01 
6 Ba-133 1.44E-01 7.2OE-03 1 .I 5E51 2.03E-02 
7 C-14 1.01 E+OO 5.05E-02 8.07E-01 1.42E-01 
8 Ca-41 I .00E-02 5.00E-04 7.99E-03 1.41 E-03 
9 Cd-l13m 
i o  Co-60 3.23E+01 1.61 E+OO 2.58E+01 4.55E+00 
11 CS-137 1.33E+02 6.66E+00 1.06E+02 1.88E+01 
12 Eu-152 8.69E-01 4.34E-02 6.94E-01 1.22E-01 
13 - Eu-154 3.02E-01 1.51 E-02 2.42E-01 4.27E-02 
14 Eu-155 1.33E-01 6.65E-03 1.06E-01 1.87E-02 
16 Kr-85 4.77E+00 2.38E-01 3.81 E+001 6.72E-01 
17 Nb-94 3.21 E-02 I .60E-03 2.56E-02 4.52E-03 
18 Ni-59 6.14E+00 3.07E-01 4.91 E+OO 8.66E-01 
15 H-3 1.93E+02 9.64E+00 1.54E+02 2.72E+01 
19 Ni-63 2.29E+02 1.15E+01 1.83E+02 3.23E+01 
21 Pu-238 5.22E-02 2.61 E-03 4.1 7E-02 7.37E-03 
20 Pd-107 
22 Pu-239 6.32E-02 3.16E-03 5.05E-02 8.92E-03 
23 PU-240 
24 Pu-241 
25 se-79 5.59E-01 2.80E-02 4.47E-01 7.88E-02 
26 Sm-151 
27 Sr-90 1.41 E+OO 7.07E-02 1 .I 3E+OO 1.99E-01 
28 TC-99 9.99E-02 4.99E-03 7.98E-02 1.41 E-02 
29 U-235 7.51 E-02 3.76E-03 6.00E-02 1.06E-02 
30 U-238 7.66E-02 3.83E-03 6.12E-02 1.08E-02 
3 1 ~  Zr-93 
32 (I) Oxide inventory determined by assuming that 0.1 % of the total inventory 
36 
37 (3) Assumes 5% of the burial ground inventory is combustible (i.e., soft waste). This is consistent with the FHC calculation for the 
38 118-K-1 Burial Ground (WCH 2006c) and the 100-BIC Burial Grounds (BHI 2005~). 
39 
40 “Contaminated, noncombustible solids inventory was calculated by subtracting the total combustible and liquid inventories from 
41 the total inventory and multiplying by 85%. 
43 ‘5)Particulate inventory was calculated by subtracting the combustible and liquid inventories from the total inventory and multiplying 
45 
46 (’) Liquid inventory is assumed to be 1 % of the total inventory. 
42 
by 15%. 
9.59E-02 
1.02E-02 2.96E+00 2.96E-03 
1.44E-03 
1.01 E-02 
1.00E-04 
3.87E-03 3.87E-06 
3.23E-01 
1.33E+00 1.26E+02 1.26E-01 
8.69E-03 5.33E-04 5.33E-07 
3.02E-03 
1.33E-03 
1.93E+00 
4.77E-02 2.74E+00 2.74E-03 
3.21 E-04 4.00E-03 4.00E-06 
6.14E-02 
2.29E+00 
5.22E-04 8.54E-02 8.54E-05 
1.00E-04 1 .OOE-O7 
6.32E-04 6.00E+00 6.00E-03 
1.50E+00 1.50E-03 
1.95E+01 1.95E-02 
5.59E-03 1.00E-03 1.00E-06 
1.71 E+OO 1.71 E-03 
1.41 E-02 1.24E+02 1.24E-01 
9.99E-04 5.00E+00 5.00E-03 
7.51 E-04 
7.66E-04 3.00E-02 3.00E-05 
1.00E-02 1.00E-05 
is in the form of oxide. 
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Calculation (Revised TQs) 
1 9.0 Calculation of Revised TQ Values 
2 CATEGORY 3 T€ 
Element 
SSNOLD 
REPA(') 
RATION, 
1 .OE-02 
I .OE-03 
1 .OE-02 
5.OE-01 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
I .OE-03 
1 .OE-02 
1.OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
5.OE-01 
1 .OE+OO 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
I .OE-02 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-O2 
[JANTITIES 
RVHA 
NTRAINM 
1.5E-08 
1 SE-08 
1.5E-08 
1 SE-08 
1 SE-08 
1.5E-08 
I SE-08 
1 SE-08 
1.5E-08 
1.5E-08 
1 SE-08 
1.5E-08 
1 SE-08 
1.5E-08 
1 SE-08 
1.5E-08 
1SE-08 
1.5E-08 
1.5E-08 
1.5E-08 
1.5E-08 
1.5E-08 
1.5E-08 
1.5E-08 
I .5E-08 
1 SE-08 
1.5E-08 
1 SE-08 
EVISED FOR 
Food'Z' 
hgestion R'C 
(Ci) 
YT AND HI 
l.SE+O 1 
3.OE-01 
5.9E+O 1 - 
8.OE+O 1 
5.8E-01 
6.0Et-0 1 
3.0E+00 
2.4Et-01 
1.5E+0 1 
1.2E+02 
na 
2.7E+01 
5.9E+02 
2.7E+02 
8.9E+02 
2.1 E+OO 
1. SE+00 
l.SE+OO 
9.OE+Ol 
1.8E-t-O 1 
- 
3.OE+02 
8.9E+O 1 
3.0E+00 
3.OE+00 
3.OEN1 
8.2E-01 
1.2E+07 
2.0E+04 
3.9E+07 
5.3 E+07 
3.9E+05 
4.0E+06 
2.0E+06 
1.6E+07 
1 .OE+07 
8.OE+07 
na 
1.8E+07 
3.9E+08 
l.XE+OX 
5 9E+0 8 
1.4E+05 
1.2E+05 
I .2E+O5 
6.0Et-06 
1.2E+07 
2.OE+08 
5.5E+05 
5.9E+07 
2.OE+O5 
2.OE+05 
2.OE+O7 
I 
- 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
1.5E+02 
5.9E+03 
na 
2.9E+02 
1 .OE+O I 
3.6E+02 
2.1E+01 
2. IE+03 
1 .OE+OO 
1.6E+02 
I .OE+02 
l.OE+Ol 
1.0Et-01 
4.7E+01 
8.3E+02 
na 
1 .OE+O 1 
2.IE+03 
1 .OE+03 
2.1Et-02 
2.6E-02 
3.1 E-02 
2.6E-02 
2.6E-02 
1.6E+00 
3.1E+02 
5.2E+01 
2.1E+OO 
3.6E+02 
2.1E-0 I 
2.lE-0 I 
3. I E+OO 
6.7E+06 
I .7E+03 
2.4E+08 7 0
1.4E+09 
6.7E+05 
1. I E+07 
6.7E+07 
6.7E+06 
6.7E+06 
3.1E+07 
2.8E+10 
na 
6.7EM6 
I .4E+09 
6.7E+08 
1.4E+08 
2. I E+03 
1.7E+03 
1.7E+03 
I .  I E+05 
2.1 E+08 
3.5E+07 
1.4E+06 
2.4E+08 
1.4E+04 
1.4E+04 
2. I E+O6 
2.2E+O 1 
1 .OE+02 
I 
- 
- 
- 
1.5E+O 1 
6.5E+0 1 
3.5E+01 
4.2ECO I 
7.0E+02 
1 .OE+03 
2.3E+01 
- 
__ __ 
I 
-- 
1.7E+06 
5.OE+06 
1.4Et-08 
I 
- 
I 
2.7E+02 - __ 
TQREVISED(' 
(Ci) 
4.4E+02 
3.5E+04 
2.OE+03 
3.OE+03 
I.lE+09 
7.7E+06 
2.8E+02 
1.3E+03 
7.0E+02 8.4E4  
I .2E+05 
2.OE+04 
4.6E+02 
7.9E+09 
3.6Ei-09 
2.8Et-09 
4.1E+04 
3.5 E+04 
3.5E+04 
2.IE+06 
2.4E+O8 
6.9E+08 
l.lE+07 
5.8E+03 
5.4E+03 
2.8Ei-05 
4.1 E+O7 
1.4E+04 
34 v. Ig. = the sorption coefficient is greater than zero and the release value is much greater than that for other pathways (EPA, f989). 
35 - = no gamma rays are emitted or the gamma rays which are emitted have gamma ray energies of less than 0.07 MeV and are strongly attenuated in 
36 air. No release value for the direct exposure pathway was calculated (EPA, 1989). 
37 na = an annual limit intake (ALI) for either ingestion or inhalation (or both) was unavailable for this radionuclide. 
38 (1) AS reported in Appendix A of "Technical Background Document to Support Final Rulemaking Pursuant to Section 102 of the Comprehensive Environmental 
39 Reswnse. Comwnsation. and Liabilitv Act: Radionuclides". EPA Contract 68-03-3452.02/89 
40 (2) A release of RV to atmosphere produces a dose of 0.5 rem via the food ingestion pathway. Assumes deposition on crops 30 meters from the point of release. 
41 DisDersion based on extramlation of mound level data for stabilitv class D and 1 m/sec windmeed fX/O = 0.072 m'/sect. 
42 
43 (3) Food ingestion and inhalation RVs adjusted by multiplying each original value by ratio o f ( h P A  / RVHA). See note 7 below. 
44 
45 (4) A release of RV to groundwater produces a dose of 0.5 rem via the water ingestion pathway. Assumes a well 30 meters &om the point of release. Contact time = 
46 9 davs. IndeDendent of the airborne release fraction. 
47 
48 (5) A release of RV to atmosphere produces a dose of 0.5 rem vi3 the inhalation pathway. Assumes a receptor 30 meters From the point of release. Dispersion based on 
49 extrapolation of ground level data for stability class D and 1 d s e c  windspeed (X/Q = 0.072 m3/sec) and average breathing rate (2.7E-4 m'lsec). 
50 
51 (6) A point source of RV produces a dose of 0.5 rem at 30 meters in 24 hours. Independent of airborne release fraction. 
52 
53 (7) TQ = 20 x the minimum value of {(Food RV x hA/RHA), Water RV, (Inhalation RV x REPA/&,,& or Direct Dose RV) . The value "20" results from the EPA 
54 RVs being based on an effective dose of 0.5 rem and the 1027 values being based on an effective dose of IO rem (Le., [0.5 rem x 20 = 10 rem]). 
55 
56 
57 (8) The most restrictive value from EPA ( I  989) is direct esposure. 20 times this value is 300 Ci. The TQ listed in DOE 1997 is 280 Ci The more restrictive value 
58 of 280 Ci is used. 
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1 9.0 Calculation of Revised TQ Values 
2 CATEGORY 3 IXRESHOLD QUANTITIES REVISED FOR APPROPRUTE RELEASE VALUES 
m 
1.OE;02 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-02 
5.OE-01 
1 .OE-02 
I .OE-02 
1 .OE-03 
1.OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
I .OE-02 
1.OE-02 
5.OE-0 I 
1 .OE+OO 
1 .OE-02 
1.OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1.OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1.OE-02 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-02 
I I 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.0E-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.0E-03 
2.0E-03 
2.0E-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.0E-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
3NCOkfBU 
1.8E+01 
3.OE-0 1 
5.9E1-01 - 
S.OE+O 1 
5.SE-01 
6.OE+O I 
3.OE+00 
2.4E+O 1 
1.5E+0I 
1.2E+02 
na 
2.7E+OI 
5.9E+02 
2.7E+02 
8.9E+02 
2.1 E+OO 
I .&E+OO 
1.8E+OO 
9.OE+O 1 
l.SE+OI 
3.OE+02 
- 
8.2E-0 1 
8.9E+Ol 
3.0E+00 
3.OE+00 
3.0Et-01 
rABLE MAT 
9.OE+01 
3.0E+02 
1.5E-0 1 
- 
4.OE+02 
3.OE+01 
1.5E+O 1 
1.2E+02 
7.5Et-01 
6.OE+02 
na 
1.4E+02 
3.OE+03 
1.4E+03 
4.5E+03 
2.9E+00 
-- 
I.lE+OO 
9.OE-01 
4.5E+01 
9.OE+01 
ISE+03 
4.1 E+OO 
4.5E-1-02 
1.5E+OO 
1.5E+00 
1.5E+O2 
9.OE-0 1 
RIAL - DEN 
v. ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
5.9E+03 
na  
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
1.5E+02 
2.9E+02 
iGRATIOI 
l.OE+OI 
3.6E+02 
2. 1Et0l 
2.1E+03 
l.OE+OO 
1.6E+02 
1 .OE+0 1 
1 .OE+0 1 
4.7E+0 1 
8.3E+02 
na 
1 .OE+0 1 
2. iE+03 
1 .OEM3 
2.1 Et02 
2.6E-02 
1.6E40 
3.1E+02 
5.2EG1 
2. IEtOO 
3.6E+02 
2.6E-02 
1 .OE+02 
3.1 E-02 
2.6E-02 
2.1E-Of 
2.1E-01 
3.1EtOO 
Dire&' 
Exposure RV 
5.0E+01 
I .8E+03 
5.38+03 
1.IEi-04 
5.OE+00 
8.OE+01 
5.OE+02 
5.OEt01 
2.4E+02 
2.1E+05 
na 
5.OEi-01 
l.lE+04 
5.OE+03 
1.1E+03 
1.3E-02 
5.OE+O1 
1.6E-02 
1.3E-02 
1.3E-02 
8.OE-01 
1.6E+03 
2.6E+02 
1.1 E+O 1 
l.SE+03 
I.1E-01 
1.lE-01 
1.6EtO 1 
2.2Et-01 
I .OE+02 
-- 
__ 
-- 
-- 
l.SE+O I 
6.5E+O 1 
3.5E+01 
4.2E+0 1 
7.0E+02 
1 .OE+03 
2.3E+01 
-- 
-- 
- 
-- 
-- 
1.7E+06 
1.4E+08 
5.OE+06 
-- -- 
-_ 
-- -- 
-_ 
-- 
4.4E+02 
2.6E-01 
2.OE+03 
3.0E+03 
5.8E+01 
8.OE+03 
2.8E+02 
3.OE+02 
7.0E+02 
8.4E+02 
4.7Efl3 
1.2E+05 
2.0E+04 
4.6EG2 
5.9E+04 
2.7E+04 
2.1 E+04 
3.lE-01 
2.6E-01 
2.6E-01 
I .6E+O 1 
I .SEN3 
5.2Et-03 
8.2E+01 
5.8E+03 
2. XE+OO 
2.1E+00 
3.1Et-02 
)5 v. Ig. = the sorption coefficient is greater than zero and the release value is much greater than that for other pathways (EPA, 1989). 
" for the direct exposure pathway was calculated (EPA, 1989). 
$8 na = an annual limit intake (ALI) for either ingestion or inhalation (or both) was unavailable for this radionuclide. 
19 (1) As reported in Appendix A of "Technical Background Document to Support Final Rulemaking Pursuant to Section 102 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
10 Compensation, and Liability Act: Radionuclides", EPA Contract 68-03-3452,02/89 
I1 (2) A release of RV to atmosphere produces a dose of 0.5 rem via the food ingestion pathway. Assumes deposition on crops 30 meters from the point of release. 
12 Dispersion based on extrapolation of ground level data for stability class D and 1 d s e c  windspeed (WQ = 0.072 m3/sec). 
13 (3) Food ingestion and inhalation RVs adjusted by multiplying each original value by ratio of 
I4 (4) A release of RV to groundwater produces a dose of 0.5 rem via the water ingestion pathway. Assumes a well 30 meters from the point of release. Contact time = 9 
'5 days. Independent of the airborne release fraction. 
16 (5 )  A release of RV to atmosphere produces a dose of 0.5 rem via the inhalation pathway. Assumes a receptor 30 meters from the point of release. Dispersion based on 
l7 extrapolation o f  ground level data for stability class D and I d s e c  windspeed (WQ = 0.072 m3/sec) and average breathing rate (2.78-4 m3/sec). 
23 
-9 (6) A point source of RV produces a dose of 0.5 rem at 30 meters in 24 hours. Independent of airborne release fraction. 
io (7) TQ = 20 x the minimum value of {(Food RV x bA&Jr Water RV, (Inhalation RV x REPA/&), or Direct Dose RV). The value "20" results from the EPA RVs 
I2 
i3 (8) The most restrictive value from EPA (1989) is direct exposure. 20 times this value is 300 Ci. The TQ listed in DOE 1997 is 280 Ci. The more restrictive value of 280 
- = no gamma rays are emitted or the gamma rays which are emitted have gamma ray energies of less than 0.07 MeV and are strongly attenuated in air. No release value 
/ RVHA). See note 7 below. 
being based on an effective dose of 0.5 rem and the 1027 values being based on an effective dose of 10 rem (i.e., (0.5 rem x 20 = 10 rem]). 
Ci is used. 
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Calculation (Revised TQsl 
Ba-I33 
Ca-41 
Co-60'8' 
C-14 
Cd-I13 
CS-137 
Eu-152 
Eu-154 
Eu-155 
H-3 
k-85 
Nb-94 
Ni-59 
Ni-63 
Pd-107 
Pu-238 
Pu-239 
Pu-240 
Pu-241 
Se-79 
Sm-151 
Sr-90 
Tc-99 
U-235 
U-238 
Zr-93 
Notes: 
1 9.0 Calculation of Revised TQ Values (continued) 
2 CATEGORY 3 THRESHOLD QUANTITIES REVISED FOR APPROPRIATE RELEASE VALUES 
6 5F Am 241 1 .OE-02 1.OE-03 
1.OE-02 
5.OE-01 
1 .OE-02 
I .OE-02 
1 .OE-03 
1.OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
5.OE-01 
1 .OEM0 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
I .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
I .OE-03 
1.OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1.OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1.OE-02 
I .OE-02 
1 .OE-03 
I .OE-03 
1 .OE-O2 
OXIDE) & 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.0E-05 
6.0E-05 
6.0E-05 
6.0E-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.0E-05 
6.0E-05 
6.0E-05 
6.0E-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
lONCOMB 
1.8E+01 
3.OE-01 
5.9E+O 1 
S.OE+Ol 
6.0E+01 
3.OE+00 
ISE+OI 
__  
5.8E-01 
2.4E+01 
1.2E+02 
na 
2.7E+01 
5.9E+02 
2.7E+02 
8.9E+02 
2. I E+OO 
1.8E+00 
1.8E+00 
9.OEt-01 
3.OE+02 
8.9E+OI 
3.OE+00 
3.0Et-00 
3.OE+O1 
-- 
1.8E+O 1 
8.2E-01 
STABLE MATERIAL - F 
3.OE+03 
5.OE+OO 
9.8E+03 
I .3E+04 
9.7E+O 1 
1 .OE+O3 
5.OE+02 
4.OE+03 
2.5E+03 
2.OE+04 
na 
4.5E+03 
9.8E+04 
4.5E+04 
1.5E+05 
3 SE+O 1 
3.OE+O 1 
3.OE+OI 
1SE+O3 
3.OE+03 
5.0E+04 
1.4E+02 
1.5E+04 
5.OE+O1 
S.OE+OI 
5.OE+O3 
-- 
-- 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. lg 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
1.5E+02 
5.9E+03 
na 
2.9E+02 
L 
1 .OEM 1 
3.6EM2 
2,1E+01 
2. I EM3 
1 .OE+OO 
1.6E+02 
1 .OEM2 
1 .OE+O 1 
1 .OE+01 
4.7E+OI 
8.3 E+02 
na 
l.OE+Ol 
2.1EM3 
1 .OE+03 
2.1 E+02 
2.6E-02 
3.1E-02 
2.6E-02 
2.6E-02 
1.6E+00 
3.1E+02 
5.2E+01 
2.lE+OO 
3,6E+02 
2.1E-01 
2.1E-01 
3.1E+00 
1.7Et-03 
6.0E+04 
1. SEN5 
3.5E+05 
1.7E+02 
2.78+03 
I .7E+04 
1.7E+03 
1.7E+03 
7.8E+03 
6.9E+06 
na 
1.7E+03 
3.5E+05 
1.7E+05 
3.5E+04 
4.3E-01 
4.3E-01 
2.7E+O 1 
5.2E+04 
8.7E+03 
3.5E+02 
6.0E+04 
3.5E+00 
3.5E+00 
5.2E+O2 
4.3E-01 
5.2E-01 
Dire&' 
Exposure Rt 
(Ci) 
2.2E+01 
1.OE+02 
__  
- 
-- 
-_ 
1.5E+O 1 
4.2E+O 1 
6.5E+O 1 
3.5E+OI 
7.OE+02 
I .OE+03 
2.3E+O I 
I 
-- 
- __ 
I 
1.7E+06 
5.OE+06 
I .4E+08 
I __ __ 
-- 
I 
I - 
wREVIsED(' 
(Ci) 
4.4E+02 
8.7E+00 
3 .OE+03 
2.0E+03 
2.7E+05 
1.9Et03 
2.8E+02 
1.3E+03 
7.OE+02 
8.4E+02 
1.4E+04 
I .2E+05 
2.0Ei-04 
4.6E+02 
2.OE+06 
9.OE+05 
7.0E+05 
1 .OE+O 1 
8.7E+OO 
8.7E+OO 
5.3Et-02 
1.7E+05 
2.7E+03 
5.8E+03 
7.OE+O I 
1 .OE+O4 
6.OE+04 
7.OE+O 1 
34 v. lg. = the sorption coefficient is greater than zero and the release value is much greater than that for other pathways (EPA, 1989). 
5 - = no gamma rays are emitted or the gamma rays which are emitted have gamma ray energies of less than 0.07 MeV and are strongly attenuated in air. No release 
$7 na = an annual limit intake ( X I )  for either ingestion or inhalation (or both) was unavailable for this radionuclide. 
38 (1 ) As reported in Appendix A of "Technical Background Document to Support Final Rulemaking Pursuant to Section 102 of the Comprehensive Environmental 
$9 Response, Compensation, and Liability Act: Radionuclides", EPA Contract 68-03-3452,02/89 
10 (2) A release of RV to atmosphere produces a dose of 0.5 rem via the food ingestion pathway. Assumes deposition on crops 30 meters from the point of release. 
" Disoersion based on extramlation of ground level data for stabilitv class D and 1 m/sec winds& (XI0 = 0.072 m'/secI. 
12 (3) Food ingestion and inhalation RVs adjusted by multiplying each original value by ratio of (REPA / RVHJ. See note 7 below. 
13 (4) A release of RV to groundwater produces a dose of 0.5 rem via the water ingestion pathway. Assumes a well 30 meters from the point of release. Contact time = 9 
I4 days. Independent of the airborne release fraction. 
15 (5) A release of RV to atmosphere produces a dose of 0.5 rem via the inhalation pathway. Assumes a receptor 30 meters fiom the point of release. Dispersion based 
" on extrapolation of ground level data for stability class D and 1 m/sec windspeed (WQ = 0.072 m'/sec) and average breathing rate (2.7E-4 rn'lsec). 
17 
18 (6) A point source of RV produces a dose of 0.5 rem at 30 meters in 24 hours. Independent of airborne release fraction. 
19 (7) TQ =20 x the minimum value of ((Food RV x REPA&A), Water RV, (Inhalation RV x REPA&), or Direct Dose RV). The value "20" results from the EPA RVs 
j0 being based on an effective dose of 0.5 rem and the 1027 values being based on an effective dose of I O  rem (i.e., [0.5 rem x 20 = 10 rem]). 
51 
52 (8) The most restrictive value fiom EPA (1989) is direct exposure. 20 times this value is 300 Ci. The TQ listed in DOE 1997 is 280 Ci. The more restrictive value of 
53 280 Ci is used. 
value for the direct exposure pathway was calculated (EPA, 1989). 
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Calculation (Revised TQs) 
I 9.0 Calculation of Revised TQ Values (continued) 
2 CATEGORY 3 THRESHOLD 
Element 
3 
REPA(') 
ING & D 
EMENTS 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-02 
1.OE-02 
5.OE-01 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
5.OE-01 
1 .OE+OO 
1.OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
I .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
I .OE-03 
1.0E-03 
1.OE-03 
1 .OE-O3 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
I .OE-02 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-02 
JANTITIES 
RV, 
- 
METAL) - 
1.OE-04 
1.OE-04 
I .OE-04 
1 .OE-04 
1 .OE-04 
1 .OE-04 
1 .OE-04 
1 .OE-04 
1 .OE-04 
I .OE-04 
I .  OE-04 
1 .OE-04 
1 .OE-04 
1 .OE-04 
1 .OE-04 
1 .OE-04 
1 .OE-04 
1 .OE-04 
1 .OE-04 
1 .OE-04 
1 .OE-04 
1 .OE-04 
1 .OE-04 
1 .OE-04 
1 dE-04 
1 .OE-04 
1 .OE-04 
1 .OE-O4 
1.8Ei-0 1 
5.9E+01 
8.OE+O I 
6.0E+01 
3.0E+00 
2.4E+OI 
1.5E+01 
1.2E+02 
na 
2.7E+Ol 
5.9E+02 
2.7E+02 
8.9E+02 
2.1 E+OO 
1.8E+00 
1 .8Em 
9.OE+01 
1.8E+0I 
3.OE+02 
8.2E-01 
8.9E+01 
3 .OE+OO 
3.OE+OO 
3.OE+01 
3.OE-01 
-- 
5.8E-01 
- 
1.8E+03 
3.OE+00 
5.9E+03 
8.OE+03 
5.8E+O 1 
6.OE+02 
3.OE+02 
2.4E+03 
1.5E+03 
1.2E+04 
na 
2.7E+03 
5.9E+04 
2.7E+04 
8.9E+04 
2.1E+01 
l.XE+Ol 
1.8E+01 
9.0EM2 
1.8E+03 
3.0E+04 
8.2E+01 
8.9E+03 
3.0E+01 
3.OE+01 
3.OEW3 
-- 
I 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. 1g. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
5.9E+03 
na 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
2.9E-1-02 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
1.5E+02 
l.OE+O 1 
3.6E+02 
2.1E+OI 
2.1 E+03 
1 .OE+OO 
1.6E-1-02 
1 .OE+02 
1 .OE+O 1 
1 .OE+O 1 
4.7E+OI 
8.3 E+02 
na 
I.OE+Ol 
2.1E+03 
2.6E-02 
1 .OE+03 
2.1 E+02 
3.1E-02 
2.6E-02 
2.6E-02 
1.6E+00 
3. I E+02 
5.2E+01 
2.1 E+OO 
3.6E+02 
2.1E-01 
2.1E-01 
3.1E+00 
1 .OE+03 
3.6E+04 
2.6E-01 
l.lE+05 
2.1 E+05 
l.OE+02 . 
1.6E+03 
1 .OE+04 
1 .OE+03 
1 .OE+03 
4.7E+03 
4.2E+06 
na 
I .OE+03 
2. I E+05 
1 .OE+05 
2.1 E+04 
3.1 E-0 1 
2.6E-01 
2.6E-01 
1.6E+0 I 
3.1E+04 
5.2E+03 
2.1E+02 
3.6E+04 
2.1E+00 
2.1E+00 
3.1E+02 
-2zm- - 
1 .OE+02 _- 
-- __  
1.5E+O I 
6.5E+O 1 
3.5E+01 
4.2E+O I 
7.0E+02 
1 .OE+03 
2.3E+01 
*- 
__  
-_ 
..* 
I 
I .  7E+06 
5.OE+06 
1.4E+08 
- 
- 
-- 
2.7E+02 -- - 
TQREVISED(' 
(Ci) 
4.4E+02 
5.2E+00 
2.OE+03 
3.OE+03 
1.6E+05 
1.2E+03 
2.8E+02 
1.3E+03 
7.0E+02 
8.4E+02 
1.4E+04 
1.2E+05 
2.OE+04 
4.6E+02 
I .2E+06 
5.4E+05 
4.2E+05 
6.2Et-00 
5.2EMO 
5.2E+00 
3.2E+02 
3.6E+04 
1 .OE+05 
1.6E+03 
5.8E+03 
4.2E+0 1 
4.2E+O 1 
6.25+03 
Notes: 
- = no gamma rays are emitted or the gamma rays which are emitted have gamma ray energies of less than 0.07 MeV and are strongly attenuated in air. No release value 
for the direct exposure pathway was calculated (EPA, 1989). 
" v. lg. = the sorption coefficient is greater than zero and the release value is much greater than that for other pathways (EPA, 1989). 
I8 na = an annual limit intake (ALI) for either ineestion or inhalation (or both) was unavailable for this radionuclide. 
$9 ( I )  As reported in Appendix A of "Technical Background Document to Support Final Rulemaking Pursuant to Section 102 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Io ComDensation. and Liabilitv Act: Radionuclides". EPA Contract 68-03-3452.02/89 
11 (2) A release of RV to atmosphere produces a dose of0.5 rem via the food ingestion pathway. Assumes deposition on crops 30 meters from the point of release. 
12 Dispersion based on extrapolation of ground level data for stability class D and 1 m/sec windspeed (WQ = 0.072 m'lsec). 
13 (3) Food ingestion and inhalation RVs adjusted by multiplying each original value by ratio of (REPA / RVtix). See note 7 below. 
14 (4) A release of RV to groundwater produces a dose of 0.5 rem via the water ingestion pathway. Assumes a well 30 meters from the point of release. Contact time = 9 
I5 davs. IndeDendent of the airborne release &action. 
6 (5) A release of RV to atmosphere produces a dose of 0.5 rem via the inhalation pathway. Assumes a receptor 30 meters from the point of release. Dispersion based on :L extrapolation of ground level data for stability class D and 1 d s e c  windspeed (WQ = 0.072 m3/sec) and average breathing rate (2.7E-4 m3/sec). 
19 (6) A point source of RV produces a dose of 0.5 rem at 30 meters in 24 hours. independent of airborne release fraction. 
io (7) TQ = 20 x the minimum value of {(Food RV x REPA/RHA), Water RV, (Inhalation RV x ii being based on an effective dose of 0.5 rem and the 1027 values being based on an effective dose of 10 rem (Le., [0.5 rem x 20 = 10 rem]). 
$3 (8) The most restrictive value from EPA (1989) is direct exposure. 20 times this value is 300 Ci. The TQ listed in DOE 1997 is 280 Ci. The more restrictive value of 280 
i4 Ci is used. 
or Direct Dose RV). The value "20" results from the EPA RVS 
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6 
7 
9 
11 
8 
I O  
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
I 9.0 Calculation of Revised TQ Values (continued) 
A&-241 
Ba-133 
Ca-41 
Co-60''' 
C-14 
Cd-113 
(3-137 
Eu-152 
Eu-154 
Eu-155 
H-3 
Kr-85 
Nb-94 
Ni-59 
Ni-63 
Pd-107 
Pu-238 
PU-239 
Pu-240 
Pu-241 
Se-79 
Sm-151 
Sr-90 
Tc-99 
U-235 
U-238 
Zr-93 
Notes: 
2 CATEGORY 3 T I  
Element 
3 
4 COMBUSTIBLI 
5 An-108m 
ESHOLD 1 
REPP 
vlATERI 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-02 
5.OE-0 1 
1.OE-02 
I .OE-02 
1.OE-03 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
5.OE-01 
1 .OE+OO 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
I .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1.OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1.OE-03 
1.OE-02 
I .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1.OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-02 
JANTITLES REVISED FOR 
RVHA 
23 - ENTR 
5.OE-04 
5.0E-04 
5.OE-04 
5.OE-04 
5.OE-04 
5.OE-04 
5.OE-04 
5.OE-04 
5.OE-04 
5.OE-04 
5.OE-04 
5.OE-04 
5.OE-04 
5.OE-04 
5.OE-04 
5.OE-04 
5.OE-04 
5.0E-04 
5.OE-04 
5.OE-04 
5.OE-04 
5.OE-04 
5.OE-04 
5 .OE-04 
5.OE-04 
5.OE-04 
5.OE-04 
5.OE-04 
Food"' 
ngestion R\ 
fci) 
[NMENT AI 
1.8Et-01 
5.9E+01 
8.OE+OI 
6.OE+01 
3 .OE+OO 
2.4E+01 
1.5E+O 1 
1.2E+02 
na 
2.7E+O 1 
5.9Ei-02 
2.7E+02 
8.9E+02 
2.1E+00 
I .8E+00 
1.8E+00 
9.0Et-0 1 
1.8E+01 
3 .OE+02 
8.9E+01 
3.OE+00 
3.OE+00 
3.OE+O1 
3.OE-0 1 
5.8E-01 
-- 
8.2E-0 1 
'PROPRIATE 
Adj ~ s t e d ' ~ '  
Food 
Ingestion RV 
6.OE-01 
1.2E+03 
1.6E+03 
1.2E+O 1 
1.2E+02 
6.OE+01 
4.8E+02 
3.0E+02 
2.4E+03 
na 
5.4E+02 
1.2E+04 
5.4E+03 
1.8E+04 
4.2E+00 
3.6E+00 
3.6E+OO 
1.8E+02 
3.6E+02 
6.OEt-03 
1.6E+O I 
1.8E+03 
6.OE+00 
6.OE+OO 
6.OEM2 
-- 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
1.5EtO2 
5.9E+03 
na 
2.98+02 
1 .OE+O 1 
3.6E+02 
2.1E-I-01 
2.lE+03 
1 .OE+OO 
1.6E+02 
1 .OE+02 
l.OE+OI 
I .OE+Ol 
4.7E+01 
8.3E+02 
na 
1 .OE# 1 
2.1E+03 
1 .OEM3 
2.1 EM2 
2.6E-02 
3.1 E-02 
2.6E-02 
2.6E-02 
1.6E+OO 
3.1E+02 
5.2E+O I 
2.1E+00 
3.6E+02 
2.IE-01 
2.1E-01 
3.1E+00 
2.OE+02 
7.2E+03 
2.1E+04 
4.2E.304 
2.OE+01 
3.2E+02 
2.OE+03 
2.0E+02 
2.OE+02 
9.4E+02 
8.3E+05 
na 
2.0E+02 
4.2E+04 
2.OEj-04 
4.2E+03 
5.2E-02 
6.2E-02 
5.2E-02 
5.2E-02 
3.2E+00 
6.2E+03 
1 .OE+03 
4.2E+01 
7.2E+03 
4.2E-0 1 
4.2E-0 1 
6.2E+Ol 
2.2E-N 1 
I .  OE+02 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
1.5E+O 1 
6.5E+01 
3.5E+01 
4.2E+OI 
7.OE+02 
I .OE+03 
2.3E+O 1 
-- 
-- 
I 
5 1.7E+06 .O  
1.4E+OS -- 
-- _ _  
2.7E+02 -_ 
-_ 
4.48+02 
1 .OE+OO 
2.OE+03 
3.OE+03 
3.2E+04 
2.3E+02 
2.8Et-02 
1.2E+03 
7.0E+02 
8.4E+02 
1.4E+04 
1.2E1-05 
2.OE+04 
4.6E+02 
2.46+05 
l.lEM.5 
8.4E+04 
1.2E+00 
1 .OE+OO 
1 .OE+OO 
6.4E+O 1 
7.2E+03 
2.1E+04 
3.36+02 
5.88+03 
8.4E+00 
8.4E+OO 
1.2E+03 
34 v. Ig. =the sorption coefficient is greater than zero and the release value is much grater than that for other pathways (EPA, 1989). 
35 - = no gamma rays are emitted or the gamma rays which are emitted have gamma ray energies of less than 0.07 MeV and are strongly attenuated in air. 
36 No release value for the direct exposure pathway was calculated @PA, 1989). 
37 na = an annual limit intake (ALI) for either ingestion or inhalation (or both) was unavailable for this radionuclide. 
38 (1  ) As reported in Appendix A of "Technical Background Document to Support Final Rulemaking Pursuant to Section 102 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
S9 Comoensation. and Liabilih Act: Radionuclides". EPA Contract 68-03-3452.02!89 
40 (2) A release of RV to atmosphere produces a dose of 0.5 rem via the food ingestion pathway. Assumes deposition on crops 30 meters from the point of release. Dispersion 
41 based on extrapolation of ground level data for stability class D and 1 d s e c  windspeed (X'Q = 0.072 m3/sec). 
42 (3) Food ingestion and inhalation RVs adjusted by multiplying each original value by ratio oF(Rw.4 / RV,). See note 7 below. 
43 (4) A release of RV to groundwater produces a dose of 0.5 rem via the water ingestion pathway. Assumes a well 30 meters from the point of release. Contact time = 9 days. 
44 fndemndent of the airborne release fnction. 
45 (5) A release of RV to atmosphere produces a dose ofO.5 rem via the inhalation pathway. Assumes a receptor 30 meters from the p i n t  of release. Dispersion based on :; extrapolation of ground level data for stability class D and 1 misec windspeed (X'Q = 0.072 m.'/sec) and average breathing rate (2.7E-4 m3!sec). 
48 (6) A point source of RV produces a dose of 0.5 rem at 30 meters in 24 hours. Independent of airborne release fraction. 
49 (7) TQ = 20 x the minimum value of {(Food RV x REPAXHrZ), Water RV, (Inhalation RV x REPAIRHA), or Direct Dose RVJ. The value "20" results From the EPA RVs being 
50 based on an effective dose of 0.5 rem and the 1027 values being based on an effective dose of I O  rem (Le., [0.5 rem x 20 = I O  rem]). 
51 
52 (8) The most restrictive value from EPA (1989) is direct exposure. 20 times this value is 300 Ci. The TQ listed in DOE 1997 is 280 Ci. The more restrictive value of 280 
53 Ci is used. 
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1 9.0 Calculation of Revised TQ Values (continued) 
2 CATEGORY 3 THRESHOLD QUANTITIES REVISED FOR APPROPRIATE RELEASE VALUES 
COMBUS'I 
Ag-108m 
Am-241 
Ba-133 
Ca-41 
Co-60"' 
C-14 
Cd-113 
CS-137 
Eu-152 
ELI-154 
Eu-155 
H-3 
Kr-85 
Nb-94 
Ni-59 
Ni-63 
Pd-107 
Pu-238 
Pu-239 
Pu-240 
Pu-241 
Se-79 
Sm-151 
Sr-90 
Tc-99 
U-235 
U-238 
Zr-93 
Notes: 
3 
ILE MAT 
I .OE-02 
1.0E-03 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
I.OE-02 
5.OE-01 
1 .OE-03 
I.0E-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
5 .OE-0 1 
I.OE+OO 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
I .OE-02 
1.OE-02 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-02 
I .OE-02 
1.OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-O3 
1 .OE-02 
LKALS - D 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1.OE-03 
I.0E-03 
I .OE-03 
I .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-O3 
I.0E-03 
1.OE-03 
1.OE-03 
1 .OE63 
1.OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
I .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
I.OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1.OE-03 
1 .OE-O3 
I.OE-03 
Food'*' 
ingestion 
RV 
(Ci) 
:NTRAINi 
i ,  ENTRA 
iLAGRA1 
I .8E+O 1 
5.9E101 
S.OE+O 1 
5.8E-0 I 
6.OE+0 I 
3.OEI.00 
2.4E+O 1 
1.5Ei-0 1 
1.2E+02 
na 
2.7E+O 1 
5.9E+02 
2.7Ei-02 
8.9E+02 
2.lE+OO 
1.8E+00 
1.8E+00 
9.OE+O 1 
1.8E+01 
3.OE+02 
8.9E+O I 
3.OE+00 
3.OE+00 
3.OE+O I 
3.OE-0 1 
- 
- 
8.2E-0 1 
Adjusted' 
Food 
Lngestion 
RV 
(Gib 
ENT, DRC 
I M  ENT, D 
3N & DR( 
1.8E+02 
5.9Ei02 
8.OE+02 
5.8E+00 
6.OE+0 I 
3.OE+01 
2.4E+02 
I .5E+02 
1.2Ei.03 
na 
2.7E+02 
5.98+03 
2.7E+03 
8.9E+03 
2.1E+00 
1.8Et.00 
I .8E+00 
9.0E+O 1 
I .  8 E a 2  
3.OE+O3 
8.2E+OO 
8.9Ei-02 
3.OE+OO 
3.OE+OO 
3.OE+02 
3.OE-0 1 
- 
- 
PINGfiMl 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
5.9E+03 
na 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v Is. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
1.5E+02 
2.9E+02 
CT 
1 .OE+O I 
3.6Et02 
2.1 E+O 1 
2.1Et03 
I.OE+OO 
1.6E+02 
1 .OEi02 
1.0Ei.Ol 
I.OE+Ol 
2.6E-02 
4.7E+O 1 
8.3E+02 
na 
I.OE+OI 
2. I E4-03 
I.OE+03 
2.1 E4-02 
3.1 E-02 
2.6E-02 
2.6E-02 
1.6Ei-00 
3.1E-02 
5 .2E~0  I 
2.1E+00 
3.6E+O2 
2.1E-01 
2.1E-01 
3. IE+OO 
I .OE+O2 
2.68-02 
3.6Ei03 
1.1 E+04 
2.1 E704 
1 .OE+O 1 
1.6Ei-02 
I.OE+03 
1 .OEt02 
I .OE+02 
4.7Et02 
4.2E+05 
na 
1.OEi-02 
2. I E+04 
I .OE+04 
2. IE+03 
2.6E-02 
1.6E+OO 
3. IE+03 
5.2Ei-02 
2.1E+01 
3.6E+O3 
2.1E-01 
Z.IE-01 
3.1E+01 
3.1E-02 
2.6E-02 
2.2E+O 1 
I .OE+02 
- 
- 
- 
- 
1.5E+01 
6.5E+Ol 
3.5E+OI 
4.2E+O 1 
7.OEi02 
1.OE-03 
2.3E+01 
- 
- 
- 
- 
1.7E4-06 
5.OE+06 
1.4E+08 
- 
- 
- 
I 
2.7E+02 
I 
- 
rQREvisEd: 
(Ci) 
3.4E+02 
5.2E-0 1 
2.OE+O3 
3.0E+03 
1.6Ei-04 
1.2E+02 
2.8Ei-02 
6.OE+02 
7.OE+02 
8.4E+02 
9.4E+O3 
1.2E+05 
2.OEi04 
4.68+02 
1.2E+05 
5.4E+04 
4.2E+04 
6.2E-01 
5.2E-01 
3.2E+O I 
3.6E+03 
I .OE+04 
I .6E+02 
5.8E+O3 
4.2E+OO 
4.2E+OO 
6.2E+02 
5.2E-0 1 
36 v. Ig. = the sorption coefficient is greater than zero and the release value is much greater than that for other pathways (EPA, 1989). 
37 - = no gamma rays are emitted or the gamma rays which are emitted have gamma ray energies of less than 0.07 MeV and are strongly 
3 attenuated in air. No release value for the direct exposure pathway was calculated (EPA, 1989). 
39 na =an annual limit intake (ALI) for either ingestion or inhalation (or both) was unavailable for this radionuclide. 
40 (1) .4s reported in Appendix A of "Technical Background Document to Support Final Rulemaking Pursuant to Section 102 of the Comprehensive 
41 Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act: Radionuclides", EPA Contract 6843-3452.02'89 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
(2) A release of RV to atmosphere produces a dose of 0.5 rem via the food ingestion pathway. Assumes deposition on crops 30 meters from the point of 
release. Dispersion based on extrapolation of ground level data for stability class D and I d sec  windspeed (NQ = 0.072 m'!sec). 
(3) Food ingestion and inhalation RVs adjusted by multiplying each original value by ratio of (REpA / RY,,). See note 7 below. 
(4) .4 release of RV to groundwater produces a dose of 0.5 rem via the water ingestion pathway. Assumes a well 30 meters from the point of release. 
Contact time = 9 days. Independent of the airborne release fraction. 
( 5 )  A release of RV to atmosphere produces a dose of 0.5 rem via the inhalation pathway. Assumes a receptor 30 meters &om the point of release. 
Dispersion based on exnaplation of ground level data for stability class D and I dsec windspeed (WQ = 0.072 m3/sec) and average breahing rate 
(2.7E-J m.'/sec). 
(6) .4 point source of RV produces a dose of 0.5 rem at 30 meters in 24 hours. Independent of airborne releaie fraction. 
(7) TQ = 20 x the minimum value of [(Food RV x REP,,/RIIA), Water RV. (Inhalation RV x REpAIRFIA), or Direct Dose RVI. The value "20" results From 
the EPA RVs being based on an effective dose of 0.5 rem and the 1027 values being based on an effective dose of LO rem (i.e.. [0.5 rem x 20 = 10 rem]). 
(8) The most restrictive value from EPA (1989) IS direct exposure. 20 times this value is 300 Ci. The TQ listed in DOE 1997 is 280 Ci. The more 
restrictive value of 280 Ci is used. 
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C-14 
Ba-133 
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Pu-238 
Pu-239 
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U-238 
zr-93 
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1 9.0 Calculation of Revised TQ Values (continued) 
l.----- 1 Element REPA(') 
i5m-i 
10E-02 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-02 
5.OE-01 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
I .OE-02 
I . OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
5.OE-0 1 
1 .OE+OO 
1 .OE-02 
1.0502 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
I .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-03 
1 . OE-02 
WANTITIES REVISED FOR APPROPRIATE RELEASE VALUES 
RVH, 
'PING/IM 
1 .OE-06 
10E;06 
1 .OE-06 
1 .OE-06 
1 .OE-06 
1 .OE-06 
1 .OE-O6 
1 .OE-06 
1 .OE-06 
I .OE-06 
1 .OE-06 
I .OE-06 
I .OE-06 
1 .OE-06 
1 .OE-06 
1 .OE-06 
1 .OE-06 
I .OE-06 
1 .OE-O6 
I .OE-06 
1 .OE46 
1.0E-06 
1 .OE-06 
I .OE-06 
1 'OE-06 
1 .OE-O6 
1 .OE-O6 
1.OE-06 
L L  1 
1.8E+01 
3.OE-01 
5.9EX)I 
8.OE+O 1 
5.8E-01 
6.0E+0 1 
3.OEW 
2.4E+01 
I.5E-W 1 
1.2E+02 
na 
2.7E+01 
5.9E+02 
2.7Ei-02 
8.9E+02 
2. IE+OO 
1 .SEN0 
1 . 8 E W  
9.0E+01 
1.8E+0I 
3.0E+02 
8.9EtQI 
3.OE+OO 
3.0E+00 
3.0Ei-01 
- 
- 
8.2E-01 
1.8E+O5 
3.OEi-02 
5.9E+05 
8.0E+05 
5.8E+03 
6.0E+04 
3.0E+04 
2.4E-t-05 
1 .SEN5 
1.2EtQ6 
na 
2.7Ei-05 
5.9E+06 
2.7Effl6 
8.9E+06 
2.1Effl3 
1.8EtQ3 
I .8EM3 
9.OEi-04 
I .  8E+05 
3.OE+06 
8.2E+03 
8.9Ei-05 
3.0E+03 
3.OE+03 
3.OEi-05 
- 
- 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
5.9E+03 
na 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
1.5E+02 
2.9EW2 
1 .OE# 1 
3.6Ei-02 
2.IE+01 
2. 1 EM3 
1.OE-W 
1.6E+02 
l.OEi-02 
1 .OEM I 
I.OE+OI 
4.7E+01 
8.3E+02 
na 
1.OE+01 
2.1 EM3 
1 .OEM3 
2.1 EM2 
3.1 E-02 
2.6E-02 
2.6E-02 
1.6EWO 
3. I E+02 
5.2E+01 
2.1E+OO 
3.6E+02 
2.1E-01 
2.1E-01 
3 . 1 E W  
2.6E-02 
I .OEM5 
2.6E-W I 
3.6E+06 
1.1Ei-07 
2.1 EM7 
I .OEM4 
1.6EW.5 
I .OEtQ6 
1 .OE+05 
1 .OE+05 
4.7EiQ-S 
4.2E-W 
na 
1 .OEM5 
2.1 EM7 
I .OE+07 
2. I E% 
3.1EMI 
2.6Et01 
2.6E+01 
1.6E+03 
3.IEi-06 
5.2EM5 
2.1 EM4 
3.6EtQ6 
2.1 EM2 
2.1 E+02 
3.1E-W 
3 -.- - 
I .OEM2 - 
- 
- 
1.5E+01 
6.5E+0l 
3.5E+01 
4.2E+0I 
7.0EW2 
I .OE+03 
2.3Ei-01 
- 
- 
- 
- 
1 .7E+O6 
5.0E+06 
1.4E+08 
- 
2.7E+02 
- 
1 
TQREv~sJ~:~' 
Wi) 
4.4EW2 
5.2E+02 
2.0E+03 
3.OE4-03 
1.6EM7 
1.2EW.S 
2.8E+02 
1.3Ei-03 
7.0E+02 
8.4E+02 
I .4E+04 
1.2EM5 
2.OEi-04 
4.6E+02 
1.2EM8 
5.4Et07 
4.2E4-07 
6.2Ei-02 
5.2EM2 
5.2E+02 
3.2E+04 
3.6Ei-06 
I .OEM7 
I .6E+05 
5.8EW3 
4.2E-l-03 
4.2E+03 
6.2E+05 
34 v. Ig. = the sorption coefficient is greater than zero and the release value is much greater than that for other pathways (EPA, 1989). 
35 - = no gamma rays are emitted or the gamma rays which are emitted have gamma ray energies of less than 0.07 MeV and are strongly attenuated in air. No release value 
36 for the direct exposure pathway was calculated (EPA. 1989). 
37 na = an annual limit intake (ALI) for either ingestion or inhalation (or both) was unavailable for this radionuclide. 
38 (1) As repofled in Appendix A of "Technical Background Document to Support Final Rulemaking Pursuant to Section 102 of the Comprehensive Environmental 
39 Response, Compensation, and Liability Act: Radionuclides", EPA Contract 68-03-3452,02189 
40 (2) A release of RV to atmosphere produces a dose of 0.5 rem via the food ingestion pathway. Assumes deposition on crops 30 meters h m  the point of release. 
41 Dimenion based on extrawlation of around level data for stabilitv class D and 1 misee windweed W O  = 0.072 m3/sect. 
42 (3) Food ingestion and inhalation RVs adjusted by multiplying each original value by ratio of (REP,, / RV,). See note 7 below. 
43 (4) A release of RV to groundwater produces a dose of 0.5 rem via the water ingestion pathway. Assumes a weU 30 meters from the point of release. Contact time = 9 
44 days. Independent of the airborne release fraction. 
45 (5) A release of RV to atmosphere produces a dose of0.5 rem via the inhafation pathway. Assumes a receptor 30 meters from the point of release. Dispersion based on 
46 extrapolation of ground level data for stability class D and 1 dsec windspeed (WQ = 0.072 m3isec) and average breathing rnte (2.7E-J m'/sec). 
47 
48 (6) A point source of RV produces a dose of 0.5 rem at 30 meters in 24 hours. Independent of airborne release fraction. 
49 (7) TQ = 20 x the minimum value of ((Food RV x REPARHA). Water RV, (Inhalation RV x REP,,&,,), or Direct Dose RV). The value "20" results from the EP.4 RVs 
50 being based on an effective dose of0.5 rem and the 1027 values being based on an effective dose of 10 rem (Le., [0.5 rem x 20 = 10 rem]). 
51 
52 (8) The most resmctive value from EPA (1989) is direct exposure. 20 times this value is 300 Ci. The TQ listed in DOE 1997 i s  280 Ci. The more restrictive value of 
53 280 Ci is used. 
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Calculation (Revised TQsl 
1 9.0 Calculation of Revised TQ Values (continued) 
Am-241 
Ba-133 
Ca-41 
Co-60'" 
C-14 
Cd-113 
CS-137 
Eu-152 
Eu-154 
Eu-155 
H-3 
Kr-85 
Ni-59 
Ni-63 
Nb-94 
Pd-107 
Pu-238 
Pu-239 
Pu-240 
Pu-241 
Se-79 
Sm-151 
Sr-90 
Tc-99 
U-235 
2 CATEGORY 3 THRESHOLD 
I
Element 81 REP,\(1) 
TRAINME 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-03 
I .OE-02 
5.OE-01 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
5.OE-0 1 
1 .OE+OO 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
I .OE-02 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-02 
UANTITIES REVISED FOR APPROPRIATE RELEASE VALUES 
3.28-05 
3.2E-05 
3.2E-05 
3.2E-05 
3.2E-05 
3.2s-05 
3.2E-05 
3.28-05 
3.2E-05 
3.2E-05 
3.2E-05 
3.2E-05 
3.2E-05 
3.2E-05 
3.2E-05 
3.2E-05 
3.2E-05 
3.2E-05 
3.2E-05 
3.2E-05 
3.2E-05 
3.2E-05 
3.2E-05 
3.2E-05 
3.2E-05 
3.2E-05 
3.2E-05 
3.2E-05 
l.XE+Ol 
5.9E+01 
8.OE+Ol 
6.OE+O 1 
3.OE+00 
2.4E+O 1 
1.5E+O 1 
1.2E+02 
na 
2.7Et-0 1 
5.9E+02 
2.7E+02 
8.9E+02 
2.1 E+OO 
1.8E+00 
1 .8E+00 
9,OE+O 1 
1.8E+01 
3.OE+02 
3.OE-0 1 
- 
5.8E-0 1 
-- 
8.2E-0 1 
8.9E+0 1 
3.OE+OO 
3.OE+00 
3.OE+O 1 
5.6E+03 
9.4E+00 
1.8E+04 
2.5E+04 
1.8E+02 
1.9E+O3 
9.4E+02 
7.5Et03 
4.7E+03 
3.8E+04 
na 
8.4E+O3 
1.8E+05 
8.4E+04 
2.8E+05 
6.6E+01 
5.6E+O 1 
2.8E+03 
5.6E+03 
9.4E+04 
2.6E+02 
2.8E+04 
9.4E+01 
9.4E+01 
9.4E+03 
_- 
__ 
5.6E+01 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
5.9E+03 
na 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
1.5E+02 
2.9E+02 
1 .OE+O 1 
2.6E-02 
3.6E+02 
2.1 E+O3 
1 .OE+OO 
1.6E+02 
I .OE+02 
1 .OE+O 1 
1 .OE+O 1 
4.7E+01 
8.3E+02 
na 
1 .OE+O 1 
2.IE+03 
1 .OE+03 
2. I E+02 
2.1 E+O I 
3.1E-02 
2.6E-02 
2.6E-02 
1.6E+00 
3.1E+02 
5.2E+Ol 
2.1 E+OO 
3.6E+02 
2.1E-01 
2.1E-01 
3.1 E+OO 
3.1E+03 
l.lE+05 
3.3E+05 
6.6E+05 
3.1 E+02 
5.OE+03 
3.1 E+04 
3.IE+03 
3.1 E+03 
1 .jE+04 
1.3E+07 
na 
3.1E+03 
6.6E+05 
3.1E+05 
6.6E+04 
8.1E-01 
9.7E-01 
8.1E-01 
8.1 E-0 1 
5.OE+01 
9.7E+04 
1.6E+04 
6.6E+02 
1. I E+05 
6.6E+00 
6.6E+00 
9.7E+02 
2.2E+O 1 
1 .OE+02 
-- 
-- 
-- 
1 SE+O I 
6.5E+O 1 
7.OE+02 
3.5E+O 1 
4.2E+O 1 
-- 
1 .OE+03 
2.3 E+O 1 - 
- __ 
-- 
1.7E+06 
5.OE+06 
I .4E+08 -- __ 
- 
- 
2.7E+02 -- 
_- 
T%EXISED(T 
(Ci) 
4.4E+02 
1.6E+O 1 
2.0E+03 
3.OE+03 
5 .OE+05 
3.6E+03 
1.3E+03 
7.OE+02 
8.4E+02 
1.4E+04 
1.2E+05 
2.OE+04 
4.6E+02 
3.7E+06 
1.7E+06 
1.3E+06 
1.9E+O 1 
1.6E+O 1 
1.6E+O 1 
3.3E1-05 
2.8E+02 
1 .OE+O3 
1.1E+O5 
5.1E+03 
5.8Et-03 
1.3E+02 
1.3E+02 
1.9Et-04 
34 v. Ig. = the sorption coefficient is greater than zero and the release value is much greater than that for other pathways (EPA, 1989). 
35 - = no gamma rays are emitted or the gamma rays which are emitted have gamma ray energies of less than 0.07 MeV and are strongly attenuated in air. No release 
36 value for the direct exposure pathway was calculated (EPA, 1989). 
37 na = an annual limit intake (ALI) for either ingestion or inhalation (or both) was unavailable for this radionuclide. 
38 (1) As reported in Appendix A of "Technical Background Document to Support Final Rulemaking Pursuant to Section 102 of the Comprehensive Environmental 
39 Response, Compensation, and Liability Act: Radionuclides", EPA Contract 68-03-3452,02/89 
*o (2) A release of RV to atmosphere produces a dose of 0.5 rem via the food ingestion pathway. Assumes deposition on crops 30 meters from the point of release. 
*I DisDersion based on extmoolation of ground level data for stabilitv class D and 1 d s e c  windswed W O  = 0.072 mj/sec). 
$2 (3) Food ingestion and inhalation RVs adjusted by multiplying each original value by ratio of (REPA / RVHA). See note 7 below. 
$3 (4) A release of RV to groundwater produces a dose o f 0 3  rem via the water ingestion pathway. Assumes a well 30 meters from the point of release. Contact time = 9 
$4 days. Independent of the airborne release fraction. 
$5 (5) A release of RV to atmosphere produces a dose of 0.5 rem via the inhalation pathway. Assumes a receptor 30 meters from the point of release. Dispersion based 
$7 
$8 (6) A point source of RV produces a dose of 0.5 rem at 30 meters in 24 hours. Independent of airborne release fraction. 
8 (7) TQ = 20 x the minimum value of [(Food RV x 
50 being based on an effective dose of 0.5 rem and the 1027 values being based on an effective dose of 10 rem (i.e., [0.5 rem x 20 = 10 rem]). 
51 
52 (8) The most restrictive value from EPA ( 1  989) is direct exposure. 20 times this value is 300 Ci. The TQ listed in DOE 1997 is 280 Ci. The more restrictive value of 
53 280 Ci is used. 
on extrapolation of ground level data for stability class D and 1 d s e c  windspeed (WQ = 0.072 m'lsec) and average breathing rate (2.7E-4 m3/sec). 
Water RV, (Inhalation RV x REp,/RH,), or Direct Dose RV]. The value "20" results from the EPA RVs 
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I 9.0 Calculation of Revised TO Values (continued) 
Inhalation 
Rf15' 
2 CATEGORY 3 TI 
Element 
3 
7 Ba-133 
a c-14 
9 Ca-41 
11 Co-60"" 
10 Cd-113 
12 CS-137 
13 ELI-152 
14 Eu-154 
15 Eu-155 
16 H-3 
17 Kr-8.5 
18 Nb-94 
20 Ni-63 
19 Ni-59 
21 Pd-107 
22 PU-238 
23 Pu-239 
24 PU-240 
25 h-241 
26 Se-79 
27 Sm-151 
28 Sr-90 
29 Tc-99 
30 U-235 
31 U-238 
32 Zr-93 
33 Notes: 
ESHOLD 
REPA('' 
LGfWTI( 
1 .OE-O2 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-02 
5.OE-01 
I .OE-O2 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
5.OE-01 
1 .OE+OO 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1.OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-03 
1.OE-03 
1.OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
I .0E-O2 
L 
3.OE-05 
4.OE-05 
4.OE-05 
4.OE-05 
4.OE-05 
4.OE-OS 
4.OE-05 
3.OE-05 
4.OE-05 
4.OE-05 
4.OE-05 
4.OE-05 
4.OE-OS 
4.OE-05 
4.OE-05 
4.OE-05 
4.OE-05 
4.OE-05 
4.OE-05 
4.OE-05 
4.OE-05 
4.OE-05 
4.OE-05 
4.OE-05 
4.OE-05 
4.OE-05 
4.OE-05 
4.OE-05 
1.8E+O I 
5.9E+O 1 
8.OE+O 1 
3.OE-01 
-_ 
5.8E-0 1 
6.OE+O 1 
3.OE+00 
2.4E+O 1 
1 SE+O 1 
1.2E+02 
na 
2.7E+Ol 
5.9E+02 
2.7E+02 
8.9E+O2 
2.1 E+OO 
1.8E+OO 
1. SE+OO 
9.0E+01 
1.8E+O 1 
3.OE+02 
8.9Et-01 
3. O E M  
3.OE+OO 
3.OEW1 
- 
8.2E-01 
4.5E+03 
7.5E+OO 
1.5E+04 
2.0E+04 
1.5E+02 
1.5E+03 
7.5Et-02 
6.0E+03 
3.SE+03 
-- 
3.OE+O4 - 
na 
6.8E+03 
1.5E+05 
6.8E+04 
2.2E+05 
5.3E+01 
4.5E+01 
4.5E+01 
2.3E+03 
4.5E+03 
7.5Et-04 
2.1 E+02 
2.2E+04 
7.5E+01 
7.5E+OI 
7.5E+03 
v. lg. 
v. ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
5.9Et-03 
na 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
2.9E+02 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
1.5E+02 
1 .OE+O 1 
3.6E+02 
2.6E-02 
2.1E+01 
2.1 Et03 
1 .OE+OO 
1.6E+02 
1 .OE+02 
1 .OE+O 1 
1 .OE+O 1 
4.7E+O 1 
8.3E+02 
na 
l.OE+Ol 
2.1E+O3 
1 .OE+O3 
2.1E+02 
3.1E-02 
2.6E-02 
2.6E-02 
1.6E+OO 
3.1E+02 
5.2E+01 
2. LE+OO 
3.6E+02 
2.1 E-0 1 
2.1E-01 
3.1E+00 
Adjusted" 
Inhalation 
RV 
(Cil 
2.5E+03 
6.5E-01 
9.OE+04 
2.6E+05 
5.3 E+05 
2.58+02 
4.0E+03 
2.56+04 
2.5E+03 
2.5E+03 
1.2E+04 
1 .OE+O7 
na 
2.5E+03 
5.3E+05 
2.5E+05 
5.3E+04 
7.8E-01 
6.5E-01 
6.5E-01 
4.OE+01 
7.8E+04 
1.3E+04 
5.3E+02 
9.0Et-04 
5.3E+OO 
5.3E+OO 
7.XEW2 
Direct@) 
Exposure RI 
(Ci) 
2.2Et-01 
1 .OE+02 
i 
-- -- 
1 
i.SE+Ol 
6.5Et-01 
3.5E+Oi 
4.2E+Ol 
7.OEt-02 
1 .OEt-03 
2.3E+O 1 
1 
1 
1 
- 
- 
1.7E+O6 
5.OE+06 
1.4Et-08 -- 
- 
- 
-- 
2.7Et-02 
- __ 
TQREVESED" 
(Ci) 
4.4E+02 
1.3E+01 
2.OE+03 
3.0E+03 
4.0E+O5 
2.9E+03 
2.8E+02 
1.3E+03 
7.OE+O2 
8.4Et-02 
1.4E+04 
1.2E+05 
2,OE+04 
4.6Et-02 
3.OE+06 
1.4E+06 
l.lE+06 
1.6E+01 
1.3Et-0 1 
1.3E+Ol 
8.OE+02 
9.OE+04 
2.6E+O5 
4.1E+03 
5.8E+03 
i.6E+O4 
1.1 E+02 
l.lE+02 
34 V. Ig. = the sorption coefficient is greater than zero and the release value is much greater than that for other pathways (EPA, 1989). 
35 - = no gamma rays are emitted or the gamma rays which are emitted have gamma ray energies of less than 0.07 MeV and are strongly attenuated in air. No release value 
36 for the direct exposure pathway was calculated (EPA, 1989). 
37 na = an annual limit intake (ALQ for either ingestion or inhalation (or both) was unavailable for this radionuclide. 
38 (1) As reported in Appendix A of "Technical Background Document to Support Final Rulemaking Pursuant to Section 102 of the Comprehensive Environmental 
39 Response, Compensation, and Liabiiity Act: Radionuclides", EPA Contract 68-03-3452, 02/89 
40 (2) A release of RV to atmosphere produces a dose of0.5 rem via the food ingestion pathway. Assumes deposition on crops 30 meters from the point of release. 
41 DisDersion based on extramlation of sound level data for stabititv class D and 1 d s e c  windsoeed CUO = 0.072 m3/secL 
42 (3) Food ingestion and inhalation RVs adjusted by multiplying each original value by ratio of (REP* / R V d .  See note 7 below. 
43 (4) A release of RV to groundwater produces a dose of 0.5 rem via the water ingestion pathway. Assumes a well 30 meters from the point of release. Contact time = 9 
44 days. Independent of the airborne release fraction. 
45 (5) A release of RV to atmosphere produces a dose of 0.5 rem via the inhalation pathway. Assumes a receptor 30 meters from the point of release. Dispersion based on 
46 extrapolation of ground level data for stability class D and 1 dsec windspeed (WQ = 0.072 m'kec) and average breathing rate (2 .784 m3/sec). 
47 
48 (6) A point source of RV produces a dose of 0.5 rem at 30 meters in 24 hours. Independent of airborne release fraction. 
49 (7) TQ = 20 x the minimum value of {(Food RV x REPAW), ater RV, (Inhalation RV x 
50 being based on an effective dose of 0.5 rem and the 1027 values being based on an effective dose of I O  rem (Le., [0.5 rem .y 20 = 10 ran]). 
51 
52 (8) The most restrictive value from EPA ( 1989) is direct exposure. 20 times this value is 300 Ci. The TQ listed in DOE 1997 is 280 Ci. The more restrictive value of 280 
53 Ci is used. 
or Direct Dose RV). The value "30" results ftorn the EPA RVs 
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WCH-50 
Rev. 2 
5 
Washington Closure Hanford, LLC. 
Fire 
Spent Fuel Element 
(Oxide) Inventory TQREVKED 
Originator: T.J. Rodovsky 7 Calc. No.: 0100X-CA-N0020 Rev. No.: 1 
Project: DlDRIH Field Remediation JobNo.: 14655 Date: f L -- ? - .Ud 
Subject: Sheet No.: 28 of 38 
118-0-1, 418-D-2. 118-04.118-H-1, 118-H-2, and 118-1-1-3 Final Hazard Categorization Calculation (Revised TQs) 
Spent Fuel Element 
1 10.0 Sum of the Ratios 
2 
3 10.1 Spent Fuel Elements (Oxide) - Fire, Dumpins. Entrainment. DrODPlnQflmPaCt 
4 
1027 CATEGORY 3 
I 
36 
37 Calculations 
38 
39 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = Ell1 027 CATEGORY 3 REVISED TQ (Ci) 
40 Notes: 
41 'Inventory from Sheet 16 and takes into consideration 100% of inventory (Section 7.7). 
42 *The revised TQ values are calculated on Sheet 21. 
43 ?he revised TQ values are calculated on Sheet 24. 
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WCH-50 
Rev. 2 
SpentFuel 
Element (Oxide) 
inventory 
(25 Elements) 
Washington Closure Hanford, LLC. 
1027 CATEGORY 3 
I 
~QREVISED 
I t  I j 
Originator: T.J. Rodovsky 3 Date: 1 9 f ab Calc. No.: 0100X-CA-N0020 
Project: DlDRlH Field Remediation Job No.: 14655 Checked: J. D. Ludowise 
Subject: 1 18-D-I , 1 18-D-2,118-D-3, I 1  8-H-1, I 18-H-2, and 1 18-H-3 Final Hazard Categorization 
Calculation (Revised TQsl 
fla 
I 10.2 Spent Fuel Elements (Oxide) -- Deflaaration 
3 
4 
6 
7 
8 
10 
5 
Q 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Rev. No.: 
Date: 
Sheet No.: 
Isotope (a ) '  (cit2 RATIO 
Ag-l08m O.OOE+OO 4.4E+02 O.OOE+OO 
Ba-133 O.OOE+OO 2.OE+03 O.OOE+OO 
C-14 O.OOE+OO 3.OE+03 0.00E+00 
Ca-41 0.00E+00 8.0E+03 O.OOE+OO 
CO-60 0.00E+00 2.8E+02 0.00E+00 
Eu-154 0.00E+00 8.4E+02 O.OOE+OO 
Eu-155 O.OOE+OO 4.7E+03 0.00E+00 
H-3 0.00E+00 1.2E+05 0.00E+O0 
Ni-59 O.OOE+OO 5.9E+04 0.00E+00 
Ni-63 O.OOE+OO 2.7E+04 O.OOE+OO 
Am-241 2.96 E-03 2.6E-01 1 .14E-02 
Cd- l l3m 3.87E-06 5.8E+01 6.67E-08 
CS-137 1.26E-01 3.OE+02 4.21 E-04 
Eu-152 5.33E-07 7.OE+02 7.62E-10 
Kr-85 2.74E-03 2.OE+04 1.37E-07 
Nb-94 4.00E-06 4.6E+02 8.69E-09 
Pd-107 1.00E-07 2.1E+04 4.76E-12 
Pu-238 8.54E-05 3.1E-01 2.75E-04 
Pu-239 6.00E-03 2.6E-01 2.31 E-02 
Pu-240 1 1.50E-03 2.6E-01 5.76E-03 
Pu-241 I 1.95E-02 1.6E+01 1 .=E-03 
Se-79 1.00E-06 1.8E+03 5.55E-10 
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Spent Fuel 
Element 
inventory 
(25 Elements) 
Washington losure Hanford, LLC, 
1027 CATEGORY 3 
TQREVISED 
Originator: T.J. Rodovsky Date: ''I 17- 1 o b  Calc. No.: 0100X-GA-N0020 Rev. No.: 1 
Project: DlDWH Field Remediation Job No.: 14655 Checked: J. D. Ludowise t& Date: / /  - 7 - 5 
Subject: 1 18-0-1, I 1  8-D-2, I 1  8-0-3.11 8-H-I, 1 18-H-2, and I 18-H-3 Final Hazard Categorization 
Calculation (Revised TQsl 
' ' Sheet No.: 30 of 38 
33 
34 Calculations 
36 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = En1027 CATEGORY 3 REVISED T 
37 Notes: 
38 'Inventory from Sheet 16 and takes into consideration 10% of 
39 2The revised TQ values are calculated on Sheet 22. 
35 
'Q 
in 
(Ci) 
vent :ory (Section 7.7). 
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WCH-50 
Rev. 2 
- 
Deflagration 
Radionuclide i 
1027 CATEGORY 3 
Washington Closure Wanford, LLC. 
Originator: T.J. Rodovsky Calc. No.: 0100X-CA-N0020 Rev. No.: 1 
Project: DlDWH Field Remediation Job No.: 14655 Checked: J. D. Ludowise && Date: t ' ~ ~  - 7-&A 
Subject: 11 8-D-1, I 18-D-2,118-D-3.118-H-1.118-H-2. and 11 8-H-3 Final Hazard Cateaorization Calculation (Revfsed Sheet No.: 31 of 38 
1 10.4 Soil -- Deflacrration and Fire 
2 
t 
I027 CATEGORY 3 
Radionuclide 
34 
35 Calculations 
37 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = EM027 CATEGORY 3 REVISED TQ (Ci) 
38 Notes: 
39 'Inventory from Sheet 16 and takes into consideration 100% of inventory for fire and 1% of inventory for deflagration (Section 7.7). 
40 2The revised TQ values are calculated on Sheet 19. 
36 
April 2007 
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WCH-50 
Rev. 2 
3 
Washington Closure Hanford, LLC. 
Fire 
1027 CATEGORY 3 
Radionuclide 
Inventory TQwvrsm 
Originator: T.J. Rodovsky B R- Date: 1 3 1 O b  Calc. No.: 0100XGA-N0020 Rev. No.: 1 
Project: DlDWH Field Remediation Job No.: 14655 Checked: J. D. Ludowise Date: Ii - '7 - fl4 
Subject: 
Ll f 
118-D-1, 118-D-2, 1184-3. 118-H-1. 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Final Hazard Cateuorization Calculation (Revged Sheet No.: 32 of 38 
TQs) 
I 10.5 Combustible Materials - Deflanration. DropdnMmoact and Fire 
Deflagration & Dropping Ampact 
1027 CATEGORY 3 
Radionuclide I 
34 
35 Calculations 
36 
37 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = Ell1027 CATEGORY 3 REVISED TQ (Ci) 
38 Notes: 
39 'Inventory from Sheet 16 and takes into consideration 100% of inventory for fire and I % of inventory for deflagration and 
40 droppinglimpact (Section 7.7). 
ii 2The revised TQ values are calculated on Sheet 23. 
?he revised TQ values are calculated on Sheet 24. 
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WCH-50 
Rev. 2 
2 
Washington Closure Hanford, 
Deflagration 
1027 CATEGORY 3 
Radionuclide 
Inventow T Q R N I ~ ~  I 
Originator: T.J. Rodovsky t.- Date: l e  /db Calc. No.: 0100X-CA-N0020 Rev. No.: 1 
Project: D/DR/H Field Remediation Job No.: 14655 Checked: J. D. Ludowise Date: 11 - 7 - 0.0 
Subject: 118-D-1,118-D-2. 118-D-3. 118-H-I, 118-H-2. and 118-H-3 Final Hazard Catmorization Calculation (Revised Sheet No.: 33 of 38 
Radionuclide 
TQs) 
I 10.6 Noncombustible Materials - Deflaqration, Dumpinq and Dror>DinullmPact 
1027 CATEGORY 3 
I 
1 I Inventow I ~ h s m  I 1 
33 
34 Calculations 
35 
36 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = EM027 CATEGORY 3 REVISED TQ (Ci) 
37 Notes: 
38 'Inventory from Sheet 16 and takes into consideration 1 % of inventory (Section 7.7). 
39 *The revised TQ values are calculated on Sheet 25. 
40 ?he revised TQ values are calculated on Sheet 24. 
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WCH-50 
Rev. 2 
Washington Closure Hanford, LLC. 
Originator: T.J. Rodovsky 'D 4- Date: " / ?  / O b  Calc. No.: 0100X-CA-N0020 Rev. No.: 1 
Project: DlDWH Field Remediation Job No.: 14655 Checked: J. D. Ludowise &L Date: ir - 7-8k 
Subject: 118-0-1,118-D-2, 118-D-3.118-H-1. 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Final Hazard Categorization Calculation (Revis& Sheet No.: 34 of 38 
TQs) 
i 10.7 Noncombustible Materials - Fire & Entrainment 
L 
?I Firn 1 . 
Radionuclide 1027 CATEGORY 3 
4 
6 Calculations 
6 
#7 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = Ell1027 CATEGORY 3 REVISED TQ (Ci) 
8 Notes: 
D 'Inventory from Sheet 16 and takes into consideration 10% of inventory (Section 7.7). 
o *The revised TQ values are calculated on Sheet 26. 
i ?he revised TQ values are calculated on Sheet 24. 
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3 
Washington CIosure 
Deflagration 
1027 CATEGORY 3 
Radionuclide 1 1 
I\ I I 
Date: f ?  t a b  Calc. No.: 01 00X-CA-NO020 Rev. No.: 1 
14655 Checked: J. D. Ludowise ,e Date: 1/ -7-P& 
35 of 38 
Originator: T.J. Rodovsky nA- 
Project: DIDFUH Field Remediation Job No.: 
Subject: 118-D-I, 118-D-2.118-D3,148-H-?. 118-H-2. and 118-H-3 Final Hazard Cateuorization Calculation (Revhed Sheet No.: 
T9s) 
1 10.8 Liuuid -- Deflaaration & Entrainment 
I I inventory I TQRM~ED I 1 
4 I lsoto L-l; e ~ (ci)' ~ ~ (Ci)* ~ tun0 1 
5 A -108m 9.59E-02 4.4E+02 2.1 8E-04 
6 Am-241 1.02E-02 1.3E+01 7.83E-04 
7 Ba-133 1.44E-03 2.OE+03 7.20E-07 
8 1.01 E-02 3.OE+03 3.37E-06 
1.00E-04 I 4.OE+05 I 2.50E-10 I 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 Calculations 
37 WTIO (CATEGORY 3) = EM027 CATEGORY 3 REVISED TQ (Ci) 
38 Notes: 
39 'Inventory from Sheet 16 and takes into consideration 100% of inven 
40 *The revised TQ values are calculated on Sheet 27. 
41 ?he revised TQ values are calculated on Sheet 26. 
36 
Section 7.7). 
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WCH-50 
Rev. 2 
Washington Closure Hanford, LLC. 
Originator: T.J. Rodovsky n h  Date: 'I f % *b 
Project: DlDWH Field Remediation Job No.: 14655 
ri i t r: T.J. odovsky t : 'I f  Caic. No.: 0100X-CA-NO020 Rev. No.: 1 
Checked: J. D. Ludowise .&'- Date: / I  - >-Pd 
Subject: 118-D-1. 11 8-0-2. 1 18-D-3, 118-H-1, 1 18-H-2, and I1 8-H-3 Final Hazard Catesorization Calculation (Revised Sheet No.: 36 of 38 
/  
' T Q s )  
I 10.9 Lisuid - Fire, Dumpins & DropDinnllmoact 
2 
31 Fire I L - .. -
Radionuclide 1027 CATEGORY 3 
Inventory 
Dumping & Droppinglimpact 
Radionuclide 1027 CATEGORY 3 
Inventory TQ 
14 
15 Calculations 
17 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = Ell1027 CATEGORY 3 REVISED TQ (Ci) 
)8 Notes: 
19 'Inventory from Sheet 16 and takes into consideration 100% of inventory (Section 7.7). 
)o *The revised TQ values are calculated on Sheet 20. 
11 ?he revised TQ values are calculated on Sheet 22. 
!8 
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WCH-50 
Rev. 2 
3 
Washington Closure Hanford, LLC. 
Dumping & Droppingllmpact 
Radionuclide 1027 CATEGORY 3 
Inventory TQREVISED I 
Rev. No.: 1 Originator: T.J. Rodowky Date: '\3 Calc. No.: 0100X-CA-N0020 
Project: DIDWH Field Remediation Job No.: 14655 Checked: J. D. Ludowise ,&f Date: - '7 &$ 
Subject 4 '  Sheet No.: 37 of 38 
Entrainment 
Radionuclide 1027 CATEGORY 3 
Inventory TQ FmnSEL) 
118-D-1, 1185-2, 118-0-3, 118-H-1. 118-H-2. and 118-H-3 Final Hazard Cateaorization Calculation (Revised TQs) 
1 10.10 Soil - DumDina. Dropoina/lmpact 8 Entrainment 
34 
35 Calculations 
36 
37 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = Ell1027 CATEGORY 3 REVISED TQ (Ci) 
38 Notes: 
39 'Inventory from Sheet 16 and takes into consideration 1% of inventory (Section 7.7). 
40 *The revised TQ values are calculated on Sheet 25. 
41 %he revised TQ values are calculated on Sheet 19. 
42 41nventory from Sheet 16 and takes into consideration 10% of inventory (Section 7.7). 
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WCH-50 
Rev. 2 
Washington Clssu 
I I  f 
Rev. No.: 1 Originator: T.J. Rodovsky Date: f ?  I O b  Calc. NO.: 0100X-CA-N0020 
Project: D I D W  Field Remediation Job No.: 14655 Checked: J. D. Ludowise &g Date: iL-y-&& 
Subject: 
118-D-1. 118-D-2. 118-5-3. 118-H-lt 118-H-2, and 11844-3 Final Hazard 
1 10.11 Combustable Materials - Entrainment 
2 
Radionuclide 1027 CATEGORY 3 
Inventory 
33 
34 Calculations 
35 
36 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = Ell1027 CATEGORY 3 REVISED TQ 
37 Notes: 
38 'Inventory from Sheet 16 and takes into consideration 10% of in 
39 'The revised TO values are calculated on Sheet 23. 
Catesorization Calculation _[Revised 
8 '  
TQs) 
Sheet No.: 38 of 38 
(Ci) 
ventory (Section 7.7). 
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